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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the relationship of the gift and its resistances to meaning. The 
ambiguous and unstable meaning attributed to the gift is examined via critical theory, 
particularly within the methodology of Derridean analysis. Derridean deconstruction 
operates as an analytic process that mirrors certain features of the gift and these 
features are utilised to investigate the visual in terms of the gift as a system of 
giftness, hence an economy of exchange. Giftness is claimed to function as a sliding 
quality of meaning that contributes to the instability of discursive exchange with 
respect to the gift. Selected Foucauldian and Kristevan concepts are employed to 
devise a typology of gifts and discursive practices in terms of the image. The spatio- 
cultural qualities of giftness are discussed; certain gifts creating forms of resistance 
and disruption through disguising representations. Such disruption operates within a 
type,of space that can be seen as socio-culturally defined and played out through 
various textual orders. 
The relationship between subjectivity and the gift is questioned from a 
psychoanalytical viewpoint. It contemplates the interpersonal qualities between 
pleasure, play and the gift as circumstances of exchange in subjectivity, also looking 
at how pleasure and play operate in terms of the subject and the gift. Finally, the 
analytic situation of transference and countertransference is read as a discourse of the 
gift relationship and a form of gift exchange (between analyst and analysand as giver 
and receiver). Introduction: On Giftness 
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The term ‘giftness’ that is used throughout this thesis draws on certain parameters of 
distinction. Any interaction with the gift via processes of exchange, production and 
construction inevitably deal with ‘grasping’ and ‘determining’. John D. Caputo states,
  
To ‘think’- in a sense a little like Kant and a little like Heidegger – the gift is, 
accordingly, to direct oneself at something disproportionate, at the 
disproportion of the impossible, while leaving the possible – the proportionate, 
properly graspable objects – to other determinate operations, like perception, 
science or intuition. That is a distinction that parallels, up to a point, 
Heidegger’s distinction between thinking and philosophy (grasping) and 
Kant’s distinction between thinking and conceiving (determining)  
(Caputo 1997:163)  
What is at the heart of these distinctions are means of interpretation. In using this 
neologism, giftness, I wish to highlight the abstract quality of the gift and its inherent 
instability that exists within gift interpretation in general.  
  
Giftness addresses the transcendence of the gift. If Derrida is correct in his recurring 
claim in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1994c), that there can never be a pure gift, 
then there must always be giftness – something that is both part of, and separate to, 
the gift. Derrida sees the gift and all thoughts of gift as “impossible thing[s]” (Derrida 
1994c:10). Any examination of the gift must be performed within the context of such 
Derridean legacy. Part of this legacy is the idea that as soon as the gift becomes 
possible, it becomes impossible, acknowledging that the conditions of interpretation 
and representation surrounding the gift are of equal significance in determining its 
problematic status, “[t]he impossible gift then is one in which no one acquires credit 
and no one contracts a debt. That in turn requires that neither the donor nor the donee 
would be able to perceive or recognize the gift as a gift, that the gift not appear as a gift” (Caputo 1997:163). This is the paradox that exists in, and through, the gift aporia, 
something besides the irreducibility of gift and debt. This paradox is giftness. On one 
level this appears to be suggesting that giftness is equitable to the ‘essence’ or ‘core’ 
of the gift. However, in keeping with Derridean methodology, there can never be an 
essence prescriptive of giving. Instead if there is an essence to be sketched, then it is 
in the same manner as Derrida, in that the gift never realise its status, its function or 
its moment. If giftness is not the essence of the gift, it is the crux by which 
interpretation and recognition hangs. It is the contentious element of the gift that 
declares simultaneously, ‘here is a gift that does not exist’.  By pursuing this term and 
chasing a workable definition, we are at risk of simplifying the wonderful, 
paradoxical instability of gifting. The aim of the thesis is not to arrive at a finite 
definition of giftness; indeed this is seen as the anti-thesis. Rather the thesis engages 
with a range of issues, specific to gift, that have been looked at previously, but not 
within the scope of giftness. At the primary level, these issues are developed through 
two fundamental rationalities - causality and circulation. Causality is viewed as what 
elements and situations cause giftness or create moments of instability and disruption. 
Circulation is taken to mean the continuation of economy, the cycle of and movement 
of the gift from giver to receiver and the on-going sense of return, obligation and 
cultural acknowledgment of what it means to give a gift, return a debt and contribute 
towards giftness. This thesis views these two terms as co-dependant. 
 
Looking at the various adumbrations of giftness helps to contribute to the analysis of 
causality and circulation, albeit, via indirect ways. It is important to note that the 
following list is not prescriptive, but merely a guide to highlight what can be 
considered of the gift as inherent in giftness:  a)  the condition of instability in the act of exchange (abstraction) 
b)  the condition of representation (paradox and double bind) 
c)  the condition of cultural interpretation (play prior to value & exchange) 
d)  the condition of investment and power 
 
Issues of corporeality bind the gift to the giver and debt to receiver. Within the 
physical exchange of the gift between people, there is a range of gifts being given, as 
well as the primary object. There is denial of relationality and responsibility. The gift 
desires altruism and invests in a masquerade of generosity, attempting to prove and 
certify its existence, and further its circularity. Receivers combine gift giving with a 
sense of generosity and the acknowledgment of debt. Caputo states,  
A gift does not belong to the circle of presents (presents) or among the 
presents exchanged within certain circles of friends. You can never get a gift 
(don) on your birthday or Christmas … But the gift (don) if there is one, 
eventuates in the excess of the moment, the Augenblick and, breaking looks 
from the closed circle of friends, heads out for the tout autre 
(Caputo 1997:162) 
 The term giftness attempts to address these excesses of the gift; the excesses of gift 
discourse, gift space; gift relationship; and gift investment. Derrida claims that “the 
gift is another name of the impossible … we never encounter it, we never know it, we 
never verify it, we never experience it in its present existence or its phenomenon” 
(Derrida 1994c:29) and this is why giftness is used to highlight the escapable aspects 
of the gift. The gift’s possibility and impossibility are issues born from causality and 
circulation, which continually arise and dominate much of Derrida’s theorising of the 
gift. This problematising of the presence of the gift and its participation in exchange is 
a large component of giftness. Giftness seeks to work through and distinguish those 
features of the gift and gift relationships that function due to instability and disruption.  
 In one sense this thesis is part of this rendering of an account of the simulacrum of the 
gift. “Even if the gift were never anything but a simulacrum” writes Jacques Derrida, 
“one must still render an account of the possibility of this simulacrum and of the 
desire that impels toward this simulacrum. And one must also render an account of 
the desire to render an account” (Derrida 1994c:143). If Derrida’s words appear to 
tremble under the weight of figuring the gift, then this thesis also acknowledges the 
seeming impossibility of defining, articulating, and positioning the gift. Such 
trembling is commonplace in the studies of the gift; much work has been spent on 
explaining the difficulties of definition and announcement of the gift than on the gift 
itself. What Derrida articulates as the simulacrum of the gift can be seen resonating in 
many accounts from the textual to the analytic.  
 
Part of the difficulty is that the gift, for all its demands of presence and cultural 
determination, is located beyond any signifying practice, including (paradoxically) the 
discourse of the gift itself. Giftness, thus, is tied not to the object or act or event that 
comes to represent it, but in complex relationships. The gift is a heterogeneous 
signifying practice that compels without ever really satisfying. Hence we see other 
equally complex relational orders and processes (such as debt, exchange, value, 
commodity, ownership, and so on) evoked, hinted at, presented, and alluded to 
whenever the notion of the gift appears. 
 
One reason why Derrida describes the gift as a simulacrum, and calls for a need to 
account for it, is this quality of fluidity. The gift cannot be fixed, rendered stable and 
concrete. Acts of gift giving may well involve countless manifestations of gifts, but 
giftness is the quality that evokes the desire and need to produce such objects. To render an account of such a complex process is beyond the realm of any single study; 
and the scholarship of the gift, with all its interdisciplinary force, acknowledges this. 
 
To exemplify giftness we must resist always referring to cultural conceptions of gift 
situations, for example where no literal gift is given, the mutual form of exchange and 
socio-cultural responsibility is still present and attached. The abstract quality of 
giftness is a consequence of causality or the action of the gift – the event process and 
situation. The thesis addresses the complexity of this instant in terms of the image, 
analysing the processual relationship of the gift with particular emphasis on 
subjectivity. Giftness is part sacrifice, as when the gift is given away it is no longer a 
gift. There is a ‘giving away’ of the event, of the object and indeed the sense of 
generosity. In what can be interpreted in a quasi-Barthesian frame, in the death of the 
giver is the birth of the receiver. The circularity of the gift is apparent within this 
context, and it is one of the claims of the thesis that this circularity and causality can 
be illustrated through visual culture – more specifically within the investment in the 
practice of viewing as it involves an exchange of subjectivities. 
 
Within the literature that has dealt with gift analysis, one finds two prominent 
theoretical approaches. The first includes research that has actively surveyed and 
engaged in the manifestation of the gift usually via production or modes of exchange, 
largely contextualised as anthropological (see for example Mauss 2002, Benveniste 
1969, 1971, Cheal 1988, Douglas 1990, Bourdieu 1977, 1997, Gregory 1982 to name 
a few); the second includes research by those theorists who have made significant 
contributions to issues that are central to a speculative consideration of the gift, for 
example what surrounds the process of giving (such as Derrida 1994c, Gasché 1972, Cixous 1986, 1989, Caputo 1997, 1999, Marion 1998, Horner 2001). This speculative 
nature is the primary approach adopted here. As such the work of Michel Foucault, 
specifically his reading of discourse, his discussion of social spaces (as well as Henri 
Lefebvre’s contribution for example, 1993), and outlining of power are used as 
theoretical models to work through some of the ideas of the gift and visual culture. 
Derrida is crucial in part because his gift analytics occupies a recurring 
methodological concern in a great deal of his writing; and the whole 
deconstructionalist enterprise enables us to engage in issues of fluidity of meaning 
and understanding. These theorists perhaps invite themselves into such a study as this 
and their legitimation can be left to more specific issues within the chapters 
themselves. 
 
Chapter one discusses the gift in terms of presence and interpretation. The specific 
aim of this chapter is to contextualise the use and understanding of giftness as it relate 
to the gift, and how it is to be understood for the remainder of the thesis. The 
hermeneutic processes attached to both the gift, and gifting, are multifarious and 
require examination of moments of instability present in the act of interpretation and 
meaning. This chapter establishes that the most fundamental quandary of the gift is its 
hermeneutic position. If there is a gift, if a gift is ever given, if things are given away, 
the hermeneutics of the gift must be discussed. Giftness operates as the common 
denominator to all that is reducible to the question of the gift. The gift’s giveness, its 
beingness, its objectness – these are elements that can be ascribed to giftness. The gift 
and the systemic processes of gift production, reception, debt and exchange, exist in a 
constant state of conflict to the fundamentals of reading competence. Another main 
concern of this chapter is the acknowledgment of this thesis’s debt to Derrida, both in terms of subject derivation but also the methodological approach, if only for the basic 
reason that a Derridean logic is readily applicable to the questions discussed here, 
primarily instability and discursive exchange, the gift and giftness. 
 
Chapter two engages with Derrida’s specific contribution to the analytic discourse of 
the gift. Although, as stated, much of the methodology of the thesis can be attributed 
as Derridean, and indeed this approach is implicated throughout the thesis, this 
chapter is more overt in identifying his direct contribution. However, this is not 
strictly a summation of Derrida on the gift. Instead the emphasis is on the visual in 
terms of the gift. This chapter looks at how deconstruction operates in terms of the 
image and vice versa. This chapter also develops the idea of the deconstructionist 
qualities of the image. This will be done in terms of four attributes – the viral, the 
limit, the double, and spectres. 
 
Chapter three returns to the fundamental structure and unity of the gift - that it is 
based upon relations between subjects. Michel Foucault’s analysis of power and 
subjectivity is developed in terms of investment and how the gift is influenced 
through such relationships of power. In this sense, it is possible to emphasise the 
complexities that arise through inter-subjective relations, particularly gift exchange, 
and those between subject and image. 
 
In chapter four, the gift’s condition of instability is further examined in terms of 
discourse, with reference to Foucault’s ‘statement’ and Kristeva’s semiotics. If one of 
the driving discourses of the gift is its discursive practice of giftness, looking at how 
the gift is enunciated is highly significant. If we can recognise a gift and giving, and also acknowledge its problematic status, we must also be able to see a discursive 
practice of giftness. The relationship between subject and image is investigated to see 
if we are able to read this investment as a gift relationship within the context of 
giftness, that is when giftness operates as an instable and challenging element to 
discursive exchange in visual mediums such as film, painting, television, art and 
photography. An examination of the gift aporia in this thesis is directed towards a 
subject’s investment in the image. What transpires between subject and image is akin 
to what circulates between giver and receiver, on the basis of investment. On this 
basis, the present configuration of giftness is utilised in terms of the image. This 
chapter addresses the semantic instability that exists within the discourse of the gift. It 
is argued that giftness highlights, and contributes to, such instability within the 
discourse of gift representation and presentation. The positioning of the subject is also 
argued as an unstable relationship within non-verbal communication – that can be 
exemplified through gift exchange and examples from visual culture. 
 
Chapter five looks at Lefebvre’s conception of social space. The gift is discussed with 
regards to the three spatial moments that Lefebvre specifies – spatial practice, 
representational spaces and representation of space. This is to illustrate how the gift 
occupies and resists social space, and how space is disrupted by the gift. The issue of 
disruption is furthered by examining the gift via various typologies of space, such as 
the carnivalesque and utopic. The reason for choosing these exemplars of space is to 
display the gift’s (and indeed, giftness’s) capacity to function within varying forms of 
space. 
 The focus in chapter six shifts the direction of the thesis to a concentration on the 
relationships, associations, and connections of the gift in terms of pleasure and play 
(from a psychoanalytic perspective). These are discussed with specific regards to the 
positioning and formation of subjectivity. It is in this section that the issue of paradox 
and the double bind is analysed with reference to giftness. The gift is such an inter-
subjective paradigm that its fundamental operative process leads to the situations 
where the subject creates or forms certain typologies of subjectivity. The focus here is 
how pleasure and play operate in terms of the subject, and how the subject relates to 
the gift through the dynamics of paradox. 
 
Chapter six takes the Freudian relationship between analyst and analysand as an 
example of the playing out of the gift. This approach allows the aporetics of the gift to 
be viewed within a ‘practical’ framework and continues the reflection on Derrida’s 
paradox of the gift as impossible. It also develops the different perspective and 
examination of exchange present in this thesis. This chapter looks at the difficulties of 
causality and circulation attributed to the gift to the image. More specifically, the 
relationship between giver and receiver is likened to the relationship between subject 
and receiver. However, to read such a parallel within such this binary is contrary to 
the speculative aims and ambitions of this thesis. Instead the aim here is to develop 
the theoretical configuration of the gift – particularly the problematics of giftness – 
and investigate certain features of visual culture. It should be noted that this 
endeavour will not engage in the visual representation of the gift. The reason for this 
is laid down in the first chapter of the thesis. The simulacrum of the gift, and the 
compulsion to render an account of it, constantly leads us to the fluidity of 
hermeneutic values of the gift. This means that the gift is particularly useful in negotiating some of the complexities in viewing investment in the image as a form of 
exchange, how the image operates in context of subjectivity, and how certain 
signifiers come to be seen as meaningful (that is, have social value and operate as 
units of exchange).  
 
The idea of giftness, which will emerge from all of this analysis, can be illustrated in 
the resonance of Derrida speaking on Foucault. He states,  
The point is to analyze not simply behaviours [of the gift], ideas [of the gift], 
or ideologies [of the gift] but, above all, the problematizations in which a 
thought of being [giftness] intersects ‘practices’ and ‘practices of the self’, a 
genealogy of practices of the self through which these problematizations are 
formed.  
(Derrida 2001:87) 
It is this Derridean genealogy and of the practices of the gift from notions of space, 
play and paradox, virus, discourse, subjectivity, and power (to name a few) that will 
allow an investigation of giftness.    11
1. Configuring the gift 
1.1 Interpretation and the gift 
1.2 Glissement and giftness 
1.3 Interpretation and Identification: Polysemy 
 
1.1 Interpretation and the gift 
  
The gift presents us with a particular set of difficulties and issues in terms of its 
relationship to interpretation. We can argue that by considering the interpretation of 
the gift, we can engage in certain aspects of interpretation itself. This thesis seeks not 
to interpret the gift or perhaps even the idea of different types of gifts (although both 
of these will inevitably become part of the discussion). Instead, the aim here is to set 
up interpretation as a model through which certain codes read certain signifiers 
within, outside and in-between the system of exchange, using the gift and ‘giftness’ of 
discursive (and other) practices as they involve the exchange of subjectivities in the 
process of communication as the central motif. By positing the gift as a nucleus 
through which several codes flow, interpretation becomes a system amongst systems 
and shifts from an overriding determinant of the argument to a supplement
1 that 
                                                             
1 The notion of the supplement here refers directly to Jacques Derrida's argument in Of Grammatology 
(1976). Derrida problematises the supplement via a double function. Firstly, the supplement is seen as 
an addition, “[it] adds itself, [as] a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude” (Derrida 
1976:144); and also as something secondary and therefore not as important, “the supplement is an 
adjunct, a subaltern instance … The sign is always a supplement of the thing itself” (Derrida 
1976:145). Derrida claims these differing elements of the supplement can never be separated and that 
the supplement disrupts any sense of origin. If giftness is to be aligned with a Derridean sense of 
supplementarity, then it must be viewed within the context of danger. In Of Grammatology (1976), 
Derrida refers to Rousseau’s conception of the supplement as a dangerous addition as it “adds itself 
from outside as evil and lack to happy and innocent plenitude” (Derrida 1976:215). This particular 
conceptual figuring of the supplement offers something for how we view and read the relationship 
between giftness and the gift. Kaja Silverman in The Subject of Semiotics (1983) states that 
supplementarity is “the compensation through proliferation on the part of the signifier for a signified 
which can never be made fully present. It demonstrates that meaning is never anything but a slippage 
or displacement from one term to another” (Silverman 1983:37-38). Quite clearly the logic of the 
supplement helps to work towards the logic of the function of giftness as the transcendental signified of   12
furthers the awareness of the functions and fragments of the gift. Two key principles 
of the thesis are presented here: that the idea of the gift enables us to examine certain 
aspects of interpretation; and that the gift presents certain moments of instability in 
the act of interpretation and meaning. The thesis explores the inherent instability 
involved in the act of discursive exchange predicated on the exemplar of the gift. That 
is, that the gift – and the systemic processes of gift production, reception, debt and 
exchange
2 – exist in a constant state of conflict to the fundamentals of reading 
competence. 
 
There are many complexities attached to the gift separate to any discussion of its 
existence. The instability of meaning, and within the interpretive act, finds particular 
concentration within the discourses that surround the gift, and for this reason it is the 
gift that has been chosen to function as metaphor in this thesis. I believe that visual 
culture is predicated on similar unstable discourses, especially concerning the 
interpretative act, and for this reason it is used as textual example. As the gift 
occupies such a peculiar (and particular) position in terms of interpretation, it 
potentially provides a type of reflexivity that will allow an examination of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the gift, if for no other reason it locates giftness as a term that neither exists outside (or comfortably 
within) the system it participates in establishing.  In the preface to Of Grammatology, Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak states, “[H]umankind’s common desire is for a stable center, and for the assurance 
of mastery – through knowing or possessing” (Spivak 1976:xi). Spivak is directly discussing the 
relationship between a preface and the body of the text, questioning the idea of a preface, its function 
and the stability of its identity in response to that of the book. As Spivak notes in Derrida’s reworking 
of the preface, this search for meaning, “becomes open at both ends. The text has no stable identity, no 
stable origin, no stable end. Each act of reading the “text” is a preface to the next.”(Spivak 1976:xii). 
This desire for direction, for return, for the knowledge of a journey’s path is a further desire within the 
discourse of the gift. Strongly attached to this “desire for a stable center” is a firm idea of one’s identity 
and contributing subjectivity. Positing giftness as supplement establishes that despite this desire for 
fixed meaning and fixed passage, their will always be instability and uncertainty, especially where 
possession and interpretation (and indeed interpretation of possession) is concerned. Certain 
similarities are present between’s Spivak’s articulation of the book and the gift, with regard to the act 
or circumstance of discursive exchange. It is the slippery nature of not being able to clearly and fixedly 
determine categories of subjectivity within a gift economy that correlates to Derrida’s idea. As Spivak 
puts it “[E]conomy is not a reconciliation of opposites, but rather a maintaining of disjunction. Identity 
constituted by difference is economy” (Spivak 1976:xlii). 
2 Mauss’s potlatch is an apt example of these aspects of the gift and will be referred to later.   13
interpretative act. This is not because the gift provides some sort of insight into 
interpretation, but rather because it continually questions the act of interpretation. 
What is central to the gift is a level of ambiguity that continually challenges our 
capacity to make sense of it.
3 A good example of this sort of critical reflexivity of the 
gift can be seen in Pierre Bourdieu’s works Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) 
and The Logic of Practice (1992). In these he argues three points where his approach 
to the gift departs from the established sense. They can be summarised as the insertion 
of time in the process of gift and counter-gift, with an attendant quality of uncertainty; 
the formation of habitus through the agent; and the relationship of the gift to a 
specific logic of an economy of symbolic goods. Most significantly – and it is a point 
that binds all these others together – is the notion of ambiguity, “[t]he major 
characteristic of the experience of the gift is, without doubt, its ambiguity” (Bourdieu 
1997:231).
4 If this is the case, and the gift is inevitably invested with ambiguity, then 
it would seem that any encounter with the gift (and all the relationships involved in 
such a process) one encounters a struggle with interpretation. Such a struggle operates 
at many levels, and part of the agenda here is to try and map out some of the ways in 
which these heterogeneous processes come to constitute the gift itself. This in turn 
will allow a new sense of interpretation. 
 
Of course a significant part of such processes and instabilities originate from the 
social contexts of the gift and acts of interpretation. The gift constantly demands that 
                                                             
3 Robyn Horner asks in Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida and the Limits of Phenomenology 
(2001), “[o]f what, then, does the gift consist? It would seem that the gift is the object that passes from 
one to another. Or does the true gift consist in the givenness? Does the gift-object serve only as a 
conduit for a certain excess: an excess of generous intention on the part of one who gives, and a 
recognition and   acceptance of that excess on the part of the one who receives?” (Horner 2001:1-2). 
4 Bourdieu goes on to argue: “[o]n the one hand, it is experienced (or intended) as a refusal of self-
interest and egoistic calculation, and an exaltation of generosity – a gratuitous, unrequited gift. On the 
other hand, it never entirely excludes awareness of the logic of exchange or even confession of the 
repressed impulses or, intermittently, the denunciation of another, denied, truth of generous exchange – 
its constraining and costly character (“a gift is misfortune,” the Kabyles say)” (Bourdieu 1997:231).   14
it be linked back to inter and intra subjective contexts, and yet it cannot ever escape 
the habitus of its social life. Quite simply, the gift requires the culturally organised 
principles of exchange, debt, reciprocity, as well as the semiotic codes of 
representation. Perhaps one of the most profound aspects of Marcel Mauss’s The Gift: 
The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies (2002) (hereafter The Gift) 
is the recognition that the phenomenon of the gift has been around for a long time, but 
its processes are quite different in modern cultures. This is summarised nicely in 
Shapiro’s essay on Nietzsche and the gift when he states: 
  Mauss argues that gift-giving, exchange and potlatch are totalistic phenomena 
  of archaic cultures that cannot be understood in terms of the individualistic 
  and economistic categories of modern rationality. The practices connected 
  with the gift, its exchange and circulation are unnameable within a social and 
  economic order assuming the priority of private accumulation and possession; 
  in such a context the gift is an occasional matter, an exception reserved for 
  holidays and special events rather than the very nerve of communal life 
 (Shapiro 1997:275) 
 
This results in an attempt to read the gift as a site of signification that necessarily 
resists such interpretative gestures, and which is located within shifting social 
contexts that alter its whole operational force. The concern here is therefore twofold. 
It is not just a simple reading of the gift, but also a figuring of the gift as it reveals its 
interpretive resistances. 
 
This is no small task, and in order to keep within the scope of this thesis a number of 
limitations will be established, allowing the discussion to focus on certain issues and 
ideas. A key part of the analysis will be on the issue of pluralism, of 
contrapunctualisms and polysemes. In short, the thesis is concerned with the 
difficulties of interpretation as they unfold within the context of the gift, and of how 
the gift itself can be seen as an incitement to the instability of interpretation. 
Interpretation, within this atmosphere, should not be misconstrued as a tool to re-read   15
or re-interpret a set of theories or ideas, rather it must be located and used as a 
conceptual framework that engages with theories and, much like deconstruction, 
opens up their spaces of difference for further understanding. From this perspective a 
certain type of lineage is tracked: from hermêneia, our moment of the hermeneutics of 
the gift - and two of its foundational aspects – analixis (the unfolding) and anaptuxis 
(opening). This is the interrelationship of the gift as it unfolds and opens up 
interpretation and at the same moment, is unfolded and opened up by the act of 
interpretation. 
 
The other, further, limitation placed on this study is that the examples used will be 
drawn largely from the visual. This is done to emphasise the other aspect of the thesis, 
which is theorising the gift through visual culture. The aim here is to locate and 
understand heterogeneous practices that surround the gift through visual 
representation. There is a marked difference between the literal representation of 
giving (for example, a film scene of presents being handed out on a Christmas 
morning) and analysing representation as a gift – which is not a concern for this 
thesis. What is examined is how one might employ the gift to understand its 
transcendental ‘giftness’ via visual cultures. An essential part of this is the 
relationship between the visual signifier and its signified, or the social conception of 
the visual and how (the process) it is imagined. The key aspect to such a relationship 
is the spectator or observer. It is the exchange of spectator positioning that occurs 
within visual culture that is read as a gift relationship, particularly in the sense that 
giftness is not seen and not tangible. Spectatorship, or representation, is not to be 
understood as a gift. It is the investment in the image, which is subject to similar 
discursive, socio-political and socio-cultural instabilities, that reflects a gift economy.   16
This is a type of Hegelian Vorstellung, in which one places a sense of the visual 
representation and at the same time the idea of imagination (which necessarily 
includes the act of imaging). In this sense the anaptuxis is visual cultures as they 
operate within systems of production, exchange, debt, and giving. What is it, for 
example, to give the image (or to be given as an image)? What sorts of debts are 
incurred when we become the spectator of an image? And, perhaps most significant of 
all, what are the instabilities, the disruptions, that occur within the process of 
interpreting visual culture that may be demonstrated through the gift? 
 
Clearly, even in the delineation or questioning of the gift - what is involved in a gift, 
what happens in the giving, what comprises the gift – there is inescapable instability 
within the discourse and discursive practices that make up ‘the gift’. To address this 
instability I use the term giftness, instead of givenness (which Jean-Luc Marion uses), 
in part to adhere to the metaphor of the gift but also in part to illuminate the 
complexity of theorising a notion that through its existence defies such an approach. 
There is instability prior to the giving of a gift as well and this is another reason why I 
use the term giftness. Horner questions the possibility of separating the givenness 
from the gift-object and in doing so, also calls into question the widespread remit of 
the word ‘gift’.  
  It is common to speak of such gifts as friendship, although there may be a 
  degree of imprecision in their definition … Imagining such gifts as 
  forgiveness, friendship, love, or inclusion, it is interesting to note that the same 
  manner of freedom and generosity that would characterize what has been 
  called ‘the excess’ also necessarily characterizes each of these particular gifts. 
  
(Horner 2001:2) 
   17
The instability of the discursive practice of the gift is further exemplified through 
distinguishing between terms of presence, particularly with respect to giver and 
receiver subjectivity. What dominates the conception of the gift is its status as an 
object interpreted as a present, or a signifier that demarcates a holiday, a celebration 
or a festival. This usually happens in the form of presenting a gift-object and such a 
literal manifestation of giving, that it placing an object into the possession of another 
helps to draw attention to the distinction of levels of presence as well as exchange and 
subjectivities relative to the gift. There are other layers of interpretation in spite of the 
presence of the gift-object completely based around the agency of the subject, such as 
the difference between receiving and accepting, or indeed between offering and 
presenting. This distinction is highly significant as it clarifies the adumbration of the 
gift that is the focus for this thesis. The relationship between giftness and the gift rests 
far more on (and is shaped by) assumption, in terms of what is presented, or what 
exists within the event. There is a phenomenological aspect to this differentiation, 
particularly in light of Horner’s claims, and for the concerns of this thesis, it is the 
inability to determine the origin (indeed it is a Derridean approach to question any 
form or pretence of origin) of the gift, which questions the security of the 
interpretation of the gift.  
 
Evidently, the instability of the given (or giftness) is overriding with regards to 
interpretation and helps to situate Jacques Derrida’s concerns with the 
possibility/impossibility of the gift, particularly as the relationship between the gift 
and the given (or giftness) is manifold and unstable in its connection.
5 Horner claims 
that there are two conditions of possibility attached to the gift – freedom and 
                                                             
5 “[A] gift is a given, although a given may bear some or even no relation to a gift” (Horner 2001:4).   18
presence. What is missing from this delineation is the fundamental premise on what 
these two conditions of possibility are based – the instability of discursive exchange. 
Horner has identified that the gift must be conceived and defined within the remit of 
presence and further, a presence that involves acceptance and receiver as well as 
presentation and the given. While she claims that the gift and the given need not be 
relative, it is apparent that in stipulating ‘freedom’ and ‘presence’ as conditions of the 
gift’s possibility, a connection to exchange of subjectivities has been established.  
 
In designating freedom as one of the primary conditions of possibility of the gift, 
there is instability in the practice of gift giving. Something so transcendental and as 
subjective as freedom suggests that the event, the handing over of the gift, lends itself 
completely to misinterpretation of intent and the receivership of what is being given. 
One of the interesting aspects of gift practice is that so much is focused on the 
handing over of the gift-object, debating its implications and even its existence, 
despite its secondary importance to ulterior intentions. When we give a gift there is 
always the possibility for a strong urge and desire to give generously, to give without 
getting something in return. However this is not always the case and even within the 
most altruistic of moments there is the implication of ‘me’ and it is unavoidable given 
that gift giving cannot occur outside some form of economy or without two people.  
 
Within a Derridean approach, the conditions for the possibility of the gift are the 
conditions and problematic for the impossibility of the gift, where freedom and 
presence are connected to the issue of economy and exchange. An example may prove 
useful here, using this first question – what is it to give or be given as an image – as a 
specific case. Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of the given image is the   19
portrait. From the photograph to the commissioned paintings of artists one of the most 
common gifts of the image involves this rendering of the subject in the visual. To 
continue with this Hegelian line, one can note his example of the tableaux vivants, 
which he evokes in order to work towards his theory of the Ideal in the aesthetic: 
  It is one thing for the artist simply to imitate the face of the sitter, its surface 
  and external form, confronting him in repose, and quite another to be able to 
  portray the true features which express the inmost soul of the subject. … So, 
  for example, in our own time what has become the fashion, namely what are 
 called  tableaux vivants, imitate famous masterpieces deliberately and 
  agreeably; and the accessories, costume, etc., they reproduce accurately; but 
  often enough we see ordinary faces substituted for the spiritual expression of 
  the subjects and this produces an inappropriate effect 
(Hegel 1998:431)  
Hegel’s point – on the Ideal – is not central to the discussion at hand; however it is an 
interesting example because it shows a sort of layering of qualities of the image. For 
Hegel the tableaux vivants are agreeable and do not represent or contain quality (as an 
example, he positions Raphael’s Madonnas opposite these imitations). Hegel’s 
distinction is one made in terms of aesthetic qualities, yet what is more notable is the 
presence of the gift-process. 
 
The rendering of the beautiful women as the image in the tableaux vivants functions 
as a declared imitation (of famous paintings). The portrait, then, is given in the spirit 
of copying rather than within an aesthetic domain. The inappropriate effect is part of 
the consequence of this reproduction, and yet it must also be a part of the gift 
production. The imaging of the subject into a famous painting is a type of transitional 
gift.
6 That is to say a gift that operates precisely on the transition of one status to 
another. In this example the inappropriate effect (that is, the loss of the aesthetic Ideal 
in Hegelian terms) is the cost of the gift of making the image. One can extend this to 
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include all forms of representation. In what amounts to a fortunate (for this thesis) 
confluence, one finds in Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind (1993) a reference to a 
different Raphael – that of the angel. Derrida’s Raphael can be employed to stand 
alongside Hegel’s Raphael at this moment, and demonstrates this aspect of the gift 
and representation. As Derrida states, “whether it be in writing or in drawing … the 
thanksgiving grace (grace) of the trait suggests that at the origin of the graphein there 
is debt or gift rather than representational fidelity” (Derrida 1987:30).
7At the heart of 
representational systems there operates gift and debt before any sense of 
vraisemblance or verisimilitude. There are two gift productions at hand. The first is 
the rendering of the subject into an image. So powerful is this that forsaking the 
aesthetic Ideal is not considered a problem. The second is this idea that debt and gift 
precede representational fidelity. 
 
Here one encounters the first issue of figuring the gift’s relationship to code systems, 
and the hermeneutics of such a process. The gift, as a system of exchange, is one 
where disruption and instability are not solely recurring features, but often 
requirements as well as consequences. The exchange process operates within a code 
structure of sliding and shifting signifiers and dynamic contextual placings. Without 
such open-ended attributes, giftness risks the loss of its operational spaces. Of course 
this quality is not unique to the gift – after all, polysemic signs and codes are an 
integral part of any ‘language’ system. The issue at hand here is the promulgation and 
function of such polysemic elements within the gift, and the particular ways in which 
giftness is bound to such qualities. Before we move to a more specific discussion of 
this attribute of the gift, it is prudent to consider two examples of codes that function 
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in terms of the gift’s dynamic processes. These examples are more representative than 
inclusive and are given initially to illustrate how codes function, in order to manage 
the free play and open-endedness of the gift. 
 
Looking to Derrida’s work on the gift offers significant considerations of resistance to 
the configuration of the gift within economic terms. Below are some examples from 
the few main works from which much of the literature on the gift and this economic 
context has derived from are acknowledged. 
 
Potlatch  
 
Primarily it is from Mauss’s The Gift that a great deal of contemporary discussions of 
the gift has stemmed. His initial question, “in primitive or archaic types of society 
what is the principle whereby the gift received has to be repaid? What force is there in 
the thing given which compels the recipient to make a return?” (Mauss 2002:1) lead 
him to suggest that a gift economy is responsible for certain social hierarchies and is 
formed via systems of exchange that operate to maintain such distinctive social 
cohesions. Mauss’s main interests dealt with the deception of the presentation and 
representation of the gift. In The Gift, he states: 
  [w]e intend in this book to isolate one important set of phenomena: namely, 
  pretations which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, but 
  are in fact obligatory and interested. The form usually take is that of the gift 
  generously offered; but the accompanying behaviour is formal pretence and 
  social deception, while the transaction itself is based on economic self-
 interest 
(Mauss 2002:1). 
 
This particular interest and consideration of the gift, and gift practice, has fuelled 
many of the responses both for and against Mauss’s research. Many economic and 
aneconomic discussions regarding the gift have resulted from Mauss’s work, leaving   22
much discussion about the transcendence or phenomenalism of the gift to other 
disciplines (most notably the theolo-phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion 1991, 1998, 
1999; Derrida 1994, 1995). For Mauss, gift-based economies are an integral part of 
maintaining socio-cultural hierarchy and are looked in terms of outlining a future 
economic anthropology. 
 
Mauss’s work is concerned with three main parts: the exchange of gifts and the 
obligation to reciprocate; the extension and implications of this economy; and the 
continued existence of these values in ancient systems of law and within ancient 
economies. These Maussian considerations of the gift as split into three main 
categories: to give, receive and reciprocate, make up the potlatch – what Mauss refers 
to as a total phenomenon as it involves all levels and aspects of the social structure 
(from religious to the family). Non-participation within the potlatch holds great 
consequences, refusal sometimes resulting in loss of face and physical punishment.  
Mauss states that objects that are exchanged during the potlatch possess hau – a spirit 
or power that makes the gifts circulate. This spirit forms part of the causality, where 
such circulation of objects is framed as spiritual both in origin and in nature. The 
power/spirit (hau) of these objects possesses a wealth in itself, as it signifies a type of 
productivity that is attached to religious level and societal rank. One example is the 
copper objects that are given a name, a value and individuality. The giving of such 
hau is part of the continuous economy of the potlatch where objects come to signify 
the self or the generosity of the giver. The hau of the gift is connected to the respect 
and courtesy of the event – what could be read as the giftness. Through giving, the 
giver also gives of him or herself because he or she is indebted to him/herself as 
participant of the community and event of the potlatch. The giver is part causality and   23
circulation. This is one example where instability as giftness is related to an aspect of 
the gift’s phenomenalism and not simply the gift-object. There is also the issue of 
spirit (that is taken up via a different perspective with Hegel’s geist-gift later in this 
chapter) that pertains to giftness. Within the process of giving and within the acts that 
surround the gift, there are elements that depend on intangible components such as 
acknowledgement, sacrifice, guilt, generosity and so on. Embedded in all these things 
is a form (or forms) of spirit to do with representing benevolence, kindness or 
etiquette,
8 and such transcendental aspects that belong to the discourse of the gift 
inevitably leave their imprint or trace in giftness.  Georges Bataille offers an 
alternative perspective of economic consideration for the gift, not completely within 
the interests of this thesis, however a brief discussion is necessary. 
 
Economy  
 
 
If Derrida resists the temptation to reduce all the phenomena of the gift to an 
economic discussion, then Bataille fractures the conceiving of economy, identifying 
two layers: restricted economy and general economy. In The Accursed Share: An 
Essay on General Economy (1988), Bataille states that a restricted economy refers to 
those systems where whatever matter is expended (for instance gifts or meaning), an 
expectation of return on that expenditure determines how that 'transaction' is 
performed and understood. His definition of a general economy, one that Bataille 
favours, is one where no matter what the terms of expenditure (gifts or meaning) no 
return is expected regardless how the transaction was made. Horner states, “Bataille 
argues that economic growth cannot be separated from loss, that unconditional 
                                                             
8 In response to Mauss’s original thesis, Marshall Sahlins believes the hau is the force that Mauss 
questions. In Stone Age Economics (1972), specifically, ‘The Spirit of the Gift’, he carefully works 
through the Maori hau in light of Thomas Hobbes’s philosophical work Leviathan (1950), forming 
parallels between the way Mauss’s theory of the gift as an economic anthropology rests on a paradox.    24
expenditure, which has no end in itself, is inevitable. No system can escape this loss; 
all organisms are structured in a way that there is an excess of energy for which we 
cannot take account” (Horner 2001:6n). To conceive of an interrupted and 
unchallenged economy is faulty. An economy must incorporate the excessive, the 
challenge and the potential for disruption which suggests two things – that there can 
be no origin from which the economy begins, and secondly, that there can be no end 
due to these forms of disruption. It further suggests that a general economy must 
always include a sense of endeavour to meet these excesses if it is to escape a 
restricted economy.  
 
For Bataille, the aim of a restricted economy is to deny its heterogeneous practice. His 
interest in primitive economies (specifically those based on various forms of gift 
exchange, ritual expenditure, potlatch and human sacrifice) possessed a common 
commitment to ‘non-productive expenditure’ of energy and goods. Alan D. Schrift 
states in his introduction to The Logic of the Gift: Towards an Ethic of Generosity 
(1997), “[t]his overturning [of economic principles] will make possible a different 
economic logic, one based on the unproductive expenditure of excess that defines the 
workings of a ‘general economy’” (Schrift 1997:5). Bataille reads the gift in the 
context of alternative systems of value and other economies. Indebted to Mauss, 
Bataille considers the various gift relations and different resulting forms of exchange. 
He explores the potlatch, which he believes to operate on the dynamic of 
unproductive expenditure based on rivalry and competition within hierarchies and the 
ways these constitute systems of value in which calculation is based on the capacity to 
lose rather than the capacity to accumulate. Thus giftness can be seen as part of the   25
general economy as it reflects the intentions of the gift when it fails but also when it 
succeeds.  
 
At one level, Derrida’s Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1994) is a reference point 
where much discussion of the gift and giftness is derived from and worked through in 
response to these conceptions of economy. However, there is another level at which 
Derrida operates in this dissertation. It is the process and style of Derridean reasoning 
that provides much of the contextualisation of the material. Where Derrida is not 
directly the concern or content of a chapter, the approach highlights my debt. It is a 
contention of this thesis to use the term giftness to indicate the instability of discursive 
practice of the gift and within the circulation of giver and receiver subjectivity. In this 
manner, it is tempting to read giftness as a defining tool, as a term that operates within 
such deconstructive ways. To identify giftness as this, to single out one term for 
function and label is not the intention of this dissertation, and does highlight a 
limitation of this thesis. If giftness is viewed as a tool of deconstruction, workable 
within a deconstructive discussion of the gift, within a framework of resistance and 
questioning, then it is to function like Husserl’s ‘critical dismantling’. It is to function 
under erasure (Spivak 1976:xiv).
9 To use an example, if only to elucidate the 
operation of giftness rather than align its importance, Peter Brunette and David Wills 
                                                             
9 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s translation of Derrida’s methodology of ‘sous rature’ is especially 
relevant to the gift as it is a topic that has particular specificities of familiarity. There is the general 
familiarity of what a gift is, how we give it and what the cultural codes of giving are. The other level of 
familiarity occurs within the questioning and theorisation of the gift that appears in many different 
works and across disciplines. Giftness is a term that must be conceived and read within the context and 
ramification of ‘sous rature’ because of its close association with the practices and ‘givens’ of gift 
giving. As Spivak states, “[i]n examining familiar things we come to such unfamiliar conclusions that 
our very language is twisted and bent even as it guides us. Writing “under erasure” is the mark of this 
contortion”(Spivak 1976:xiv). For the remainder of the thesis, it is my intent that the term giftness is 
read as one that continuously resists easy classification, continues the problematic of the gift and 
challenges all the familiarities we hold and understand of the gift – especially the roles of giver and 
receiver. 
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discuss Derrida’s lexicon establishing the “strategic resistance to logocentrism’s will 
to truth and centrality of meaning” (Brunette and Wills 1989:11) commonly read as 
deconstruction’s toolbox. They claim, “it must be said, the moment it is written, that 
this new lexicon is not a new lexicon but a series of words written under erasure, 
attempts to move toward a new conceptualization without at the same time imposing a 
new set of hierarchical truths” (Brunette and Wills 1989:12). Giftness is used to 
identify moments of instability, the drive of these acts of instability, and to denote the 
impetus for shifts in subjectivity (the exchange). Giftness is the transcendental other 
of the gift. It is too obvious to read debt as gift’s other. Instead, and in accordance 
with Derrida’s thinking, it is the double of the gift – giftness – that is its other. One 
caution that must be made and sustained throughout the reading of this thesis is that 
while giftness may illuminate some practices surrounding the exchange of subjectivity 
and the gift, there are enough important limitations to its function that prevent it from 
operating as a ‘key term’. So within this context, the following examples are specified 
and separated/distinguished in order to explain their theoretical and methodological 
significance, applicability and resonance to giftness as claimed here. In some ways 
giftness works in the manner of these terms, in others only in their legacy, in their 
invitation to read things in this way. These terms are also used as critical examples of 
the relationship the gift to giftness. 
 
Giftness as aporia  
 
Simply put, an aporia is a challenge to easy classification, easy definition, or easy 
resolution. Derrida believes the gift reflects aporetic qualities, “[the gift] is always 
defined in the paradoxia or rather the aporia of what is without being, of what is never 
present or what is only scarcely and dimly … Such is the aporetic effect – the ‘what   27
does not pass’ or ‘ what does not happen’” (Derrida 1994c:27-28). Derrida’s 
resistance to the economy of the gift is based on the instability and volatility that 
surrounds its interpretation. When he states, “we could translate this into other terms: 
these conditions of possibility define or produce the annulment, the annihilation, the 
destruction of the gift” (Derrida 1994c:12) he is articulating how the context of 
economy impedes the gift. By interpreting it, acknowledging its existence and 
locating it within a spectrum of circularity, and by identifying its causality, the gift 
has been ‘annulled’ and ‘destroyed’ via interpretation. Part of this interpretation is 
conceiving where the gift has come from, who it is come from, why it has come from. 
It returns us to the instability within interpretation and the questions that surround the 
intentions of the gift – why does the gift always hide something?
10  
 
The part of the aporia that is most significant here is the ‘non-passage’. Where 
Derrida states, “here the [aporia is] impossible passage, the refused, denied, or 
prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can in fact be something else, the 
event of a coming of a future advent, which no longer has the form of the movement 
that consists in passing, traversing, or transmitting” (Derrida 1993:8 sic), he is setting 
up the difficulty of the aporia as resting within the limit of making sense – of being 
able to clearly establish the definable boundaries of a problem. In terms of the gift, 
this is very relevant as part of the process of investing in the gift is caught up with the 
interpretation of the gift as well as the giving and the receiving. It further illuminates 
the instability of giftness that confronts an interpretation of the gift, in the sense that 
part of the gift is the giver’s intention and/or the receiver’s gratitude. The gift 
represents an intention, whether it is genuine or insincere, which becomes a part of the 
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There is no such implication here – rather that it is simply one’s inability to clearly and wholly know 
all the gift is offering results in something (positive or negative) being hidden.     28
gift that is given away. This is an example of the relationship between the gift and 
giftness that identifies such an integral aspect of gift interpretation that rests on the 
instability within its discursive practice. There are cultural codes to operate within, 
such as the knowledge of the obligation to say thank you for a gift that you may not 
be truly thankful for, and further to continue the charade of pretending that it is liked 
and graciously appreciated. Or, alternatively, giving a gift to someone you don’t 
really want to give a gift to, but do simply because it marks an occasion. 
 
Christopher Norris works through the etymology of aporia in Deconstruction: Theory 
and Practice (1982), stating, “[c]learly the concept of aporia occupied a suspect, even 
sinister, place in the system of traditional rhetoric ... In Derrida’s hands it represents 
the nearest one can get to a label or conceptual cover-term for the effects of différance 
and the ‘logic’ of deviant figuration” (Norris 1982:49). The linking of giftness as 
aporia has been briefly highlighted here so that throughout the rest of the thesis 
certain considerations regarding the structural aspects of the gift (such as literal 
examples of the giving of gifts) will be put to one side, so as the more problematic 
relationship between subjectivity and giftness can develop. Indeed, to echo Norris’s 
words, “[t]he explanatory props of ‘structure’ are always available when thought tries 
to ignore the question of how its own regulative concepts are brought into play” 
(Norris 1982:50). Subsequently, it is the quality of aporia that is exists throughout the 
remainder of this thesis rather than any direct engagement.  
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Geist-gift 
 
The first example involves the naturalisation of the status of the gift. That is, the 
ideological function of rendering the cultured (gift) into the seemingly natural (gift). 
The sense of generosity that is attached and indeed intrinsic to any notion of the gift is 
a clear example. Generosity is something that is positioned as natural because it is 
located as part of the human spirit. This can be termed the coded process that results 
in the Geist-gift. Hegel’s sense of ‘Geist’ comes from The Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1977). The original term is retained due to its multiple meanings. Geist comes from 
the German language, comprising all the meanings of spirit, mind, soul and esprit 
present in English. In German there exists no distinction between spirit and mind. 
Geist is used to denote both. Geist has been translated both as spirit or mind (see  
Philosophy of Spirit, Phenomenology of Mind), and so for my purposes here I will 
retain the original German word.  There is also the added benefit of retaining other 
dualities present within Geist. For Hegel, Geist operates at both individual and 
collective levels – much in the same way as the gift. This myriad of duality is 
interesting in an explication of the gift as it reflects so many gift qualities that remain 
non-verbal in the language of the gift but are paramount within socio-cultural gift-
exchange. Geist, as sense of spirit, is invested in humanity and that can be applied to 
the concept of the gift particularly in light of its individual and collective relativity. 
This highlighted element of the composition of the gift helps to illustrate the process 
of naturalisation that produces the sense of generosity as a part of subjectivity. It can 
be traced back to its Enlightenment origins in terms of this version of gift as Geist; but 
clearly its status has been tested and altered since then. However that which has been 
termed Geist-gift should not simply be seen as part of the humanist project, or the   30
Modernist reclamations, or even the postmodernist struggles with fragmented 
subjectivity. Geist-gift marks that part of the coding process that locates the gift in 
terms of its relationship to subjectivity, no matter what the ideological, textual, or 
socio-cultural agenda might be. So despite any changes to interpretations and 
representations, the idea of the gift being linked to subjectivity remains. The Geist-gift 
stands for those gifts (and code structures) that link the gift to subjectivity – from the 
humanist project of generosity of the human spirit to the Freudian idea that ego-
centric and id-driven subjects are only capable of gifts to the self. What joins these 
two seeming opposites is the common feature of the gift’s relationship to the subject. 
It is the Geist-gift that bonds the gift to the giver, which ties the gift production to the 
cultural order. 
 
This has a certain resonance in Mauss’s idea of the moral issues of the gift. For him 
one of the enduring qualities of the gift (that is, what constitutes the gift in itself) is 
how it bonds the subject to the gift through a moral order. Towards the end of The 
Gift Mauss states, “[a] considerable part of our [that is, Mauss’ contemporaries] 
morality and our lives themselves are still permeated with this same atmosphere of the 
gift, where obligation and liberty intermingle… The unreciprocated gift still makes 
the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has been accepted with no 
thought of returning it” (Mauss 2002:83). This illustrates one of the ways in which the 
instability of meaning operates within the gift because what is so often at stake is a 
moral ordering of things. As with the example of imaging the subject in terms of the 
gift, this moral bond ties the giver and receiver of the gift through a deeply embedded 
social order. This order is not necessarily transparent, and certainly not always   31
foregrounded within the gift itself. This moral attachment makes the gift a volatile 
signifying practice.  
 
Another, related, code structure to this idea of the Geist-gift is derived from this idea 
of the naturalised status of gift and giving. The codes through which the gift signifies 
are highly ‘naturalised’, and at one level there can be an acute iconic relationship 
between giver-gift-receiver. The two examples given above – the giving of the subject 
as an image in the portrait and the moral connection of gift giving – in different ways 
offer ways in which this naturalisation process takes place. The moral issue of a gift is 
not engaged with each time one is given or received, just as the aspects of the gift are 
not questioned in every portrait one encounters (be it in an art gallery or a personal 
photo album). Of course it could be argued that the reason why these do not take 
place is because there is a more primary edict happening – the object of the gift itself. 
Yet the Geist-gift, it is argued here, can only exist if aspects such as these are present. 
Their seeming absence (or invisibility) is due to the naturalisation process by the 
codes involved. In one example, the production of the gift is the rendering of the 
subject in the portrait; but it is the coding of ‘portraiture’ that disguises the gift. In the 
other example, it is the seeming act of generosity of gift giving that disguises the 
underlying moral code of obligation and debt. Mauss’s examples in the sections 
entitled “Moral Conclusions” and “Conclusions for Economic Sociology and Political 
Economy” are revealing in this aspect. They show the continuation of certain 
practices into recent (that is Mauss’s) times where to break the ritual of the gift is to 
disturb some social and/or moral law.
11 The origins of such rituals may well be lost, 
                                                             
11 For example Mauss refers to the giving of an egg at a birth, or the attendance of an entire village at a 
wedding breakfast. To break such traditions reveals a breaking of a moral order: “If anyone stayed 
away [from the wedding breakfast] it was a very bad omen, a foreboding, proof of envy, and a sign of 
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and often the actions will be carried out with little or perhaps even no knowledge of 
their significance. This in turn becomes a type of naturalised process where the 
significance of the gift giving operates below the surface of the gift itself. To 
understand this more fully the idea of glissement will be taken up. 
 
1.2 Glissement and giftness 
 
The gift is coded by cultural contextualisation. This produces a non-verbal but highly 
circulated socio-cultural and socio-political conceptualisation of gifts and gift giving 
that I refer to as giftness. Its separation and definition as an individual system arises 
from the inscription of particular meaning(s) to form a 'site'. Using the gift as an 
example, the system of giftness becomes a site for exchange and, through 
consequence or intent, possession and ownership, debt, and so on. The heterogeneity 
of codes within these systems is generated from the cultural sphere of meaning. 
Meaning located within any signification system is constructed from the difference 
between the composing elements. The system of the gift works on highly complex 
and elaborate arbitrary codes of deferral and difference. This system of the gift 
appears at its most unquestionable, most hidden, when it performs under two different 
terms of the exchange process. It works despite its different codings as these various 
codifications are contained within the meta-system of exchange, wherein both parties 
acknowledge the differences and overlapping between their individual code systems, 
the meanings produced by each, and how these meanings relate and contribute to the 
overall implications of the gift. Thus the 'meaning (s)' of the gift is/are arrived at 
through difference.  
   33
For the ‘natural’ aspect of the gift, and arguably any sign system, the first encounter 
with coding is the cultural construct of illusion. The code's primary duty is to set up 
an apparatus for meaning to occur. It sits between the signifier and the signified as a 
conduit for all meaning to flow. The code is not what separates the signifier from the 
signified, but what directs interpretation and identification between both. Meaning is 
not fixed here - the code is only a pipeline for signification to travel through. Multiple 
codes create potential for meanings to arise due to differing interpretations, yet this 
expanse of possible meaning and potentiality needs direction and contextualising to 
be realised. It is at this junction where Lacan’s idea of the point de capiton
12 becomes 
important with regards to the 'fixing' of meaning. This point de capiton is the point in 
any system where the reading of codes produces an interpretation and identification 
(Lacan 1985). 
 
A strict set of codes is not outlined here. Instead a system emerges where a set of 
codes are taken up and used to interpret and contextualise cultural phenomena – for 
the concerns of the thesis, it is argued that giftness participates in this discursive 
process of coded communication. In a sense this is an argument where heterogeneous 
codes appear to elucidate the defining concept of a system, such as giftness because of 
its difficult categorisation. It is because of the differing parts of any signification 
system that meaning can be produced. Without this difference no definition can occur. 
No distinguishing one against another; no vehicle or avenues for interpretation and 
identification. One starts with a signifier, a code and a signified,
13 and a meaning – 
                                                             
12 The French term is retained here as its English equivalent ‘quilting point’ or ‘anchoring point’ does 
not reflect or address the technical precision the original provides.  
 
13 This is not to imply some version of a historical progression, or even a causal relationship between 
signifier, code and signified. Codes can ‘predate’ signifiers, and signifiers can emerge before codes.   34
sign - is produced. This is however not enough to create a system, or meaningful 
space for a site of cultural contextualisation of a specific concept (giftness). Carrying 
on with the premise of an unchanging material signifier, heterogeneity is effected 
through the interpretation of the signifier with respect to its placing in a socio-cultural 
context. Codes begin to multiply as more than one interpretation emerges (and 
interpretative gestures draw on more and more code systems). 
 
It begins with a seemingly homogeneous coding order of signifier, code, and 
signified, in the production of the sign. However this meaning is heterogeneous 
because of the possible interpretations that can be formed with respect to the sign 
itself and the sign in relation to cultural contexts. This then returns to an assumed 
homogeneity (signifier, code, signified) under the construction of a meta-
heterogeneity, as once a signifier is read through a specific code, there can never be 
one signified. Excepting formal sign systems, the code functions as a splitting 
mechanism that shatters the homogeneity of the signifier. This manipulation of spaces 
within sites, and sites within systems, is realised by moving beyond the primary use of 
interpretation - as a model through which concepts are re-read - to a more self-
reflexive approach, where interpretation becomes part of the cultural phenomena 
itself, thereby positioning giftness in a open forum. By this I am referring to giftness 
as a system through which heterogeneous interpretations are made. For example, 
giftness is a concept that, due to its self-reflexivity, belongs to both the debt and the 
gift – the intact discourse of the gift. Giftness does not only comprise part of the gift. 
It is an omnipresent code within its own system that creates the two sites of gift and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Eco, in A Theory of Semiotics (1976), speaks of ‘overcoding’ and ‘undercoding’ as versions where a 
new sign appears that requires a shift in coding processes. This is the order that is being discussed here.   35
debt.
14 The giver interprets giftness through different signifiers than the receiver. 
Whilst it may be the same sign that is being interpreted by the giver and receiver, the 
disposition of the gift is to invert giftness via its surrounding codes. As a result there 
is a necessary part of the gift that is never hidden - it operates flamboyantly and tries 
to subvert its giftness through such ostentation. This self-reflexivity challenges the 
typography of the gift and sees it more as an interlocuting system of larger issues - for 
example, gift giving and guilt, reparation and/or debt.   
 
Lacan discusses an 'anchoring point' in Écrits: "what I have called the 'anchoring 
point' (point de capiton), by which the signifier stops the otherwise endless movement 
(glissement) of the signification" (Lacan 1985:303). It is at this point where meaning 
is 'fixed' in the wanderings of the signified. For the concerns here this is the slippage 
of giftness and the site of exchange. Lacan's argument is relevant here primarily 
because of the nature of this site. These point des capitons are the places of 
interpretation and momentary identification. Literally, point de capiton refers to the 
buttons on a couch, and Lacan uses this term to contextualise sites of meanings within 
language. The couch represents a system and its heterogeneous codes; the upholstery 
representing the ultimate materiality in signifiers. The point de capiton is the point 
where one interpretation and identification is made within a code. Initially it 
represents the primary interpretation and identification, yet concurrently infers a 
secondary point de capiton – that where the codes of interpretation and identification 
intersect. As the buttons on a couch hold the material in place to complete a piece of 
furniture, these point des capitons hold sites together in a system of meaning, by 
coordinating its codes.  
                                                             
14 What is being argued here feeds into the fundamental part of the thesis, in that the sites of gift and 
debt are concurrent. They function like a rotating sphere – two parts of the one whole.   36
 
Giftness captures the 'endless movement' of codes of exchange, debt, reciprocity, 
possession, and so on. It is a system wherein the subject reads a signifier through 
many codes simultaneously rather than one code at a time, or solely one code. In a 
normative signification system, the code through which a signifier is read - interpreted 
- potentially produces the subsequent codified signified. For example a signifier read 
through a code of the gift produces a gift-related signified. If a wrapped up box with a 
ribbon around it is presented to me I will interpret it as an action of giftness and 
identify it at the primary level of its materiality - as a gift. This box now occupies the 
space of the material signifier within the site of exchange. What glissement provides 
is a structure that disrupts this normative signification system. This glissement 
accounts for the dynamics of meaning and the non-equivalence of a signifier to a 
single signified, or even a limited set of signifieds. Whilst this suggests that 
glissement is a model that propagates misrecognition, non-identification and chaos, 
the function of the point de capiton is to arrange the array of potential meanings 
through fixing them within certain codes, and situating these codes within systems. 
Within each and every site of exchange, there are heterogeneous spaces - levels that 
encapsulate codes through which signifiers are read. Glissement creates the potential 
for heterogeneous meaning, however point de capiton fixes spaces for these potential 
meanings to be interpreted and identified. Glissement is the elemental axis for self-
reflexive giftness. Through glissement’s shifting of signification, it allows giftness to 
be posited within the system of exchange instead of outside it or on top of it. The gift 
operates as glissement, primarily because it assists the shift within signification and 
the instability of gift (and discursive) practice. Referring back to the metaphor of the 
couch, giftness does not become part of the material, nor the button on the couch   37
covered in material. It is part of the thread – further, it is in the thread that contains the 
couch. The same material on a chair or bedspread forms another site and indeed 
another signification system. Thus glissement is an anarchic structure which turns the 
essence of a system – in this case giftness – to be within its site. Yet this does not 
happen within a moment of simultaneity. The result of this disordered ordering is the 
self-reflexivity of a site. Arguably, the capacity for glissement is in every code 
structure, signification systems, and sub-divisions thereof, yet what is important to 
recognise is that through the intersection of identification and interpretation does this 
self-reflexivity occur most. Glissement not only creates the spaces within sites for 
self-reflexivity, but its characteristic of ‘endless movement’ enables creation of spaces 
within space. Drawing on Barthes' diagram helps to illustrate this polysemy further.  
 
1.3 Interpretation and Identification: Polysemy 
 
What emerges from Barthes' diagram (see figure 1.1) is the polysemic nature of the 
sign. If this diagram is read as an example or template for all signs then what becomes 
clear are the levels that exist within each site. Here, the points of identification and 
interpretation function on all levels but in different capacities for different meanings. 
The breakdown provided here creates a methodological working through of any 
signification system. Barthes relates this diagram (as metaphor) specifically to culture 
as myth, yet it can be viewed as generic, and thus is applicable to the gift. Barthes's 
main argument is that myth as system is pre-constructed. This is indicative of the 
polysemy within the sign as the pre-construction of the myth system is attributed to a 
"second-order semiological system." (Barthes 1993:114) This layering effect 
highlights the individual function of the signifier, the signified and the sign. On the   38
first layer, the signifier and signified are operating at a denotative level, where the 
concept and image perform the fundamental identifying and interpretation of the sign. 
The ideological value of the sign has not yet been engaged. It is just at the point of 
substitutes that the sign is concerned with here. Continuing with the tri-dimensional 
diagram, this substitutionary action of the sign progresses to a more culturally 
embedded meaning where the initial level acts as signifier for the next. In terms of the 
point de capiton, it is the next button on the couch, yet this next button adds to the 
next, and lets the subject into the 'larger picture' of the couch. It is here that the 
connotative level of the sign is found. 
 
At this point the gift and the cultural order surrounding its site of exchange relates to 
the sign. The gift's meaning and place in the cultural order is part of a much deeper 
and profound interpretation and identification. The identification that occurs here is 
not of the material gift but rather part of the interpretation of the gift functioning as 
giftness within the cultural order. Note that it is important which process happens 
first. To identify a sign (and its relativity) a method of interpretation has to occur first. 
When Derrida argues that for a gift to exist it cannot be recognised, he is arguing at 
the most fundamental level of signification (Derrida 1994c). A gift is identified 
through interpreting its materiality - the paper and ribbon, or perhaps a simple 
presentation of an object. Derrida's argument is engaging with the greater directive of 
interpretation. It is at the second level of Barthes's tri-dimensional diagram that 
Derrida's contention works. Through identification and interpretation the gift enters 
into a semiological order where it is "reduced to a pure signifying function" (Barthes 
1993:114). 
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Giftness reveals one of the fundamental aspects to this relationship, that is: to interpret 
is to identify and to identify is to interpret. Despite appearances, these are not the 
same processes reversed. Each method produces different systems and codes, using 
different signifiers and signifieds to effect different signs. Deciding which is the 'right' 
process with relation to the gift - for example, does one interpret and then identify; 
does one identify and then interpret - is to misread the capacity for "endless 
movement" within the signification system of the gift. The possibilities of different 
avenues of identification and interpretation signify the principal investment of 
glissement within any system of signification, specifically with regard to the gift. 
Such questioning begins to appear inevitable once glissement has been positioned 
within a significatory site. Interpretation and identification begin to separate and 
function not symbiotically but individually with relative codes running between them. 
This suggested apparatus is to locate it as two systems that have the potential to 
operate on their own, and to highlight their capacity to deliver meaningful signs 
within a system regardless of other sites. 
 
By segregating these two particular sites - no significance of order is intended at this 
moment - viewing their individual function then relating them symbiotically and non-
symbiotically - they become an example of a vehicle for glissement and point de 
capiton. The meanings produced by the interplay between interpretation and 
identification use the same site - that of giftness - but they occupy different spaces. 
Glissement is the disruptive force that creates the heterogeneity of spaces and in doing 
so contributes to the formulation of a habitus of the gift. Its constitution of endless 
movement of signification carries the potential for it to split spaces within a site(s). 
Point de capiton anchors these split spaces not to confine them, as limiting is not part   40
of what the point de capiton does, but to keep the propulsion of shifting meanings 
constant by ordering the spaces within a site. 
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2.  The Parasitology of the Gift and the Force of Spectres 
2.1 Parasitology/Virology 
2.2  The Torment of Internal Drifting: Terrorism, Containers and the Gift 
2.3  At The Limit 
2.4       On the Double 
2.5  The Gift, The Spectre and The Mirror 
 
There are two primary aims in this chapter. The first is to explore some of the ways in 
which Derrida can be brought to bear on the issue of giftness. This can never be a 
complete analysis (which would amount to a thesis in itself); rather the strategy is to 
examine some of the ways in which Derrida’s ideas on deconstruction operate as 
analytic processes that are in some ways mirrored in certain features of the gift. To 
this end the chapter will look at some of these analytic processes in terms of the gift, 
both within Derrida’s own terms (that is, his own words on the gift) and as a larger 
issue of deconstruction as a philosophical operation or activity. The second aim of the 
chapter is to utilise ideas from Derrida to elaborate giftness through looking at the 
visual. Once more there must be limitations, and what is developed here is much more 
a sense of how deconstruction can be used to investigate such ideas, rather than a fully 
formed analytic moment. At the heart of these aims is the idea that deconstruction 
reveals just how central giftness is to the image; indeed it will be argued that the 
image can be read within a system of gift giving and taking, and hence an economy of 
exchange. Finally, this chapter looks to how deconstruction operates in terms of the 
image and the impact of the image on deconstruction. To this end this section 
develops the idea that the image possesses deconstructionist qualities. This will be 
done in terms of four attributes – the viral, the limit, the double and spectres.   42
 
One of the most seductive - and dangerous - strategies of bringing someone like 
Derrida to a study of visual cultures is to take up some of the dominating terms and 
work them into a study of the image. So, for example, Derrida's term, différance,
1 
might be used to explore differences and deferrals in the image. However the problem 
with such an approach is that it runs the risk of eliding the real sense of what is going 
on in Derrida's work. Most of the applications of Derrida’s complex terms are unusual 
here, however certain insights can be made if the terms are worked through the texts, 
in this case that of the visual and giftness. With this in mind the proposal here is to 
attempt to capture some of the flavour of Derridean deconstruction by taking up some 
recurring themes and applying them to issues of the image and the gift. The diagram 
below represents how we might progress through this, moving through four 
interconnected themes: parasitology and virology, limits and borders, the double, and 
the trace. The diagram in one sense moves 'downwards', from the broadest sense of 
deconstruction as a parasitology, through to a very specific issue within 
deconstructionist texts - that of the trace. The diagram also moves 'sideways' towards 
connected terms and ideas before we encounter some possible examples. These 
include the metaphor of the virus and rupture as deconstructionist 
techniques/processes and from these the two examples of terrorism and symptom. At 
the next level we find issues about limitations and boundaries, exemplified this time 
through the frame and transgression. The third level deals with the double, with the 
examples of reflexivity and the uncanny, which in turn are connected to the final level 
of the trace with its sense of spectres. 
                                                 
1 The undetermined nature of meaning is, as it were, one of the consequences of this ‘system’ of 
meaning. However, there is a more ambitious aim in différance, namely the replacement of 
Heidegger’s system of positivities (beings) [if governed by its abstraction Being] by an ‘assemblage’ of 
relations under the ‘still metaphysical’ generality différance.   43
 
2.1    Parasitology/Virology 
 
Derrida once responded to an interviewer's question (regarding his work and 
communication) with the following:  
I often tell myself, and I must have written it down somewhere - I am sure I 
wrote it somewhere - that all I have done, to summarize it very reductively, is 
dominated by the thought of a virus, what could be called a parasitology, a 
virology, the virus being many things. ... The virus is in part a parasite that 
destroys, that introduces disorder into communication. Even from a biological 
standpoint this is what happens with a virus; it derails a mechanism of the 
communicational type, its coding and decoding. On the other hand, it is 
something that is neither living nor nonliving; the virus is not a microbe. And 
if you follow these two threads, that of a parasite which disrupts destination 
from the communicative point of view - disrupting writing, inscription, and 
the coding and decoding of inscription - and which on the other hand is neither 
alive nor dead, you have the matrix of all that I have done since I began 
writing. 
 (Derrida 1993: 3) 
 
In this beautifully succinct passage Derrida indicates the two aspects that typify all of 
his work - the disruptive and the liminal status, expressed in these terms as that of 
neither living nor dead. 
 
It is easy to see why Derrida's works can be taken to be inherently destructive or 
negative when he admits that of primary interest is this issue of the disruptive. 
However it is important to recognise that deconstruction (indeed any aspects of 
Derrida's themes and techniques) is not about the destruction of ideas and systems, 
but a genuine attempt to come to terms with them. It is significant to remember, for 
example, that the term deconstruction has its origins in Heidegger's Destruktion, 
Husserl’s ‘critical dismantling’, and Hegel's Aufhebung. These terms carry within 
them not a negative sense of destruction, but of rebuilding, of growth and change, of   44
shifting orders. Hegel’s Aufhebung, for example, has three ‘meanings’ to it: to cancel, 
to preserve, and to lift onto a higher plane. It is never simply a matter of destroying 
the ideas, but exploring their trajectory, their methods, and processes, and how they 
function. The original meaning, and intent, for all these terms is not to destroy but to 
alter. Take, for example, this passage from Of Grammatology:  
The movements of deconstruction do not destroy structures from the outside. 
They are not possible and effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by 
inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, because one 
always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating 
necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic 
resources of subversion from the old structure... 
(Derrida 1976:24) 
  
For Derrida, it would seem, the most effective way of understanding and altering a 
system of thought is to be within it, rather than external to it. This strategy is very 
well known in many guises. 
 
So why does Derrida choose the negative analogy of the virus for his work? Recall 
that the first quality Derrida specifies for his virology/parasitology is that it 
"introduces disorder into communication", and that it disrupts destination.
2 This sort 
of enterprise is most markedly demonstrated in works such as The Post Card: From 
Socrates to Freud and Beyond (hereafter The Post Card), where we witness, through 
an extended analysis of the love letter and psychoanalysis (especially Lacan’s and 
Freud’s), the idea of the disruption of communication and meaning. One of the key 
aspects that Derrida develops in The Post Card is the lettre en souffrance (the lost 
letter, or one held in abeyance). Derrida's theme is one of the letter that does not, and 
cannot, arrive at its destination. This is not a failure of a particular type of letter, but 
                                                 
2 Derrida also uses the theme of the parasite within a different context – that of painting – in Memoirs 
of the Blind. For example, “… you can hear them resonating all on their own, deep down in the 
drawing, sometimes right on its skin; because the murmuring of these syllables has already come to 
well up in it, bits of words parasiting it and producing interference” (Derrida 1993:39).    45
the idea that no letter - no sign - ever arrives at its intended destination because of the 
disruptions to the communication process; or, perhaps more accurately, every sign has 
the potential to become a sort of lettre en souffrance through this technique of 
deconstruction.
3 Part of Derrida's technique is to expose and work through this sense 
of non-arrival for all systems of meaning and interpretation. The structure of the letter 
is premised on what Derrida’s terms a mishap. The lettre en souffrance cannot arrive 
as its composition allows for fragmented delivery, meaning that the letter’s 
destination is never arrived at, rather it is in a state of constantly arriving.  
  
So even when we seem to have a hold of the letter - that is, in effect, to have 
understood and gained meaning from something - for Derrida it will always contain 
within it non-arrival, a multiplicity of arrivals in other places. Elsewhere Derrida 
states, "a letter does not always arrive at its destination, and from the moment that this 
possibility belongs to its structure one can say that it never truly arrives, that when it 
does arrive its capacity not to arrive torments it with an internal drifting" (Derrida 
1987a:489). This idea of the torment of internal drifting will now be taken up in terms 
of the visual, and through this can be developed the idea of the viral gift. 
 
2.2 The Torment of Internal Drifting: Terrorism, Containers and the Gift 
 
After September 11 2001, when the Bush administration declared 'war on terror', 
images belonging to two very different orders were constructed but both were directed 
at a very specific target with deliberate intentions. The first of these were the images 
                                                 
3 The three key texts on this are namely Lacan's "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'"; Derrida's The 
Post Card, and his paper 'For the Love of Lacan'. In passing the letter en souffrance are those letters 
that have failed to be delivered; and the additional meaning of souffrance - suffering - works 
particularly well for Lacan in his reading of the Poe short story and the anxiety of the Queen.   46
of the terrorists themselves, the second of various Western leaders and public figures 
with Islamic people and cultural artefacts. These were the intended destinations of 
these images/letters, for a war on terror, not the West against Islam. The internal 
drifting of the two sets of images is contained precisely within their juxtapositioning 
in the world's media, and the torment was precisely the danger of not linking the two 
in the intended manner. Behind all of this was one of the most profound elements of 
political life, that of the sense of the benevolence of government and its protection of 
the people. The letter of this ‘gift’ was the ever-watchful government securing the 
population. It was important for this letter's arrival (the winning over of the public 
mind and sympathies; the sense of benevolence) that the images of the terrorists be 
seen as evil, but not as external. The force of the 'war on terror' lay in the internalising 
of the fear that acts of terrorism could continue to take place. Significantly this fear 
was generated in many Western countries as if it were something new, whereas the 
truth is that many of these countries (such as Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Germany) 
have had a long history of terrorist activities within them. However, running parallel 
to this was the idea that internalised Islamic culture (in the US, in Britain and so on) is 
good. This was further mirrored by the highly simplifying notion of good Afghanistan 
people against the bad Taliban regime. Any slippage from reading the images in this 
way - that is, the internal drifting - would lead to an ambiguity of meaning. This 
affects a reading of terrorist as en souffrance - held up and yet to arrive, as well as the 
cause of suffering. This is the sense in which all terrorist acts operate, in this constant 
state of arriving.
4 In this sense the viral gift, contained in the attempts to control the 
image and its readings, is a version of a certain type of giftness. This is the gift as 
                                                 
4 One can parallel Bateson’s threat with this state of non-arrival as discussed in section six.   47
aporia. Contained within the discourse of the gift in terrorism and its opposition (in 
this case governments of certain countries) is the overflow of meaning. 
 
This thesis is not directly concerned with the actual politics of the images, and if 
possible, the difficulties of the histories and ethics of such a situation are put to one 
side in order to stay focussed on the idea of reading images of terrorism in terms of 
non-arrival. For both terrorists and those who fight them are caught up in the same 
struggle of the image. As Umberto Eco once pointed out, the difference between the 
criminal (such as the bank robber) and the terrorist is that the latter needs to be 
recognised and seeks the exposure of the media, whereas the bank robber will always 
try and keep his/her identity a secret. This is why terrorist groups and those who 
oppose them (almost inevitably governments) compete for control of the image, 
fearing and acknowledging the internal drifting of arrival and non-arrival. Terrorism 
is a particularly good example of the vying for interpretive power in the image, as 
well as revealing just how much the image conveys beyond the words that surround it. 
After September 11 2001 (even the date has now become a self-standing sign) the 
image of the fundamentalist terrorist was so emphatically entrenched in the world 
media that it could evoke very specific responses. Yet competing with this are the two 
forces of the internal drifting - the need to construct an image of non-terrorising Islam 
for the West, and the need to assert the absolute sense of danger in the terrorist. 
 
A remarkably similar process is apparent in the terrorist's construction of the image, 
including how much slippage is involved in the manifestation and interpretation of 
those images. The targets on September 11 2001 were chosen as much as images by 
the terrorists than for any other single reason, more perhaps than as politically or   48
strategically damaging. The Twin Towers were already established images, existing in 
so many of the visual representations of New York (and synecdochically, the USA), 
and the terrorists would have known that their acts would be captured in a variety of 
media. This construction of the image is how the terrorist attempts to control the 
internal drifting of the message, and the world's media, by replaying and reproducing 
those images, attempts to reconfigure them in a directly oppositional way. The 
difficulty of course - and this is an 'of course' added by deconstruction - is that this 
internal drifting is not only a fundamental part of any act of communication, it is also 
essential. Deconstruction does not create such internal drifting, such moments of 
indecision and complication in the sign, but it does work to expose them and to 
acknowledge their existence. 
 
Before this line of deconstruction and the visual is continued with, two other 
examples of the viral gift will be discussed. If this first one - the vying for the political 
consciousness of the population by different groups (governments and terrorists) 
through control of the image – illustrates the necessity of a viral gift for the political 
environment of a culture, and then the following examples will both support and 
differ from this line. The concern here is to develop a gift that is so completely 
internalised that it cannot be separated from the health of the organism (such as the 
ideological function of morals and ethics to the actual biological manifestations in 
something like symbiosis), and yet this can be seen as a viral existence. By this is 
meant the idea that certain aspects of the gift, like the function of deconstruction 
within philosophy, come to question, and be questioned, the aspects of positivity and 
negativity; and at the same time they are an integrated and essential part of what has 
come to be brought into question. With this first example of terrorism there are many   49
cases where the idea of terrorism is used for political gain by a government; it has 
become a viral gift. This is also the case for any terrorist act. The rhetoric of both 
government and terrorism is to position their acts and deeds as gifts of freedom and 
knowledge. This might become clearer through further examples. 
 
Perhaps one of the most obvious, and earliest, example of the viral gift is the Trojan 
horse, which has become symbolic of cunning rather than treachery and remains a 
cautionary note on accepting gifts. Rather than focus on this more obvious example of 
the viral gift we can look to Epeius, a less well remembered player in the story. Both 
Homer, in the Iliad, and Euripides, in The Women of Troy, attribute the design of the 
horse to Athene, but it is through Epeius that the plan is made, “[E]peius, a Phocian 
from Parnassus, made to Athene’s plan that horse pregnant with armed men, Called 
by all future ages the Wooden Horse, and sent it to glide, weighty with hidden death, 
through the Trojan walls” (Euripides 1954:83). Yet the character of Epeius is far from 
favourable, “and though a skilled boxer and a consummate craftsman, was born a 
coward, in divine punishment for his father’s breach of faith… Epeius’ cowardice has 
since become proverbial” (Graves 1975:331). His cowardice was so great that he had 
to be forced to go into the belly of the horse. His presence was necessary as “he alone 
knew how to work the trap-door” (Graves 1975:331). In many ways Epeius represents 
the viral gift more than the horse itself. His presence is absolutely necessary for the 
trick to work, for the horse to be built and for the armed men to operate yet he is the 
greatest coward amongst them. This is the recurring theme of the viral gift – that it 
holds its contradictions and opposites within itself. As the discourse for anti-terrorism 
contains within itself the need (real or imagined) of terrorism, the wooden horse was 
crafted and operated by its antithetical other, that of the cowardly and weak.    50
 
These two examples are made clearer by a third, once more premised on a seeming 
contradictory status and linguistic turn. Derrida, in working through Lévi-Strauss’s 
introduction to Mauss’s The Gift, points out that there is embedded within the praise a 
level of critique.
5 This critique, too far from the central point here to go into detail, is 
based on the relationship between (or historical development of) social 
anthropological studies and language. Derrida goes so far to say that it is due to 
Mauss’s theories on the social significance of language that language became such a 
central aspect of study in structuralism in France in the 1960’s. Derrida excludes 
himself, it would seem, from such a history but does include Lacan’s famous 
statement, ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’. This must certainly be due 
to what Derrida describes as the hegemonic institution of structuralism in France (see, 
for example, Derrida 1994c:78).
6 Derrida goes on from this point to work through a 
point from Benveniste’s article “Gift and Exchange in Indo-European Vocabulary” 
(‘Don et exchange dans le vocabulaire indo-européen’) in Problems in General 
Linguistics (1971). Derrida, via Benveniste, illustrates what seems to be an essential 
feature of the gift: 
 
…Benveniste begins with that verb from the root dô – which means ‘to give’ 
in ‘most Indo-European languages’. But at the heart of this certainty 
concerning an assured constant an uneasiness arises when it is established that 
the Hittite verb dâ signifies not to give but to take. Since it is difficult to 
believe that the Hittite dâ is a different verb, one is prompted to wonder 
whether the ‘original meaning’ of dô was not ‘to take’; this original meaning 
would have been maintained in Hittite or even in certain composites such as 
the Indo-Iranian a-da, which means to receive. But that still leaves the 
question of how ‘to give’ could have come from ‘to take’…Benveniste then 
                                                 
5 This critique is very much a questioning of Mauss’s study and, for Derrida, “may still poison the 
vibrant generosity of the tribute” (Derrida 1994c:73). 
6 It is noteworthy that Derrida also sees the influence on Foucault, Barthes and Althusser. See Given 
Time: I. Counterfeit Money (1994c) especially pages 75-78.   51
proposes to resort to syntax rather than semantics. Dô would ‘properly’ mean, 
he says, neither to give nor take ‘but either one depending on the construction’ 
 
 (Derrida 1994c:78-9)
7 
 
This lengthy quote illustrates a whole range of issues for the study of the gift and, 
notably, for this sense of the viral. Derrida is deconstructing Benveniste’s idea by 
allowing precisely this quality of giftness to stand and yet be questioned. (Although to 
be fair to Benveniste he does in fact argue this point in his work. In a footnote to the 
same essay Benveniste admonishes certain practices of exclusion by etymologists as 
they “…often refuse to admit these opposed meanings or try to retain only one, thus 
rejecting obvious parallels and spoiling the interpretation” (Benventiste 1971:42)). 
This is a prime example of sous rature as there are two positive signifieds ‘buried’ in 
the same signifier.
8 The viral gift, it is argued here, operates sous rature by allowing 
the status of gift to be asserted and questioned simultaneously. Once more the 
correction to the gift as aporia is evident here. 
 
Before this line is developed further it is important to draw out some of the other key 
aspects of Derrida’s analysis. He quite rightly feels uncomfortable with Benveniste’s 
line regarding syntax and semantics (as does Benveniste himself). Derrida then 
proceeds to argue something perhaps more exacting. His argument out of this paradox 
of giving and taking as coming from the same root is to show that all language is 
premised on this same sense of doubling and oppositions, and the reason for this is 
nothing less than the gift itself, “…first of all that language is as well a phenomenon 
                                                 
7 An alternative explanation can be found in Freud’s observation of the splitting of terms into their 
opposites in early languages. Remnants in Latin ‘succus’ (juice) and ‘siccus’ (dry); in German ‘stimme’ 
(voice) and ‘stumme’ (voiceless), are some examples. 
8 Derrida deals extensively with the concept of sous rature in Of Grammatology.   52
of gift-countergift, of giving-taking – and of exchange” (Derrida 1994c:81).
9 So it is 
not so much that there is a certain conflict within ‘language’ that makes/allows the 
gift to contain its opposite, rather it is because of the phenomenon of the gift that 
makes language contain its opposites. 
 
This returns the thesis back to Mauss, for it relocates the social structure of ‘language’ 
as a gift based process. For Derrida, it would seem language is impossible except as a 
gift system of exchange. This helps to explain the visual examples that have been 
used so far (if we regard the visual as a ‘language’ system in itself). This raises one of 
the recurring ideas for the thesis, that of the slippage of signifiers and signifieds 
(meanings) within the gift process. This has been indicated in the section on 
glissement and Lacan’s concept of the point de capiton, but it is worth revisiting 
within this context. Derrida locates one strategy (from Lévi-Strauss) for negotiating 
the seeming contradiction of giving and taking within the same signifier as part of a 
slippage process:  
Dans la logique de cette discussion, Lévi-Strauss thématise ce concept de 
‘signifiant flottant’, de ‘contenu symbolique supplémentaire’, cet appel des 
linguites au ‘phonème zero’ qui viendrait résoudre toutes les contradictions 
produites par le recours aux notions primitives de hau, de wakan, d’orenda ou  
de mana, comme forces mystérieuses inhérentes à les choses 
 (Derrida 1991:102)  
(Signifiant flottant, it is noteworthy, carries with it not only the sense of floating but 
also of a debt). However Derrida does not see this quality of floating or the 
supplementary content, or even the linguistic turn of the zero phoneme as fully 
explaining this phenomenon. Does this cast his idea of the gift and language (in terms 
                                                 
9 Elsewhere he states, “[p]erhaps first of all, however, one must ask oneself, in a manner that is in some 
way absolutely preliminary: What is the relation between a language and giving-taking in general? The 
definition of language, of a language, as well as of the text in general, cannot be formed without a 
certain relation to the gift, to giving-taking and so forth, having been involved there in advance” 
(Derrida 1994c:79-80).   53
of exchange) as a contradiction to the Lacanian glissement of the sign? The answer to 
this is both yes and no. There is a contradictory notion here – indeed there must be – 
because even though Lacan’s model is an attempt to map out the processes of the 
signifier in terms of the unconscious (hence glissement can be tracked back to Freud’s 
model of the dream-work utilising condensation and displacement to escape 
repression) it is still concerned with the language of the unconscious. This can be 
taken to mean both the unconscious operating like a language, or the capacity for the 
psychoanalyst to read the unconscious language system. Either way what holds is the 
sliding process between exploring and fixing involved in understanding meaning. 
Similarly the zero phoneme, or the signifiant flottant, does help to explain how a sign 
can contain its opposite without collapsing into meaninglessness. 
 
However Derrida’s point is essential to this study of the gift and the visual because it 
offers an extra dimension. Part of the problem for Derrida with something like the 
signifiant flottant is that it is a strategy (for someone like Lévi-Strauss) to explain the 
‘mysterious forces’ of particular (cultural) utterances (such as hau and mana). Derrida 
is more intent in offering up the gift as an explanation for all language systems and 
processes, or at the very least in observing how the gift is a necessary function in such 
a deconstruction of language as social phenomena. It is argued here, however, that 
this is not in contradistinction to Lacan’s version of the sliding signifier. Part of the 
gift of such glissement, for example, is the sense of pleasure and play.
10 So, for 
example, terrorism and government agencies vie for the control of the signifier in the 
image, but the real power base (of exchange and debt, of the sense of generosity, and 
ultimately in the determination of meaning) lies in the mechanisms of slippage, of 
                                                 
10 This is taken up in section four of the thesis.    54
supplement, and aporia. Rather than control the image it is more essential to control 
the ways in which it slips around. One way to affect this involves commencing with 
the initial understanding that the language is based on the gift process. Contained 
within such an understanding is the essential aspect of debt. In this sense, 
communication, and specifically language, become systems of debt as much as 
exchange. 
 
2.3  At The Limit 
 
This series of points raises the difficult issue of deconstruction's capacity to analyse 
(the image or any other form of the sign), for it questions how one is supposed to 
perform such a deconstruction. To understand precisely what is involved in this 
difficulty it is important to distinguish between two models of analysis. The first is 
perhaps the most obvious version - that is, a system of tools is brought to bear on the 
problem or issue and through them we make sense and produce interpretation. But 
strictly speaking it is not possible to perform such a process with deconstruction. For 
deconstruction is not about taking up a text (be it an image or a document, an 
utterance or a cultural process) and applying various processes of analysis; rather, it is 
the transformation of that text through deconstruction. In this sense the whole series 
of images that emerge from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack are 
deconstructions of the original images of two buildings in the New York skyline. The 
images of the Twin Towers are transformed into a rupture of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, the West and Islam, and so on. In this we witness how deconstruction (as an 
act of analysis as well as the production of a text or series of texts) is the product of a 
new image out of the old, a rending of the seemingly seamless so that it becomes an   55
altogether different version of itself. To this end deconstruction becomes a meta-
discourse, for it starts precisely with the idea that there must be exchange within its 
own language system. Deconstruction, and by this is meant Derrida’s entire work, is 
the gift of analysis because it allows itself this status of the open exchange, of giving 
and taking.
11 This enfolding of the analysis with the subject of analysis is the viral 
metaphor that Derrida evokes to summarise his work. 
 
The second attribute of deconstruction's methods and systems to be considered here is 
how they are always positioned at the limit. Derrida once described his method of 
analysis in the following manner, "[I] try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical 
discourse. I say limit and not death, for I do not at all believe in what today is so 
easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple death of whatever - 
the book, man, or god, especially since, as we all know, what is dead wields a very 
specific power)" (Derrida 1987b:6). So the limit is vitally important for Derrida. It 
does more than simply designate the extremity or the end point - it is the very marker 
that allows deconstruction to exist. Part of the project for deconstruction is precisely 
to find the limit of a discourse, and for the concerns of this thesis this means finding 
the limit of the image, and how the image can help us find other limits in terms of the 
gift. These will be taken separately, even if in reality they are usually closely linked. 
 
Determining the limit of the image is complex, in part because what actually 
constitutes an image varies enormously. The cinematic and the painterly are 
constituted of images, but to assert a sense of limitation for either of these would look 
                                                 
11 Once more this is too far away from the central issues, but it is noteworthy that many of Derrida’s 
works are written in a style of exchange. See, for example, Memories of the Blind (1990), sections of 
The Truth in Painting (1987b), Glas (1986b), and Droit de regard (1989). In such ‘dialogues’ Derrida 
opens up the language, showing the operation of exchange over a series of ideas.   56
quite different. However there are a number of aspects that can be approached not 
quite in the spirit of universals, but at least within the sense of deconstructing the 
image. The following are suggestions and the list is far from complete - but it will at 
least give a sense of things. The limit of the image and giftness can be seen to include: 
diachronics, synchronics, exhaustion, and problematising. The strategy here will be to 
indicate how these are reflected in Derrida's works, and how they might be used in the 
analysis of the image. It is important to bear in mind that what all of these elements 
represent is the image in crisis, of how it is positioned in such a way, of how it 
functions, through a challenge to itself and the context from which it emerges. 
 
Diachronics and Synchronics 
The visually represented gift presents us with a number of interesting aspects in terms 
of the diachronic and synchronic aspects of deconstruction. If, as has been argued 
throughout this section, deconstruction is an analytic process that mirrors the gift, it 
should be possible to witness these processes in the gift itself. In one way this will be 
demonstrated throughout the remaining part of this chapter, however a simple 
example may help show the sorts of interconnections that are being specified here. 
There is a small, perhaps almost insignificant scene in The Godfather II (Coppola 
1974). The young Vito Corleone, having just lost his job at the store, wanders down 
the street, an isolated yet hardly lost figure. He is then seen entering the small room of 
his home where he places a pear on the table. His wife picks it up with the 
exclamation “What a lovely pear” and then the scene fades. 
 
The deconstructive diachronics of all three Godfather films are complex (even within 
a sensibility of the Classic Hollywood narrative style), and The Godfather II is   57
particularly interesting in these terms. Here is a film that stands between the temporal 
progression of the first and third film, and yet in itself continually slides between at 
least three temporal orders: the ‘past’ of Vito, the ‘present’ of Michael, and the 
parallel past/present of Michael’s memories (of particular note is the closing scene 
where Michael remembers his brothers before both of them, and their father, are dead. 
In effect The Godfather II both unites and fragments the narratives and histories of 
past and present; in doing so it reveals one of the key motifs of the trilogy – that of the 
inescapable force of one’s actions and ethics on the past and future. This motif is 
shown again and again in the films. Note, for example, the baptism scene in the first 
of the films, where the montage switches between the images of the baptism of 
Michael’s child to the brutal slaying of the heads of the other families. Innocence and 
guilt are of the same order in the world of the Corleone, just as the past and future are 
of the same order across the whole narrative of The Godfather II. 
 
What is of greatest significance here – what is, in effect, being designated as the 
architectonic of these temporal orders – is the way in which the gift can be seen 
within the overall structure. To submit a deconstructionist reading of all this it is 
possible to move from the innocent gift of the pear to the diachronics of the narrative 
that allow it to carry such weight. Vito places the pear, without words, on the table; he 
is now without employment and has a family. This gift of the pear for him symbolises 
that no matter how extreme the circumstances the family will always be cared for.
12  
These are precisely the same sentiments that are shown through the violent history of 
                                                 
12 The pear is such an interesting piece of fruit in this sense. In Dutch painting the pear was always a 
symbol of fidelity and marriage. There is an old Italian tradition that the family would plant a pear tree 
for the birth of a girl (an apple for a boy) and bury the after-birth at the base of the tree (see, for 
example, Frazer The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (1936)). In this sense it is not a 
fruit of temptation or of exotica, it is the familiar, the home. Within this tradition it can also be seen as 
part of a gift that has a sacrificial root. The gift of the pear tree (along with the gift of the after-birth) is 
part of the life of the child.   58
the Corleone family. Vito’s gift of the pear thus becomes the image at the limit of the 
trilogy. It marks the very moment that the powerful Corleone family begins; in effect 
it marks the birth of the Godfather, for from that moment on Vito becomes more 
powerful. He also becomes more present in the social order. In a series of quick 
scenes it is established that Vito is respected and admired on the streets. So just as all 
acts of violence and guilt are directly tied to an ethics of the family in the trilogy, 
everything can be brought back to this moment of the gift of the pear. And because 
this gift originates from a (potential) crisis of subjectivity, it can be seen as the viral 
gift. It signifies care for the family, but it is a stolen item. In this way it is both good 
and evil, and beyond both. It thus contains the sense of opposition that has been 
developed throughout this thesis in terms of the defining attribute of the gift. 
Furthermore, it marks, in this particular instance, the formation of the diachronic 
image at the limit. 
 
The same can be argued in terms of the synchronic aspects of this gift of the pear. 
Unlike the close-up or freeze-frame that were discussed above, this scene does not 
‘distort’ time and narrative. However if the gift of the pear can be seen as the moment 
when the Godfather comes into presence (develops his subjectivity as it were) then all 
time is channelled to this single moment. The three orders of time mentioned above 
(past, future, and present/past-future) are conflated into this moment. Of course this is 
not to say that this scene comes to stand, diachronically and synchronically, for all 
events (in many ways it mirrors other events shown, such as the slaying of Vito’s 
family in Italy, his isolation in New York – all of these can be seen as root causes to 
his life of crime). However it does hold within it the limit so important to a 
deconstructional analysis. In this sense the gift of the pear is a synchronic moment,   59
and it does indeed offer a moment in time that explains all past and future events. 
Read in this way other key moments of the trilogy are gift-like and contain this 
opposition of guilt and innocence, family care and violence. What may seem like a 
contradiction to the outside stands perfectly legitimately to the members of the 
Corleone family. (This sense of contradiction is clearly located in the role of Kay, 
Michael’s wife). What does happen to the gift, however, in such a containment of 
oppositions, is that it becomes something that cannot be refused.  
 
Such ‘offers’ are fundamental to the gangster genre in cinema, and are part of the 
cultural reading of such films and characters. The gifts from Tony Soprano (in The 
Sopranos) not only cannot be refused, but also are given within an atmosphere that 
makes readily apparent that this is a gift of a totally different order. The amount of 
debt that is incurred from such a gift originates from the ethical value of blood and 
violence. These gifts declare their oppositional status at the very moment (that is, 
synchronically) they are given. The exchange value is often far higher than the value 
of the gift itself. Vito does not offer his wife this order of the gift in the pear, but all 
other gifts attain this status. In a totally different way, and yet one that can be 
connected here, the value of the body is something that has always been tied to the 
gift. As Benveniste puts it, 
‘[v]alue’ is characterized, in its ancient expression, as a ‘value of exchange’ in 
the most material sense. It is the value of exchange that a human body possess 
which is delivered up for a certain price. This ‘value’ assumes its meaning for 
whoever disposes of a human body, whether it is a daughter to marry or a 
prisoner to sell. There we catch a glimpse, in at least one part of the Indo-
European domain, of the very concrete origin of a notion connected to certain 
institutions in a society based on slavery. 
 (Benveniste 1971:43)  
The gangster genre works in a very similar way of valuing the body in terms of 
ownership, gift-exchange, and debt.     60
 
Exhaustion 
 
A criticism that seems to be a recurring part of deconstruction's existence and 
operation is that there is a danger of pushing its analysis to the extreme, thus 
producing nonsense. One of Derrida’s primary interests is pushing to exhaustion a 
concept or term, not to make it seem like nonsense, but to test its limitations and 
possibilities. This necessarily includes the limitations of interpretation and the 
possibilities beyond the known. This theme and framing of exhaustion is found in 
many of Derrida’s works, its challenge is to the systems of meaning, as they exist to 
produce some sense of truth. So often this allows his work a sense of opposition - 
which he seems to conjure out of a proposition the exact opposite of what the reader 
might be expecting.  
 
One of the effects of such a strategy is this sense of exhausting the text. The terms of 
this idea here must be derived from an interest in seeing how deconstruction can 
exhaust the image, and how an image can be seen as a type of deconstructive 
exhaustion. Both of these critical ‘flows’ will be interpreted in terms of the gift. In 
both senses the general idea is that things are pushed to their limit, in order to find 
some sense of the limit. This raises an immediate problem, for how is a limit 
supposed to be defined? What constitutes the limit of a gift or debt? It is not important 
that a concrete, universal limit is found - in fact nothing could be further from the case 
for deconstruction - rather the issue is the action of investigating such limits. 
Deconstruction would assert that it is the function of the text to explore the idea of 
limits (as Derrida implies when he claimed that there is no, or very little, literature –   61
that is, there are few literary works that actually test the limit of literature and 
language; Derrida uses James Joyce as an example of an author who does), even if 
such limits are impossibilities in themselves. This is very much along the lines of 
Derrida's ideas on the centre and the margin. In Of Grammatology, Derrida states that 
the centre is ultimately just another margin for another (falsely perceived and 
constructed) centre.
13 It can be claimed here that any limit is really just another centre 
which has its own limits elsewhere. Likewise the limit of the gift – what exhausts the 
gift – is found not in its manifestations, or even in the parameters of its cultural 
moments, but rather within the social order that defies giftness. 
 
The gift is particularly suitable to the concerns here, for so much of it is dealing with 
the flux between the transcendental and sacrificial, as well as the problematics of 
representation (and representational systems). The gift, as cultural process, is an 
exemplar of these two orders, and its very presence (through the systemics of gift 
production and enactment) must always operate within the shadow of this tension 
between transcendentalism and the sacrifice. The presented gift, like Derrida’s notion 
of the image that emerges from the transcendental, is a sacrifice in terms of the 
intended (and received). Once given, the gift can no longer contain the transcendental 
and must conform (even in the most simplistic of ways) to the trait. To understand 
this connection it is important to recall a central idea in Memoirs of the Blind,  
The heterogeneity between the thing drawn and the drawing trait remains 
abyssal, whether it be a thing represented and its representation or between the 
model and the image. The night of this abyss can be interpreted in two ways, 
either as the eve or the memory of the day, that is, as a reserve of visibility 
(the draftsman does not presently see but he has seen and will see again: the 
aperspective as the anticipating perspective or the anamnesic retrospective), or 
else as radically and definitively foreign to the phenomenality of the day. This 
                                                 
13 See Derrida Of Grammatology, especially the section ‘The Essay on the Origin of Languages’. 
Derrida's concerns are with Rousseau, and how the Enlightenment contributed to the idea of a centre 
that in effect produces meaning and a site for interpretation.   62
heterogeneity of the invisible to the visible can haunt the visible as its very 
possibility 
   (Derrida 1990:45) 
 
This line is useful at two levels here. It is a remarkably interesting take on the 
relationship of the image to its absented others, and therefore offers an insight into the 
system of representation and the image. Similarly, it is possible to take what Derrida 
states here and apply it to the process of the gift (within or external to its visuality). 
 
The significance of the first term for our concerns here is the haunting of the visible 
by its possibilities. Note that Derrida emphasises the processes of invisibility and 
otherness – his is a schema of the foreign, the reserve, and the abyssal. In other words 
this is the image that is not figured by what is encountered, but precisely by what is 
not. This, it is argued here, is also the quality of the gift. The heterogeneity of the 
hauntings of the gift is not simply that which could have been given (the alternative 
signifiers of the gift that exist in the paradigmatic processes of giftness), but also the 
phenomenality of the gift system. So the gift given is a syntagmatic presence that is 
haunted by the other gifts not presented; it is also that signifier (that image in this 
context) that operates as a gift because it finds itself within the system of the gift. 
Under another systemic order this same signifier can cease to be a gift and become 
something entirely different. However, and this is absolutely essential to what is being 
argued throughout this thesis, the gift is ‘unique’ because it contains this opposition at 
all times. If there is a haunting of the gift it is this sense of the opposite. Of course 
part of the reason why this is so, is that the gift system necessarily invests those signs   63
with opposition. The gift is to give and take, receive and owe, make absent and 
present, pay back and collect, originate and return.
14 
 
Returning to the overall theme of exhaustion, it is possible to see how Derrida, by 
employing these terms, explores the limitations of representation. Through shifting his 
focus from the struggles of representation in painting, to how representational systems 
overall force us to engage in a number of paradoxes involving what something is and 
what we actually see, the possibilities of representing something and the sacrifices 
that meet our eye/gaze can be opened up. In this way any attempt to represent 
something – every image in effect – is an exhaustion of the possible. Similarly, every 
gift is the exhaustion of the potlatch, and at the same time the preservation of the 
system of exchange. Through exhausting the specific, all gifts allow the processes of 
value to be sustained. This is not simply because the image fixes the representation, or 
that the gift defines the value and exchange, but also because ways of representing, 
and looking, become determined and predetermined just as ways of giving are 
established within social and psychical systems. This is why Derrida describes the 
event that is the moment, between the transcendental and the sacrificial as that which 
“provides drawing with its thematic objects or spectacles, its figures and heroes, its 
pictures or depictions of the blind” (Derrida 1993:41). In a sense this is the 
compromise of representation and the gift, as it works its way through the 
impossibilities of the transcendental and the demands of the sacrificial. It is also the 
space and mechanism which allows a visual culture. Without these two it would not 
only be impossible to represent, but also impossible to understand the representational 
                                                 
14 It is noteworthy that Derrida makes the following comment in Memoirs of the Blind, “… the 
thanksgiving grace of the trait suggests that the origin of the graphein there is debt or gift rather than 
representational fidelity” (Derrida 1990:30). Such a contrast between gift/debt and representational 
fidelity suggests that the image and gift operate within a site of crises and paradox rather than 
complicity. This is a key idea of the disruptive gift.   64
processes or even what is being represented. Both the transcendental and the 
sacrificial become the defining paradoxes of the limits to representation, including, of 
course, the representation of the gift and what the specific gift itself comes to 
represent (love, debt, repayment, fidelity, and so on). 
 
2.4 On the Double 
 
There are many varieties and versions of the double in Derrida's works. In fact it 
recurs with such regularity that it quite possible to argue that it is one of the 
fundamentals of deconstruction. In order to understand why this is the case this 
section will firstly consider what Derrida seems to be evoking when he deals with the 
double, and then looks to how deconstruction's theorising of the double can be used to 
analyse another feature of visual culture in terms of the gift. As with the previous 
sections in this chapter the thesis will avoid considering the obvious examples in 
Derrida's works, and in doing so attempt to extend the idea of the double across a 
range of material.  
 
One of the fundamental aspects that needs to be understood in this context of the 
double is that for Derrida it is rarely, if ever, a case of simply the double (or doubling) 
of something. There are many reasons for this, but at its core there is a primary theme 
that runs throughout Derrida's works, and one that can be traced back to the earliest 
(phenomenological) writings.  If one of the core aims of deconstruction is to reveal 
and dismantle the primary terms of reference in a particular epoch then it must do so 
with a reflexive eye. It is one thing to devise a strategy to reveal sense making and 
rule governing processes, but it is another thing to not see your own system falling   65
into that same status/trap. In other words, deconstruction's attempt to expose the rules 
of meaning generating systems could place itself precisely in that same position - of 
generating a different set of 'rules' about how meaning is generated. To safeguard 
against this deconstruction must have a healthy level of self-reflection - it must 
observe itself as it attempts any form of analysis. This is precisely why so much of the 
writings of deconstruction seem so convoluted; it observes itself as a philosophical 
system attempting to disentangle all the issues of philosophy. 
 
In this way deconstruction cannot be the double of the current systems of meaning, it 
must exist somewhere else. In these terms it is interesting to see how Derrida 
positions différance within a group of thinkers that includes Nietzsche, Saussure, 
Freud, Levinas, and Heidegger (see, for example, Derrida 1973:130). Our epoch 
(which includes this list), Derrida points out, is one of différance. All of these 
theorists share this attribute of critical self-awareness, of a misgiving for their 
contemporary order's ways of thinking, and a desire to reformulate them beyond a 
straightforward alternative. Différance sees that every sense of meaning operates on a 
process of differences and that all resolutions of meaning should be, and necessarily 
are, deferred. Meaning itself becomes a dynamic process where production overtakes 
resolution as the primary force. In this way it is possible to see how différance is not 
Derrida's double of a theory of meaning, but another term altogether. 
 
Différance is one example of many of Derrida's resistance to binary oppositions (the 
fundamental structure of Western thought that gives us the divisions of good and evil,   66
male and female, day and night, and so on). Derrida provided strategies to think 
outside of the binaries including what he called the third term
15:  
the pharmakon is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the 
inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing; the supplement is neither a 
plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor a complement of an inside, neither 
accident nor essence, etc.; the hymen is neither confusion nor distinction, 
neither identity nor difference, neither consummation nor virginity, neither 
veil nor unveiling, neither the inside nor the outside, etc.; the gram is neither a 
signifier nor a signified, neither a sign nor a thing, neither a presence nor an 
absence, neither a position nor a negation, etc.; spacing is neither space nor 
time; the incision is neither the incised integrity of a beginning, or of a simple 
cutting into, nor simple secondarity... 
(Derrida 1987b:43) 
  
Here we have a list that reveals much more than a set of terms. Notice how Derrida 
ends many of the listings with an 'etc.' - even in his examples there is a sense of so 
much more than can be contained in the terms. One gets the impression that no matter 
how long the list of terms became (of the neither/nors) there must always be a sense 
of a furthering. Notice also how the list given by Derrida starts with some relatively 
straightforward binaries (remedy/poison, inside/outside) but quickly collapses into 
more complex relationships that might not appear as opposites ending with 'incised 
integrity of a beginning/secondarity'.  Derrida does this to demonstrate not only the 
instability of the binary oppositions, but also the difficulty of even working in terms 
of the binary. Finally, notice how this list of terms (pharmakon, supplement, hymen, 
and gram) works across divisions of opposition so that what Derrida achieves is a 
sense of deconstruction beyond the terms and into the ways in which meaning is 
constructed. 
 
                                                 
15 Certain resonance is noted in this idea with Lacan’s third time. Both invite a position beyond the 
established, perhaps even beyond the comfortable.   67
This is the case where we find Derrida's engagement with these terms, for example, 
the pharmakon in Dissemination; the supplement in Of Grammatology, the hymen in 
Spurs: Nietzsche's Style all carry with them this sense of not just containing their own 
opposites, but of acting as moments of deconstruction. It will take us too far afield to 
pursue this much further, but just as a final point of illustration it is important to 
realise that in Derrida's list are embedded references and illusions to more and more 
ideas and arguments. Take, for example, the hymen. Derrida's deconstructional point 
of neither veil nor unveiling is a reference to Nietzsche's veil/unveil effect (Schleier, 
Enthüllung, Verhüllung) (see, for example, Derrida 1979: 51) of the truth as 
woman/woman as truth. So this becomes enfolded in Nietzsche's complex arguments 
about truth and illusion, and Heidegger's commentaries on this. In other words beyond 
the binarism of the doubling, is this style of thinking which flows on in the 'etc.' of 
such lists. 
 
What, then of the double of the gift in these terms? The double function of the gift has 
already been noted in various ways in the thesis. In no small way this has been 
defined here as an essential aspect of the gift and the gift-exchange process. The other 
feature of the double that is revealed through this deconstruction of the double is that 
there must exist a double to the gift. This is distinct from, yet attached to the idea that 
the gift contains its own (oppositional) double. Hence it is possible to speak of the 
pharmakon of the gift in terms of remedy/poison and gift/debt; and at the same time 
look towards a double that the process of exchange is derived from. In these terms the 
gift’s double is not debt (which is contained within it) but a different semiology that is 
positioned external to such processes. One of the primary processes of this double 
semiology is exchange itself. The double of the gift is the exchange system itself. This   68
would seem to suggest a typology, and this is, to a certain extent, the case. In as much 
as the gift cannot exist without its double of exchange, so the same can be said of any 
form of exchange; that is, that it can only exist within a sense of gift-debt. The reason 
why this can be seen as part of the doubling process is that it is quite possible to have 
an exchange system that appears to operate outside of the gift-debt frame. However it 
is argued here that the process of the double is always present, even if it often passes 
unobserved. For example, it is unusual to speak of the penal code as one based on the 
gift. Yet it is precisely within the sense of exchange (a crime is ‘exchanged’ for prison 
time, the prisoner is said to have a debt to society that must be paid, and so on) that 
social orders construct punishment. Such an exchange system is the gift’s double 
because even though the punishment may never be described as a gift (to the social 
order, to the ‘victims’ of crime), such notions of exchange and debt can only really 
work if the semiology of the gift operates as a double to this. 
 
It is possible to speak of the double and the gift in another way, this time more 
visually derived. The next part of this chapter will look at a version of the double, the 
visual, and the gift in terms of spectres and mirrors, arguing further this idea of the 
exchange system as double, as well as looking to other, different versions of this 
phenomena. 
 
2.5  The Gift, the Spectre and the Mirror 
 
By using some of the terms that Derrida uses to define the status of spectres in texts, 
the doubling of the gift can be viewed from another perspective. In a sense it goes 
against the spirit of the spirit because spectres should always resist positions that   69
make them tangible, concrete, or simply rendered visible. By its very definition the 
spectre inhabits a space that is neither living nor dead, neither present nor absent. 
Texts that attempt to represent spectres and spirits illustrate that there is an encounter 
with something that lies at the heart of the problems of representation noted above. 
Spectres even resist the middle ground between the transcendental and the sacrificial.  
 
In this way it is possible to employ such figures to make sense of an aspect of 
différance. Derrida states, "[d]ifférance is what makes the movement of signification 
possible only if each element that is said to be 'present', appearing on the stage of 
presence, is related to something other than itself but retains the mark of a past 
element and already lets itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future 
element" (Derrida 1973:142). Derrida is aiming for something more than the haunting 
spectre, but the status he is articulating does fit them. This idea that to operate in 
terms of différance is to necessarily contain within itself elements of the past and a 
possible future relation is what determines the threat of these figures. They must 
operate in terms of différance because the threat they bring is continually deferred and 
their status to others (the living) is always determined through difference. 
 
It is also worth noting that Derrida himself engages in the figure and concept of the 
spectre. We see it extensively in Spectres of Marx, underpinning sections of The Gift 
of Death, and in key sections in Politics of Friendship. It is noteworthy (although 
once more it can be signalled here for it would take the thesis too far from its primary 
concerns) that these are all central works in Derrida's writings on political philosophy. 
It is an interesting reflection on Derrida, perhaps, that when he engages in the political 
(something many have called on him to do for some time) there is an evocation of the   70
spectral. There is one more feature of the spectre from Derrida that needs to be 
considered before moving on to some implications for the gift, and then on to the 
related topic of mirrors. The spectral breaks down the opposition between self and 
other because it questions the processes employed to maintain those distinctions. In 
the horror and slasher film genres the aspect that so often allows the threat to take 
place is the connection between the spectral and the central character (often a woman) 
- it is because of what she is that the figure from another realm can exist and continue 
to return. The spectral simultaneously challenges the order of spaces (and time) and 
asserts them (the white middle class suburban world is defined as such because it 
contrasts so sharply with the world of spectres and mutilated killers). This means that 
the figure of the threat and potential victim become reflections of one another. One of 
the central themes in Memoirs of the Blind is the self-portrait, and Derrida figures this 
in quite a curious way. He argues that the extreme examination required in the self-
portrait exerts a type of analysis quite unique in representation, and the consequence 
is one of ruin, "[r]uin is the self-portrait, this face looked at in the face as the memory 
of itself, what remains or returns as a specter from the moment one first looks at 
oneself and a figuration is eclipsed. The figure, the face, then sees its visibility being 
eaten away" (Derrida 1993:68). Apart from the recurring themes of the past and 
future, the other striking thing about this passage is that Derrida ties the self directly 
to a sort of spectralisation. It is as if self-reflection is not possible unless it is inhabited 
by a spectre. This is because the self-portrait, like the spectral, contorts the sense of 
presence and absence, as well as the present and past/future.
16 The self-portrait, by its 
very nature, allows the vision of visibility to be eaten away. 
 
                                                 
16 Here we are reminded of Barthes' sense of the punctum - which is the spectrely presence, and status, 
of the photograph.    71
Figuring the gift within all of this can be done at a number of different levels. One of 
the most overt would be to note the spectral qualities of the gift itself. This would be 
to argue that the object chosen as the gift is a type of haunting of the ‘real’ gift being 
made; this ranges from the straight-forward (tokens of love standing for true love, 
ever-lasting love, absolute fidelity) to the heavily disguised (which is in some ways 
the anthro-political agenda of Mauss’ entire study of the gift). In such a reading the 
gift occupies the third term in as much it is both present and absent in the moment of 
exchange, it both represents and can never totally represent the underlying thematics 
and semiotics of the relationships involved. This is all to do with the spectral quality 
of the gift. The spectre of the gift, in this sense, is giftness, in that much of what 
directs the economy of the gift comes from the shadow of intent and assumption. 
Such a perspective on the spectral characteristic of the gift includes the qualities of 
exchange, debt, instability, and power that haunts the gift and all those engaged in its 
production and reception. The spectral gift mirrors the systems of subjectivity because 
it sets up mirroring processes, once the giver has given the gift away; their sense of 
giftness adjusts to the new subjectivity of expectant receiver. This is a theme that 
recurs throughout this thesis. 
 
Another way of looking at this is the idea of the relationship between the spectre and 
gift, particularly in terms of death. In some ways this is the primary theme of 
Derrida’s The Gift of Death, and it is noteworthy that this is the theme that he uses to 
discuss religion and ethics.
17 In other words it is within the context of gift and debt 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that Derrida does this in a reflexive manner, acknowledging that this book of 
his exists not out of a sense of obligation, of duty, but in order to reflect on the difficulties of doing 
such a thing. As he notes, “[p]hilosophers who don’t write ethics are failing in their duty, one often 
hears, and the first duty of the philosopher is to think about ethics, to add a chapter on ethics to each of 
his or her books…” Derrida 1996:67). Yet Derrida goes on to say that this is far from straightforward, 
and philosophers run the real risk of missing the ‘most common and everyday experience of   72
that Derrida places notions of sacrifice, the debt of and to the state (especially in terms 
of the death in custody of the human rights advocate and philosopher Jan Patočka), 
and death itself. Gift in the terms here is woven into the dynamics of sacrifice and 
social responsibility. Two passages illustrate this well; the first is from Patočka, and 
the second from Derrida:  
Responsible life itself was conceived in that event as the gift of something 
that, in the end, while having the characteristics of the Good, also presented 
the traits of something inaccessible to which man is forever enslaved – the 
traits of a mystery that has the last word 
 (Patočka in Derrida 1996:30) 
 
Let us emphasize the word ‘gift.’ Between on the one hand this denial that 
involves renouncing the self, this abnegation of the gift, of goodness, or of the 
generosity of the gift that must withdraw, hide, in fact sacrifice itself in order 
to give, and on the other hand the repression that would transform the gift into 
an economy of sacrifice, is there not a secret affinity, an unavoidable risk of 
contamination of two possibilities as close one to the other they are different 
from each other?  
(Derrida 1996:30-31)  
 
Here we find the absolute political economy of the gift, for this is the gift as it is 
located within the need to do good, to perform the Good, not simply as the social 
order determines it, but in the Hegelian sense of the Good as a conceptual order 
beyond the social. Primary to this is the subject as social agent, the subject who 
performs the sacrifice through the gift. This particular sacrifice is the spectral because 
it must operate both within and outside of the established (social) orders. This is why 
Derrida emphasises the gift that must withdraw. This is also the construction of the 
Good as it formulates a social order with responsibility. For Derrida this is the 
responsibility of philosophy, however for the concerns here it must also include the 
                                                                                                                                            
responsibility”. Let us not shirk from this, for The Gift of Death is one of Derrida’s most personal of 
works. The entire second half of the section entitled “Whom to Give To: Knowing Not to Know” is 
working towards Derrida’s highly personal statement of himself as philosopher in a world where 
millions starve.   73
presenting (that is the actual formulation as well as the representational systems 
involved) of the gift within the (social) order. This will also include the systems of 
exchange, and so value, debt and all such processes. 
 
An idea that is central to The Gift of Death is that of mysterium tremendum – the 
frightening secret to make you tremble (Derrida 1996:53). One of its central attributes 
here (for this thesis as well as Derrida’s analysis) is the gift of death, which 
necessarily includes the knowledge of death and acts of faith. In part this is the excess 
of the moment, where the something is beyond knowledge and comprehension. And 
in part it is the gift caught up in the moment of self-reflexivity, 
What is it that makes us tremble in the mysterium tremendum? It is the gift of 
infinite love, the dissymmetry that exists between the divine regard that sees 
me, and myself, who doesn’t see what is looking at me; it is the gift and 
endurance of death that exists in the irreplaceable, the disproportion between 
the infinite gift and my finitude 
(Derrida 1996:55-56)  
In this we witness Derrida discussing something remarkably similar to what was 
considered earlier in this chapter – the interplay between the transcendental and the 
sacrificial – only here the tensions are witnessed in terms of the infinite and finitude. 
This of course ties in with the Hegelian theme of eternity and the Eternal. This all 
takes place within a framework of self-reflection (the layerings are manifold here), 
which is a good point at which to turn to the issue of mirrors. 
 
Mirrors 
Reflection is one of the corner stones of philosophy – it is what philosophy defines 
itself as doing. There are whole systems of thought, and fiercely contested debates, 
about the degree and type of reflection (and in this is included reflexivity) that should   74
be included in any system of thought.
18 The two concerns here must be with how 
deconstruction operates in terms of the mirror – that is, the act of reflection – and how 
the gift can sometimes function within this sense of reflexivity. The first of these is 
fundamentally about how Derrida attempts to get the philosophical discourses to 
reflect on themselves, and in so doing make his readers, and philosophy in general, 
more reflexive in the approach to the ideas. This methodology of Derrida’s allows the 
reader to work within a moment of reflection. This is the tain of the mirror; it is the 
behind of the mirror that we do not see, but without it there can be no reflection of the 
image. 
 
When we find moments of mirroring in an image there are a number of consequences 
that can occur. One is a sort of declaration of technique; a show within the image that 
such a thing can be done. Dutch still life paintings are good examples of this, because 
what the tiny aspects of reflection (on bowls and jugs, cups and in water) perform is a 
sense of the life-like, but also a demonstration of the skill of the painter. In other 
words we find combined within the single image both a denial of the artifice (the 
replication of the real) and a claim of it (the technique of the artist him/herself). 
Another possible consequence is that the whole discourse of the image is interrupted, 
perhaps even broken. These are the moments of reflection when the illusion of the 
text is arrested and the spectator is reminded that they are actually looking at 
something (which then returns their gaze). The direct address to the camera in cinema, 
the photographic moment that reveals the camera (the pseudo-sexuality of Helmut 
Newton’s images for example are so formulated that their sexuality becomes reflexive 
                                                 
18 An excellent summary of this situation, and Derrida’s own position within it, is to be found in 
Rodolphe Gasché The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection.   75
of a particular type (phallocentric) and era), and the use of mirrors in painting are all 
examples of this.  
 
It is possible to note the function of this in the gift. They are textual forms that return 
the line of thinking to the opening ideas in this chapter, for they have a certain 
parasitology attached to them. So often these mirrors do not sit on the same plane of 
existence as the rest of the objects in the image, but render visible, to be consumed by 
the spectator, the dynamics of the image. Deconstruction is the tain behind the ideas, 
drawing moments of reflection on the thing itself (be it an image or a definition of 
truth) and the participation of the spectator. “Deconstruction” says Derrida, “does not 
consist in passing from one concept to another, but in overturning and displacing a 
conceptual order, as well as the non-conceptual order with which the conceptual order 
is articulated” (Derrida 1986:329). All of the ideas that have been looked at here – 
from mirrors and spectres to limits and viruses – are part of this process of 
overturning the conceptual order. What then of the gift in terms of mirroring and self-
reflexivity? Like deconstruction’s relationship to philosophy, the gift has a facet of 
not being visible as a gift. Or, to put it another way, there is a certain aspect of the gift 
that allows it to declare ‘giftness’ but not seem to be reflexive. Yet all gifts must, at 
some level at least, contain this reflexivity. This can be as straightforward as the gift 
seeming to reflect aspects of the giver or receiver, or it can be as complex as the 
systems laid out by Mauss. Indeed, it can be argued that Mauss’s whole 
anthropological study is a reflexive moment on the gift (which includes the idea that 
the gift reflects/mirrors the social order). In these terms it can be argued that Mauss 
articulates the gift as reflexive of the cultural order (that is, how cultures operate 
within exchange systems reflects wide aspects of their socio-cultural, ethical,   76
political, and even textual, life). A key aspect of the gift is this process of reflexivity 
and self-reflexivity. It is made manifest at the most denotative level (the signs of gifts) 
but functions throughout the entire exchange order. The gift itself will often disguise 
this reflexivity (that is one way it ensures its continuing existence as a gift), but at 
another level this mirroring is always present. Once more we encounter the idea that 
the gift contains it opposite, this time in terms of self-reflexivity and denial of the 
apparatus.   76
3.   Relationship of Investment: Power and Gift 
3.1  Subject Exchange and Investment in Visual Culture 
3.2  Bodies and Gifts: Image analysis of power relations through 
 investment   
 
In this section, Foucault’s analysis of power and subjectivity is developed in 
terms of investment and how the gift is influenced through such relationships of 
power. In this sense, it is possible to emphasise the complexities that arise 
through intersubjective relations, particularly gift exchange and those between 
observer and image. The image provides a generous domain as an example of 
cyclical giving, taking, and return, particularly with respect to, and in terms of, 
investment through power and subjectivity. To argue this is to acknowledge the 
complex relationship that exists between the image (and the visual) and various 
kinds of theorisations (including those by Foucault).  
 
3.1  Subject Exchange and Investment in Visual Culture 
 
Everyday images of culture, bodies, and life help to form our conscious sense of 
what it is to be regarded as visual. As subjects, our consciousness is not attentive 
to the forms and typologies of investments that are made in or as part of visual 
culture. In viewing paintings, reading literature, watching films, we are engaging 
with other images and forming investments of power, continuously interacting 
within systems of exchange and shifting subjectivities. The system of exchange 
that transpires between the image and the subject-as-observer reflects the 
exchange in subjectivity between giver and receiver. This is not arguing that   77
spectatorship is a gift, rather it is suggesting that the exchanging of subjectivities 
revolves around, and is dependent on, issues and relations of power within any 
interaction regarding the image and establishes a connection with the gift and gift 
exchange. The relationship between subject and image has been chosen as 
example and parallel for the relationship between giftness and the gift because of 
its similar insecure and uncertain discursive practices, and the subsequent 
questioning of subjectivity within the processes of communication. 
 
The primary edict of power for Foucault was its investment and manifestation 
through relationships, and in particular the formation of subjectivity. Foucault 
was not primarily interested in analysing or critiquing power; as for him power 
(as a freestanding socio-cultural force) did not exist prior to an interactive 
relationship. Rather, it was the subject, more specifically, the construction of 
human beings into subjects that was his main research objective. The effects and 
machinations of power only being realised and ‘activated’ once a power 
relationship has been constructed and engaged with. Frow notes that this is also 
how the gift relationship is effected, “[g]ifts are precisely not objects at all, but 
transactions and social relations. It is only in these terms that it is possible to 
speak of a gift economy, in the sense of an order governing transactions and the 
chains of debt and return that flow from them” (Frow 1997:124). Read this way, 
it becomes possible to view the gift via the subjects involved and to further 
conceive of their positioning (giver and receiver) as a system of exchange that is 
modified by power.
1 Foucault viewed power as a technique or mechanism to be 
used in working out why and how we become subjects, “[m]y objective, instead, 
                                                 
1 This sense of power and the gift is precisely what is evoked in Derrida’s The Gift of Death. The 
notion of social responsibility as gift necessarily contains aspects of power.   78
has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three modes of 
objectification which transform human beings into subjects” (Foucault 
1983a:208). By claiming that a subject invests power in an image, by forming a 
relationship with it, a discursive practice evolves where the subject, as observer 
invests in the determination of meaning from the image.  What is of interest here 
is how these power relations are produced and why they are produced to create 
certain subjectivity with specific reference to any image. Whilst some of the 
visual examples discussed will have the gift as their content, it is the subject’s 
investment of power in the image that also reflects a gift relationship. It is argued 
that the subject’s investment in the image is an investment, made on similar 
ground to that of the giver and receiver in the gift. It is the exchange of 
subjectivities that occurs within visual culture that is of significance here. 
 
In order to use power as a tool to analyse the subject and how we become 
subjects, Foucault suggested a new economy of power relations:  
It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of 
power as a starting point … Rather than analysing power from the point 
of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analysing power relations 
through the antagonism of strategies 
(Foucault 1983a:211)  
 
It is worth adopting this approach to look at what power relations are involved in 
visual culture, by looking at various oppositions such as resistances to power 
relations, or any attempts that are made to separate aspects that comprise power 
relations. As a result, more is discovered about power relationships, their 
function, and effect, instead of merely outlining certain circumstances and   79
situations where power operates. This is especially important and relevant for 
any gift exchange as it maintains a focus on the interaction of exchange and its 
systemic structure. In only identifying what power relations are and what 
typologies exist; little is highlighted about the subjects involved in any form of 
investment, particularly with respect to the gift, and any subjectivity produced by 
them. Additionally, this method of analysis emphasises the most fundamental 
aspect of all power relations; that is, how power is practiced and exercised within 
a relationship. Directing this towards the image, this section aims to sketch out 
what aspects are involved in forming types of power relations and essentially the 
significance this has for the subject. Looking for the inter-relationship and 
interaction that exists between subject and the image is essential to the 
examination of how power relations between the two are constructed, played out, 
and contested. Investigating this relationship as a system of exchange and 
subjectivity assists in determining a typification of the relationship/s present with 
gift exchange. It takes into account the role of power and its contribution to one 
of the primary structures of the gift, that being the investment in subjectivity as 
either giver or receiver. In this we find Mauss’s sentiment where he argues that 
an aspect of the gift is part of the person/s that participate in gift exchange and 
are subsequently directed towards a system of exchange that deals with the 
shifting subjectivities of giver and receiver. 
 
Another link between visual cultures and the gift relationship with respect to 
power can be found in the characteristics of power. Looking at such elements of 
power is not to ignore other facets but rather to regard more closely how power is 
used between people to influence and adapt their actions in specific relationships.   80
Characteristics of power are uncovered through analysing the subject’s struggle 
with forms of power and this is taken up in the following section. 
 
Questioning the status of the individual: Struggles of Power 
 
Foucault’s examination of power is complex and involved, as what ultimately 
drives his analysis is a new definition of an already socially current concept. His 
reappropriation of the concept of power provides redefinition and reshaping so 
that the result is a different agenda contained within the same term. One of the 
ways in which he achieves this is through discussing what his version of power is 
not, and he does this through attacking what he terms ‘power struggles’. These 
power struggles oppose and resist power through criticising it as a tool – what 
Foucault calls a ‘form of power’, not particular establishments or social classes – 
although this is not to deny that forms of power exist within these domains. 
Commonalities between these struggles circulate around the issue and status of 
the subject, such as the notion of the subject as individual, the concept of 
individualisation and the effects of power specific to subjection. This analysis of 
the characteristics of power can be linked with the gift in terms of struggle as it 
echoes Foucault’s conception in that it is premised on the theme of that which 
contains its opposite. Many arguments concerning the gift – particularly 
Derrida’s –define the gift through what it isn’t. Instead, and this is conceptually 
very significant, it is done so through the formation of the subject. Gift exchange 
revolves around relations with people and on this basis is completely concerned 
with the issues of the subject and power as an investment. As the gift’s 
fundamental paradox lies in it containing its opposite, Foucault’s categorisation 
of struggles in terms of power and the subject offers a more centred perspective   81
on how the subject comes to invest in power as well as how such an investment 
in power relations bears on gift exchange. This viewpoint concerning the gift 
also brings together two of the main themes that are argued in this thesis – the 
gift containing its opposite and the gift as a system of exchange. In involving the 
issues of power and subjectivity with investment we find the alignment of 
opposition and exchange in that opposition becomes that which is exchanged. It 
is worthwhile suspending this for the moment and look towards Foucault’s 
typification of power struggles. This, in turn, will allow an examination of how 
opposition is exchanged in terms of the gift and giftness.  
 
Foucault summarily identifies aspects of struggles as those “which question the 
status of the individual … struggles against the ‘government of individualisation’ 
… struggles against the privileges of knowledge … struggles revolve around the 
question: Who are we?”(Foucault 1983a:212). Struggles then deal with the 
various effects of the exercise of power and are primarily concerned with 
attacking any form of power that attempts to govern the individual and prevent 
him/her from becoming a critical subject. Viewing these power struggles from a 
different perspective suggests that the subject resists not only a prescription of 
individuality from the state but also resists the seduction of such conformity and 
homogeneity that the totalisation of the subject yields. In terms of visual cultures, 
the subject-that-observes struggles against the seduction of the image – the 
seduction of being placed, of being told how and what to view. The current 
popularity of ‘real life’ television programmes attests to a viewer demographic 
succumbing to such a seduction of the image. From Survivor to Temptation 
Island to Big Brother, each television programme prescribes viewing places for   82
the home viewer through constructing a strict narrative out of the power relations 
that develop between the game show participants. These programs are not 
designed for the critical subject, instead they rely on the seduction within the 
image - being told what is meaningful is easier than critically assessing it for 
oneself. Thus power struggles are comprised of two sides, both centred on the 
creation of a particular subjectivity. Mauss’s point regarding “the dissoluble 
bond of a thing with its original owner” has a certain resonance in that it 
identifies one of the main struggles and functions in the formation of subjectivity 
of giver and receiver. In recognising the ‘indissoluble bond’ that exists between 
giver and receiver, Mauss also (perhaps inadvertently) identifies gift exchange as 
a process and structure through which power relations help to form subjectivity 
through a ‘struggle’ of seduction in addition to an investment in the subjectivity 
of the opposite. 
 
Foucault never argues seduction as a typology of struggle, or as a characteristic 
of power, but this is precisely what is happening within systems that exchange 
positions of subjectivity, as seen between subject and image, and within gift 
exchange between giver and receiver, where subjectivities struggle with the 
investment in a relationship that is based on paradox. Take for example when 
you see a photo of yourself that you quite like. Part of your pleasure is derived 
from the seduction of the image – you are seduced by this particular captured 
image (as compared to those photographs where ‘it’s not a good photo of me’). 
In this photo, there is an investment in what others may find attractive or 
desirable. At this level there is an exchange of subjectivities – you are assuming   83
another perspective – similar to the assumption that is made in the selection of a 
gift (why else would a gift be chosen?).  
 
 In order for the gift to be given and signal exchange, its value must be noted 
(culturally) as seductive in the sense that the giver wants to give it and the 
receiver wants to accept it. This seduction surrounding the gift in exchange is the 
basis for why investment in power relations is seen as a struggle as 
predominantly what is seductive is not the gift but the promise of further gifts 
and exchanges. The subjects (giver and receiver) engage with the seduction in 
these power relations with the knowledge that once an investment has taken 
place, the relations will shift and alternative power relations will form. To 
explicate this web of relationships further, it is necessary to work through 
Foucault’s typification of struggles.  
 
Foucault identifies three types of struggles against the domination, exploitation, 
and subjection present in any imposition of power. While Foucault does not 
relate these forms of power struggles specifically to the image or the gift, they 
are concerned with the discourse of the subject and creation of subjectivity. It is 
this perspective that is of interest in viewing gift exchange as a relevant discourse 
of power relations. Its economy structures can be examined to look at how the 
subject interacts with the gift on the basis of exchange, specifically with respect 
to issues of management and governmentality. Foucault’s analysis allows the 
positions of giver and receiver within gift exchange to possess a primacy, rather 
than being dominated by the process of gift-object exchange. By focusing on the 
subjectivities exchanged within gift giving, the connection drawn with visual   84
cultures emerges with more clarity as its manifestations of power relationships 
are quite similar. By avoiding a specific analysis of the constructions of power 
within particular examples of gift exchange, the focus is maintained on how the 
subjectivities involved are manifested, formed, and exchanged through relations 
of power. This in turn allows us to think about power, the gift, and the image 
purely in terms of the subject.  The reason why this works so effectively within 
the parameters of a Foucauldian analysis is that the discussion of the gift (and 
giftness) emphasises the impact of the subject (and the formation of subjectivity) 
in exchange and the causality of the gift economy. A different typology of 
exchange found in the image and a visual culture allows the impact of the subject 
to foreground the struggles. Below the typologies of struggles, as identified by 
Foucault, are discussed with respect to the connection between gift, image, and 
subject. 
 
1. Dominance 
 
The subject has to struggle with the dominance of the image. The image here can 
be taken to mean, a photograph, a film, an advertisement, or even a mental image 
– such as in the remit of Charles Sanders Peirce’s interpretant.
2 The image 
                                                 
2 The three triads offered by Charles Sanders Peirce in Collected Papers (1931) provide a 
workable template to discuss the relationship between the gift and giftness within a semiotic 
framework. Peirce’s theory has particular relevance because of the emphasis on the referent – 
something that clearly exists within the discourse of the gift. The object that denotes the gift 
dominates much of the economy, yet at the same time, can have little to do with the other levels 
of exchange, specifically the act of discursive exchange. The initial triad presented by Peirce is 
made up of, the ‘sign’, the ‘interpretant’, and the ‘object’.  “A sign … is something which stands 
to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in 
the mind of that   person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which 
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands 
for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes 
called the ground…” (Peirce 1931:135). The gift is the sign that stands to somebody for 
something, and as Kaja Silverman points out, “[t] he sign which indicates the play of meaning   85
                                                                                                                                    
within this model corresponds fairly closely to Saussure’s signifier in at least one respect: it is a 
form capable of eliciting a concept. In another respect – its representational qualities – it would 
seem quite different … Peirce’s sign often either resembles or adjoins the object” (Silverman 
1983:15). Within this scope, the gift functions as the sign that adjoins the object and that elicits a 
concept – giftness, which operates in the place of the interpretant. Silverman states that Peirce 
attributes this transcendental concept, interpretant, to the sign to identify the potential of 
exchange by virtue of being replaceable, “the intepretant is nothing but another representation to 
which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again” 
(Peirce 1931:171). Most of the instability within the act of discursive exchange stems from the 
continuous cycle of repetition regarding the interpretation of the sign. By emphasising the 
interpretant within this triad, Peirce addresses that a significant and directing aspect in the act of 
communication and signification is existential. Fundamentally, exchange is managed and 
manipulated by intent or desire. The importance of Peirce’s work, for the concerns of this chapter 
and indeed the relevance to the discussion of the image, rest on the applicability of the 
relationship between sign, interpretant and object and the relationship between gift, giftness and 
giver/receiver. It helps to stage the challenge giftness presents to the stability of signification in 
the discourse of the gift, particularly, “the connections the system establishes between 
signification and subjectivity … and the emphasis it places on the endless commutability of the 
signified, upon the capacity of the signified to generate a chain of additional 
meanings”(Silverman 1983:25). Peirce’s interpretant is the element of the initial triad that is 
unstable. It cannot be measured or be categorised. Consequently, a large part of instability within 
discourse, discursive practices and exchange stems from the mental interpretation of the 
interaction or relationship between sign and object. Giftness, as the transcendental signified of the 
gift, mirrors and embodies this instability, as it is the element within the discourse of the gift that 
connects sign to object and continues the economy. To adopt Peirce’s term, for the purposes of 
giftness, places the focus on perception, where the perceiving of some ‘thing’ (object or sign), 
transforms the perceived ‘thing’ into a mental representation, or interpretant. Each ensuing 
perception/interpretation of the ‘thing’ becomes recognition, subsequently forming new 
interpretation and clarification of the mental representation. Peirce states in Writings of Charles 
S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition (1982), “[w] e are capable of understanding representations 
only by having conceptions or mental representations, which represent the given representation as 
a representation” (Peirce 1982:323). The interpretant works on the condition that it also involves 
the consciousness of its reality is a representation. Built into discourse or systems of signification 
then, are the fracturings of representation. What transpires are multiple moments of varied 
meanings, varied interpretations and varied exchanges based on implicit heterogeneity. The 
interpretant illustrates a double layering of signs, as a layer of signs and a layer of meta-signs. 
The result is that meaning derived from signification and representation becomes more and more 
unstable as the mental representations (of the interpretant) seek stability of meaning from the sign 
and object. The key consequence of Peirce’s theory for this dissertation is the instability that he 
establishes within the initial triad through the introduction and function of the interpretant. It is 
the relationship between the interpretant, sign and object that creates the instability as there can 
be no uniformity between each production of meaning. The resonance for the gift and giftness is 
that each connection (or moment of exchange) according to the Peircian triad, produces a 
meaning that can only be made in the mind of the giver. The question of the gift is complex 
because involved within the term ‘gift’ are number of exchanges that occur. Principally, the 
exchange of the object, the exchange of subjectivity and the exchange of intent are the most 
nominal forms. Peirce’s ideas assist the separation of these convoluted exchanges that are present 
within the discourse of the gift (as a process of communication, as exchange between 
subjectivities) as he distinguishes between practicality and impracticality that is of interest here. 
Peirce states, “we have direct experience of things in themselves. Nothing can be more 
completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas … Our knowledge of things in 
themselves is entirely relative” (Peirce 1931:73). An important question that rises from this 
negotiation of representation is the validity of reality. Peirce believes that signification can 
legitimately represent reality, yet this is not something we can discern for ourselves. As is seen in 
the work of Derrida, the problematic status of an object such as the gift is subject to rigorous 
questioning in terms of ‘purity’, (Derrida 1994c).  The second triad that Peirce constructs looks to 
identify the various signs we interpret. He stipulates three elements, the ‘icon’, the ‘index’ (or as 
‘indices’) and the ‘symbol’. The gift operates at all three levels within this triad, but it is the 
indexical sign that is of most interest here, especially pertaining to giftness. The icon has a closer   86
dominates through the privilege of the institution-as-state; ‘state’ here meaning 
the prevailing conditions and mitigating factors that aim to individualise a 
subject. Within the realm of visual culture, the state can function as those 
physical places where images are viewed or engaged with and the conceptual 
frame in which any image is viewed formed. The art gallery states – ‘this is art’, 
the cinema states ‘this is film’; the dominance of these images stemming from 
the autocratic and managerial discourses the institution-as-state establishes and 
practices. This form of totalitarian discourse is purported by the social order and 
is strengthened through a continuation of lack of rebellion and resistance from 
society. Within each visual medium there are images that contest the medium 
itself. Not only is the subject struggling against the dominance of the image but 
the images are struggling against other images. For example, David Lynch’s 
Mulholland Drive (2002) defies conventional linear narrative and character 
development to produce a film that, in form, radically differs from other films. 
Yet much of the film’s content and plot lines are markedly similar to other Lynch 
films, particularly in terms of narrative spacing, double characters and an integral 
involvement with the ‘underbelly’ of American idealised life.
3  
 
Mulholland Drive was originally intended as a pilot for a new television series, 
and holds many similarities with Twin Peaks, Lynch’s previous television series. 
                                                                                                                                    
relationship to the qualities of the object it represents. The icon of the gift is usually viewed as a 
wrapped box with a ribbon tied around it. Peirce outlines the icon, as Silverman puts it, as sharing 
or even duplicating the codes of the object resembled. The clearest example is the photograph 
where what is seen readily look likes what it represents. The indexical sign is “a real thing or fact 
which is a sign of its object by virtue of being connected with it as a matter of fact and by also 
forcibly intruding upon the mind, quite regardless of its being intercepted as a sign” (Peirce 
1931:359). 
3 Thematically, Blue Velvet (1986), Lost Highway (1997), and Wild at Heart (1990) are other 
Lynch films that deal with chaos in morality and atypical representations of love and American 
society.  
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In particular the character of Naomi Watts is templated on Sheryl Lee’s 
character, Laura Palmer. In Twin Peak’s Lynch uses Sheryl Lee to play both 
Laura Palmer and her cousin Madeline, as he does in Mulholland Drive where 
Naomi Watts plays two characters – Betty Elms and Diane Selwyn. This 
undermines the concept of double identity through exploiting issues of 
representation.  Investing power in this type of image, as well as the montage, is 
to recognise its difference and liminal positioning compared with other films. 
Ironically to invest in a film like Lynch’s is to be seduced into his world of 
disorder and unrest while at the same time allowing one’s subjectivity to be 
governed by it.  The two characters in Mullholland Drive operate as mirrors of 
the other. In this sense theirs is a subjectivity almost entirely based on exchange. 
Moreover, this exchange system is invested in power and powerlessness (the 
capacity/incapacity to act, the loss and acquisition of knowledge and memory, 
and so on). What this mirroring performs, in its exchange system, is a form of 
giftness. One woman offers the gift (of memory, care, power, knowledge) to the 
other in order for both of them to gain a hold on subjectivity. Thus, this is the 
giftness of the mirror as an investment in power. 
 
Mainstream cinema (which necessarily includes Hollywood, but by no means is 
exclusive to it) dominates through its central (and normalising) social discursive 
position as firm representation of attitudes present in phallocentric Western 
culture. These films seek no criticality from their audiences, there are no spaces 
invested by themselves for creative interpretation, instead these films seek a 
compliant investment of power from the individual. In terms of the image as 
state, these films seek the reflection and support in the maintenance of dominant   88
ideology from its governed individuals. The governed subject who enjoys these 
films enjoys resting in the folds of dominant culture and is seduced by images 
that enforce it.  
 
Seduction by the image is not always a negative process and is not limited to 
banal representations of right wing culture. Likewise, the example of painting in 
the Renaissance period, specifically lovers of Crivelli, Botticelli, Mantegna, and 
Tura form an investment of power in these images that reflects a subjectivity that 
locates them in proximity to these images. This form of investment is also made 
in response to the seduction of the image, but to a different effect. The image 
remains meaningful through recognition and subscription to its discourse. The 
more the image is interpreted as being important and powerful in its given visual 
(and social) field, the more seductive it becomes and the less it is met with 
resistance. In this way an investment of power serves to strengthen the seduction 
of the image and ultimately its totalising form. This is not to suggest that 
individuals of society are ineffectual and weak-minded, but rather to highlight 
and expose those investments of power in an image are heterogeneous. Being 
fond of a particular type of image doesn’t necessarily negate other typologies of 
images being attractive, or that images found attractive binds you steadfast to a 
solitary subjectivity. What it indicates is an investment of power along these 
seductive lines produces a reflective mode of subjectivity that responds to the 
dominance of the image with minimal resistance. In this way, the power struggle 
with dominance is a fundamental component to the formation of visual cultures. 
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Returning to the gift, the importance of outlining and discussing Foucault’s 
typologies of power struggles is to emphasis not the power hierarchies that 
potentially exist within a gift economy but to illustrate that every aspect of the 
discourse of the gift, especially the process of communication between giver and 
receiver and their subsequent exchanges of subjectivity, is constantly questioned 
and volatile. Some dominating forces active in gift-giving are the cultural codes 
that determine gifting etiquette, that prescribe specific discursive practice that 
identifies and defines a subject as ‘giver’ or as ‘receiver’.  
 
It is worthwhile keeping in mind Foucault’s intention in outlining a series of 
struggles that ‘attack’ certain forms of power such as dominance, in that their 
purpose lies in questioning the status of the individual. On this basis, struggling 
against dominance as a form of power highlights the particular type of 
investment that the subject produces in order to form and position a specific 
subjectivity. It is the categorisation that dominance inflicts on the subject with 
regards to their formation of subjectivity that is of interest here. In terms of the 
gift, the subject is dominated through the imposition of complying with the 
identity of giver or receiver in that as giver (or as receiver) the subject must 
conform and act in terms of giving and receiving within the laws of gift 
exchange. They are controlled through their investment in giving, just as the 
receiver is controlled and dependent on their investment in receiving. In addition 
as a further manner of compliance, the subject must invest in a power relation 
specific to exchange that recognises their status as giver in order for the receiver 
recognise them as the giver. Foucault argues that two meanings to the word 
subject exists, “subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and   90
tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault 1983a:212) 
and both definitions are present within gift exchange. The paradox that presents 
itself in this investment is that the subject, to engage within gift exchange, must 
allow a certain degree of subjugation to occur in order for the gift to be 
exchanged, yet (and this will be discussed in further depth in the other power 
struggles) concurrently resists such a suppression of free identity (the visual 
example here is the characters in Mullholland Drive, but clearly this is a much 
broader issue). The system of exchange as it appears here is born from resistance 
and compliance. 
 
Not all forms of domination are struggled with in regards to investments of 
power. Read differently, a strong, Western culturally ubiquitous image like the 
Crucifixion of Christ demands a higher level of resistance. The image of Christ 
in church compared to the image of Christ on a children’s Easter cartoon or the 
Renaissance section of the National Gallery, London, asks for a different type of 
investment of power from the subject. In church, commitment to (and 
engagement with) the image of Christ is fundamental to the faith and livelihood 
of the religious individual. Here the individual seeks a conscious domination 
formed through inviting Christ into their life specifically to control it and guide 
it. The crucifixion functions as a synecdoche for particular religious 
denomination and as such, an individual refusing to subscribe to the prescripted 
viewing position that such an image suggests is to greater define their 
subjectivity as critical observer.
4 In Dali’s Christ of St. John of the Cross, we are 
                                                 
4 Horner discusses Husserl’s idea of intentionality, within the context of Levinas’s explanation, 
stating “for Husserl, intentionality is ‘what makes up the very subjectivity of subjects’. He then 
indicates that the types of objects toward which intentionality is directed can be different” 
(Horner 2001:47). This is especially relevant here as it foregrounds the importance of   91
shown to exist underneath the dominance and ubiquity of religion. The cross and 
the body of St. John dominate the picture through their foreboding size – they are 
larger than they should be both in terms of scale and in terms of cultural 
significance. In investing in this image, the subject participates in, and on one 
level forms, a relationship that depends on giving and taking. Does the subject 
take from the image or give to it? The answer to this question is both.
5 The 
subject structures their subjectivity on multiple levels in response to this image 
and in doing so reflects that an investment of power in a relationship is a system 
of exchange - circular and continuous – especially as an image such as Dali’s 
never ceases to question the status of its viewing subject.  
 
Power relations are effected and maintained through their invisible practice and 
deficient self-reflexive apparatus in socio-cultural ‘state’ places, like cinemas, art 
galleries, as well as in cultural situations of overt forms of exchange such as 
Easter, birthday parties and Christmas. Power relations operate as expressions of 
powerful ‘truths’ that are part of the construction of the discourse of the image or 
the discourse of the gift. This form of domination is social in that within the 
power struggle of dominance, the subject resists and opposes a homogeneous 
social positioning that seeks to unify all individuals into a governed position. 
Within visual cultures, to meet all resistances and struggles of forms of power, 
the subject-that-observes, as a critical thinker, produces a mirror or a considered 
                                                                                                                                    
intentionality in the gift object but also within the value and desires attributed to giftness. In a 
religious context this is significant and highly important as the relationship between God and the 
subject is premised on the whole idea and ambiguity of the gift. Life after death is the gift from 
God, if you believe in him.  
5 Later in this section, the relationship between subject and image is read as invitation and as 
refusal.   92
form of investment in the image.
6 They imagine the image on their own terms 
and oppose its seduction. The image – whether it is painting, film, or television – 
is seen not for what it is, but what it is for the subject. The ‘subject-that-
observes’, as opposed to a ‘seduced subject’, does not want to be dominated by 
the image; but if the individual is seduced by the dominance of the image, their 
investment of power takes the form of reflection. The subject-that-observes does 
not want to be exploited by the image through any form of social dominance that 
the image constructs. If the individual is seduced by the social positioning of the 
image, they choose to reflect it by investing a typology of power that affirms and 
seeks to solidify the image’s place and relation to the state (whether the state be 
cinema, art or popular culture). The power struggle of dominance is hard to work 
through precisely because its mechanics demand a lack of questioning from the 
subject in order to operate successfully. In order for power to dominate, the 
subject needs to be dominated via seduction, but this does not always occur. As a 
subject-that-observes, investment into any mode of communication or 
signification, especially visual cultures, is based on a critical approach to power.  
 
The subject is not necessarily seduced by the image and is able to adopt a critical 
perspective regarding the image, as well as their interaction with it, their 
investment of power forming a different form of reflection. The individual as a 
subject-that-observes is, in response to the image and its ‘state’, reflecting 
freedom from the type of individualisation that the image as government 
prescribes.
7 The image is appropriated and reviewed via the desire of the subject. 
                                                 
6 Once more it is important to see this as not merely reflection, but within the context of Derrida. 
In this way the mirror and investment is linked back to giftness. 
7 There is a certain resonance in this conception of freedom and subjectivity in Horner’s 
discussion of Levinas where the question of subjectivity is asked in terms of origin. In becoming   93
The subject-that-observes’s discovery within this investment is not the answer to 
‘what are we?’ but is a refusal of the management and governing that constructs 
a viewing status when the image asks ‘what are we?’ Part of the function of the 
visual in cultures is to allow a struggle with forms of power, and thus becomes an 
investment of power born from struggle.  
 
The subject seeks to move away from any strict sense of categorisation regarding 
individuality and formation of subjectivity, their struggle against a domination of 
power opposing is the idea that there are any fixed subjectivities, especially those 
of giver and receiver. In investing in a power relation, the subject must 
acknowledge that their formation of subjectivity will occur through opposition, 
yet is necessary if the roles of giver and receiver are to be questioned and worked 
with in terms of the circulation and process of gift exchange. It is not a complete 
analysis to analyse the function of the gift through its exchange as object, and not 
the exchange regarding the respective positions of giver and receiver. In 
examining their relevance and significance as subjectivities within a process of 
exchange, the rules, the regulations, and the traditions of the practice of the gift 
can be critiqued in terms of power – how the economy of exchange operates 
based on an investment of power and an investing in power.  
 
2. Exploitation 
 
forms of exploitation that separate individuals from what they produce  
                                                                                                                                    
conscious of our subjectivity we lose our freedom. Horner states, “Levinas’s answer is that it is 
my responsibility for the Other that makes me unique. Prior to my consciousness, prior to my 
freedom, and in my utter passivity, the Other invests me with subjectivity by calling me to my 
responsibility. I only become I in responding “Here I am” to the Other who calls” (Horner 
2001:68).   94
(Foucault 1983a:212) 
Domination of the subject is a social struggle; the image dominates and seduces 
the individual via the state strategies of management and government. The 
struggle that the subject-that-observes is faced with is the consequence of their 
investment of power. To be dominated is to be seduced and remain as a governed 
individual in relation to the image. To become a critical and subject-that-
observes in a power relation with an image, or visual cultures in general, is to 
refuse the constructed viewing position and remain at a distance. This distance is 
part of separating the individual from what they produce.  
 
In separating each struggle the aim is to found a cogent understanding of what 
types of investments of power exist, what ends they serve and the consequences 
that arrive from them. They are not mutually exclusive, and as Foucault points 
out, “in history you can find a lot of examples of these three kinds of social 
struggles, either isolated from each other, or mixed together. But even when they 
are mixed, one of them, most of the time, prevails”(Foucault 1983a:212). The 
subject, in order to oppose the traps of power and knowledge produced through 
epistemes, continues to make these investments as their opposition is also 
directed at the hidden power relations that are imposed on formations of 
subjectivity. Foucault offers the example of secrets as hidden power relations,
8 
another example being the cultural practice of ignoring what the receiver is really 
receiving – not the gift but its opposite. This is a clear example of separating the 
subject from what they produce as it necessitates a conscious blindness to the 
                                                 
8 Perhaps even within the sense of Derrida’s mysterium tremandum.   95
opposition that is exchanged. To explain this further we can turn to Foucault’s 
work on Machiavelli. 
 
In his essay on Govermentality (Foucault 2002), Foucault talks about the art of 
government with reference to Machiavelli’s The Prince (1515). Working through 
Machiavelli’s writings, Foucault analyses the art of government and its objective 
concerning the exercising of power. Foucault looks at the relation of power of the 
Prince and his principality and seeks to analyse the link between them from the 
perspective of how they are joined as well as how they are separated. The Prince 
is located at a distance from his principality despite his control and integral 
association with it. The principality concurrently defines and excludes the 
position of the Prince as well as the person of the Prince, even though the 
principality may have been gained through conquest or legacy. This link between 
the Prince and his principality is what is at risk in this power relation, as the 
Prince needs to be constantly vigilant in the manner of protecting, serving, and 
strengthening his people. The exercising of power in terms of the Prince and the 
principality is not “to reinforce, strengthen and protect” (Foucault 2002:204) the 
people but rather is more concerned with preserving the position of the Prince.  
 
Relating this back to visual cultures, the image functions in the similar position 
of the Prince and the governed individual as the principality. The link between 
the image and governed individual is constantly under threat from other subject-
that-observes (the “Prince’s enemies”) who may interfere with any form of visual 
social domination, through presenting knowledge that may challenge the 
dominance of the image. Other threats that may subvert the image are other   96
visuals that have stronger seductive qualities. What the image seeks to protect is 
not the person of governed individual but more the concept of governing the 
individual, their subjectivity one that can be controlled – a protection of Kant’s 
fondness for the state. This is what the Prince achieves, in protecting his 
principality, he protects his position as Prince and maintains management and 
control, as well as separating himself from what he produces – a well-defined, 
well-ordered principality.
9 
 
The position of the Prince can also be viewed from the place of the subject-that-
observes. Here the subject-that-observes functions in the position of the Prince 
and forms their investment of power on a similar basis as the Prince’s protection 
of his people. As the principality is isolated from but still connected to the 
Prince, so is the subject-that-observes from their criticality with regards to the 
image and visual cultures. In refusing to become governed by the social 
dominance of the visual, the subject-that-observes forms an isolated position as 
such a refusal distances the image from the subject-that-observes. Through this 
liberation from a visual economy that manages individuals, the subject-that-
observes exercises a form of power at a cost. To refuse a specific site, reinforces 
the link between the image and governed individual as much as it reinforces the 
lack of a link between a governed individual and subject-that-observes. The 
subject-that-observes produces a questioning position in order to escape a 
                                                 
9 This is similar to Kant’s notion of the realm of obedience and its distinction from the realm of 
use of reason in light of the struggle of exploitation. Self-incurred tutelage is what exploits the 
individual. To escape it requires distinction between obedience and reason.  If this struggle of 
exploitation separates the individual from what they produce, then escaping one’s own tutelage is 
also self-produced. A negotiation of obedience and reason produced by the subject exploits the 
tutelage and distances the subject from it.    97
governed viewing position, yet in doing so is kept distant from the visual as a 
consequence.   
 
This struggle against the form of exploitation is most significant for the gift as it 
bears on the aspect of communication necessary to systems of exchange. The 
exchange of the gift, the physical handing over of the gift object, is an obvious 
circumstance of separating the subject from what they produce. What is less 
obvious is what is separated in the exchange of relationships between giver and 
receiver. In the event of gift exchange, finality to the giver/receiver relationship 
is implied as the knowledge or information of what connotes ‘exchange’ includes 
an ‘ending’ in the cycle. By this is meant that the giver gives the gift, the receiver 
accepts it and the cycle ends – only to repeat again later. In limiting this process 
of giving to a seemingly singular cycle the relations of power exercise a 
separation. What appears is that the giver has been separated from the gift yet the 
separation that has actually occurred is a consequence of their attempt to 
substantiate their position within an act of exchange. The giver has exploited the 
relations of power present to establish their position as receiver in the following 
cycle. In effect, the gift has been given away in order to create, and secure a 
subjectivity specific to “the division of labor [sic] and the hierarchy of tasks” 
(Foucault 1983a:218) for future acts of exchange. 
 
3. Subjection 
 
The struggle against subjection is to conceive of a power that is completely 
focused on the birth of the subject from governed individual. The power   98
struggles not only help to establish and consolidate a sense of subjectivity, they 
wrestle with any order that assists the government of the individual. Foucault 
states that using the term “to govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible 
field of actions of others” (Foucault 1983a:221). Foucault’s notion of power 
helps to mark the shift, or exchange, in subjectivity from an uncritical and 
unaware positioning to a conscious and self-reflexive positioning, with respect to 
an image in terms of visual culture. For the gift, this rally against control over 
subjectivity highlights how it is not simply the exchange itself that occurs 
between giver and receiver that demarcates the relation or exercising of power 
but rather it is the function of subjectivity (or the formation of it) in adapting and 
responding to each other within exchange that does.  
 
The institution of the image designates specific observing positions from which 
the subject is required to view the image in order to obtain its ‘proper’ meaning 
(this forms part of the privilege of knowledge that the governed individual must 
struggle against in order to become a critical subject-that-observes). This power 
relies on a communication of strict systematic signification and/or symbolisation. 
This typology of information that comes from the image is not to be ignored in 
looking at the function of power, and indeed isn’t by the subject, yet it is to be 
separated not from what is happening within the subject-that-observes, but 
between the subject-that-observes and the image. Because power, here, is argued 
as a relational force, its existence is not completely dependant on systems of 
signification and can’t be read primarily within such a frame. This would 
suppose that power pre-exists a relationship, which it does not. To define power 
relationships only within a communicative domain is to restrict their importance   99
and effect for the subject, as it presents any investment of power by the subject as 
given and definitive. The idea of power pre-existing relations and exchanges 
between subjects tends to triumph in society as the privileges of knowledge are 
generated in a manner that totalises and individualises them.  
 
To separate this classification of power relations from others is not to negate 
them but rather to extend power’s effect and function especially in terms of 
analysing what manifestations of power relations participate in the formation of 
subjectivity. Indeed these three types of relationships (domination, exploitation 
and subjection) involved in the exercising of power are important as even when 
focusing on one of these, more than the others, one needs to be aware that it is 
their inter-relationship that ultimately determines a comprehensive analysis of 
power relations. By doing this we are not limited to viewing how power is 
invested but are also able to consider why and what the consequences are as a 
result of such an investment. 
 
Kant & Foucault: Investing the power 
 
The power relations present in visual culture that exist outside of systems of 
communication but also rest alongside of them. In the moment of resistance to 
the form of power (or what Foucault terms the totalising of the individual) the 
subject-that-observes asks the question “What are we?” The subject shifts from a 
relationship of power based on communication and signification and gravitates 
towards producing and defining meanings in relation to image from a position of 
self. Foucault talks of Kant’s paper that discusses the question “What is the 
Enlightenment?” This is, for Foucault, part of the issue of the Enlightenment –   100
that is, the formation of a type of subjectivity. In engaging with this question, 
Kant’s paper also asks a more fundamental question for all subjects (observing or 
otherwise), ‘What are we?’ that being a critical inquiry into the current status of 
subjects – the first step towards refusing and struggling against the government 
of the species, in terms of society and culture.
10 Kant’s question is directed 
towards the modern state and indicative of its capacity to ask such self-reflexive 
questions.  His questioning allows a self-reflexive moment in the history of ideas 
as well as in a specific point in time. 
 
When in 1784 Kant asked “What is the Enlightenment?” he meant, “what 
is going on just now? What is happening to us? What is this world, this 
period, this precise moment in which we are living?” Or in other words: 
What are we, as Aufklärer, as part of the Enlightenment? … But Kant 
asks something else: What are we? In a very precise moment of history. 
Kant’s question appears as an analysis of both us and our present. 
 (Foucault 1983a:216) 
Foucault accepts Kant’s question as an offer of escaping prescripted power 
structures and relations that belong to the state and its institutions who are 
interested in governing and managing subjects. His response to this question of 
Kant’s is to propose escape from any form of subjugation that institutions 
impose. The result aimed for being new typologies of subjectivities through 
different ways of forming them. This question ‘What are we?’ does more than 
merely direct focus to subjects and their position within a current socio-historical 
domain, rather it demands subjects adopt a critical perspective of themselves, 
their function and being to live out an active existence.  
 
                                                 
10 There is a connection with Kant’s distinction between the merely subjective and ‘subjective 
universality’ in Critique of Judgment (1907) but it would take us too far away from the focus at 
hand to do more than acknowledge it here.    101
For Kant, subjects are responsible for their own tutelage, and the escape from it 
must also be self-incurred. The change from governed individuals to subject-that-
observes must be a responsibility taken up through asking the question ‘What are 
we?’ instigating the exchange between subjectivities, whether they are between 
activity and passivity or giver and receiver. This question is where the 
investment of power occurs. On the precipice of where both subjects and images 
define and position themselves, where the struggles are fought with respect to a 
configuration of our subjectivities, the power relation is also an investment of 
power. Subjects who ask ‘What are we?’ emphasise a conscious self-reflexive 
moment that signals the investment of power in the image for a subject. It marks 
the exchange from subjects to subject-that-observes and for us, redefines how all 
images are viewed as a different subjectivity has been assumed. ‘What are we?’ 
not only engages with struggles and power relations but it also identifies and 
concurrently resists the seduction of the state. Both Foucault and Kant 
acknowledge that subjects have a fondness for the state, the seduction to live out 
an uncritical and unquestioning existence forms part of the attraction of any 
relationship, either with an image or a gift. Kant’s idea of the ‘expanded horizon’ 
is interesting here, as it looks at how we modify our judgment by our speculative 
analysis of the likely judgments of our fellow citizens - a give-and-take process 
by imaginative anticipation. It could be argued that this Kantian version of 
expectation is invested in the gift – from giving, to debt, exchange and value. As 
has been consistently argued here, the gift resists singularity and so makes such 
judgments potentially self-reflexive (intrasubjective and cultural). 
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Such a connection between subjects and images provides fecund ground for the 
gift relationship in exemplifying the manifestation of power relations through a 
system of exchange. In visual cultures, we are confronted with diverse images 
against which we must negotiate our position through this constant questioning. 
Such interrelationships are present within the economy of the gift as each gift 
object possesses its own value, causing both the giver and receiver to 
continuously reassess their interaction with the gift and each other or to revert 
back to the comfortable prescripted positions within gift exchange. Foucault is 
suggesting that the answer to Kant’s question is not to release subjects from this 
individualising ‘comfortability’ but (and this is developed further on in the 
section) to use the question ‘What are we?’ – the investment of power, as a 
platform to create new subjectivities, at the very least engage with exchange as a 
system that holds this potential. As such, it is possible to view Kant’s question as 
both an invitation and refusal in terms of the formation of our subjectivity.  
 
The Image: the invitation and gift as invitation 
 
In gazing at the image the subject enters into a multitude of relations, forming 
investments of power. This is most critical as it fundamentally positions the 
subject and the image, individually and with respect to one another, and aims to 
classify each other through an exercising of power. The power relation is played 
out on the threshold of the subject’s gaze and the gaze of the image. Each time an 
image is looked at, the image re-asks itself ‘What are we?’ and rotates in a 
constant cycle of liminal questioning. The image asks this question as it seeks to 
totalise the individual. In asking ‘What are we?’ from its position as image, it is   103
determining the position from which it is to be viewed. It is important to note that 
the image asks this question to define a position but still recognises the gift and 
freedom line. Once a subject has entered into a discourse with the image, the 
image possesses the privilege of knowledge and uses it in its exercising of power 
to the best effect possible. Compare Andy Warhol’s Marilyn Monroe to Diego 
Velazquez’s The Rokeby Venus, where as two images they superficially seem to 
stand at diametric ends of a visual cultural spectrum. Both paintings hang in 
veritable institutions-as-state, London’s National Gallery (Velasquez) and 
Warhol’s versions of Monroe are to be found in similar institutions including The 
Tate Gallery, and yet his series of images are culturally framed to be interpreted 
as holding a different position within the art world. The Warhol image of the four 
Marilyn’s represents the genre of contemporary art, generically subverting the 
entire concept of representation and the image, at the same time as 
deconstructing the myth of celebrity, through repeatedly presenting its 
representation. Velazquez’s painting draws on classical mythology and 
represents Venus the Goddess and personification of beauty and all that is 
feminine, with her son Cupid. Here Venus looks not only at herself but also 
seems to look at the viewer. The image that is reflected in the mirror is 
ambiguous due to its opacity. This opacity is part of the idea that it exists in a 
different realm of mirrors and mirrorness, like the non-real world that is often 
found in the Baroque. Each image, provocative in its own way, deals with the 
question of femininity and its representation through looking at their place and 
function within a phallo-socio-centric context. The power relation from an 
observer’s perspective brings them much closer together, as here the paintings 
operate under similar surveillance despite their distance. The Rokeby Venus   104
comes from a recognised canonical position within the art world appearing to 
oppose Warhol’s piece despite its similar reverence as canonical art. 
 
The investment of power here relies on the invitation to question the subject’s 
position and formation of subjectivity in response to a constructed and governed 
individualisation. In an abstract sense, the relationship of invitation and refusal in 
Kant’s question reflects a gift relationship as it possesses a similar paradox. 
Initially the question ‘Who are we?’ appears benevolent and to some extent it is, 
yet as Foucault’s perspective indicates, it also holds an aggressive position as it 
takes the formation of subjectivity and invites the subject to analyse their 
position both in relation to the discourse and power relation that they are a part 
of, and redefine it. From the perspective of the gift, it is this sense of the 
continuous re-cycling of subjectivities between people (the exchange of position 
as giver and receiver) through relations of power that mirrors this assertive 
questioning and suggests an exchange of opposition. 
 
The Subject: the refusal and refusing the gift because of the attached debt 
 
In forming a critical subjectivity the subject must also pose the question ‘what 
are we?’ in order to invest in a conscious identification with images. The subject 
asks it from a different point of view, as this inquiry is a refusal. It asks only to 
say ‘I am not’ but the ‘I am not’ is in response to the determining position asked 
by the image. In the Louvre sits Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. It is an attraction of the 
museum, one of its treasures, and yet the painting is encased behind glass and 
seems very small in comparison with the many other paintings in the room. The   105
Mona Lisa attracts the crowd not because it is the best painted, or because it is 
the most aesthetically pleasing, but because as an image, the Mona Lisa is a 
culturally recognised ‘piece of art’. As a highly valued object of art, the Mona 
Lisa reflects the history of art and the art gallery as institution-as-state. Here, the 
power exercised by the image invokes a desire within the subject to become a 
part of the body and privilege of knowledge within the image. The subject has 
choices in engaging with the image and also in the formation of their subjectivity 
by asking ‘what are we?’. Subjectivity can be invested in the image, within the 
confines of the image, so that the governed individual remains controlled but 
within the discourse of the image. The subject is not only seduced by the image 
but also by the state. Viewing the Mona Lisa becomes more about the act of 
viewing and being included in a cultural moment rather than viewing the Mona 
Lisa as a singular piece of art. 
 
The refusal is a resistance against impositions of power. In refusing to subscribe 
to dominated, exploited and subjected mechanisms of power, the subject uses 
their investment to expose power relations, in terms of its machinations and 
consequences. This implication of investment returns us to the themes of the gift 
as a concept that contains its opposite, and as a system of exchange. Subjectivity 
influenced via a refusal (in effect investing power in a relationship that does not 
seem to advocate it) helps to analyse power outside its rationalities. Put 
differently, to analyse the gift it is better to view it as a debt. To argue a liberty of 
subjectivity, it is better to look at what imposes and controls it. Investing in 
relations of power becomes more about working against resistances in 
relationships like that of giver and receiver and producing subjectivities that are   106
not restricted. Such is the pervasive nature of these resistances, and the 
subsequent struggles against forms of power, that the subject in process becomes 
located not simply in a subject type but in a constant exchange of subjectivities 
through opposition.  
 
3.2  Bodies and Gifts: Analysis of power relations through investment 
  
The focus of this next section will be to conceptualise these Foucauldian forms 
of power, and power struggles, to the more image specific example of the body. 
It is the notion of the body’s capacity to mark systems of exchange within 
various socio-cultural discourses that is to be held in readiness here. Given that 
our culture is saturated with a diverse range of bodies from the canonical to the 
popular to the sub-cultural, this corporeal example keeps the issue of 
representation of the body separate from the topic at hand, that is to track the 
investment of power in the image via the body, through forms of visual media; 
the body as resemblance and as similitude; and to argue visual cultures as 
responsible for our culturally constructed corporality. In using the body to 
exemplify a subject’s investment of power, it is possible to develop the concept 
of power relations working as a discursive practice in visual cultures, 
subsequently arguing that all images, specifically here bodies, are interpreted 
through forms of power. This viewpoint provides an alternative perspective in 
looking at the gift. It is the similarity within the structure of the subject’s 
investment that is of interest to the argument of the gift. As images and bodily 
images are interpreted through power, so are forms of the gift. The second half of   107
this section is therefore structured as a comparative analysis of the subject’s 
investment and interpretation regarding the body and the gift via power relations.  
 
This section looks at the construction of corporal representation in visual culture 
rather than the topographical interpretation of the heterogeneity of bodies, and 
involves the observer at the primary level of thinking about the formation of the 
visual. By looking closely at how bodies are formed through a framework of 
power, the observer’s transformation is traced from governed individual to 
subject-that-observes. Avoiding exclusive representations of the body, the 
discussion is freed from the confines of genre and visual mediums, and can look 
at typologies of the body and how they function in terms of investing power, and 
power as a discursive practice. The aim is to use representations of the body in 
order to illustrate how an observer responds and invests their subjectivity into the 
visual through a power structure associated with giftness. It is not just a response 
and/or investment to any representation of the body but a response/investment to 
all bodies, disruptive bodies, sick bodies, healthy bodies, attractive bodies, 
feminine bodies, black bodies, Asian bodies, masculine bodies, Caucasian 
bodies, infantile bodies, bodies that tear, bodies that mend, bodies that move, that 
stand still and so on. The effects present in such investments of power are looked 
at to uncover how the subjectivity of an observer is formed. The example of the 
body further asks: do different representations of the body construct different 
observing positions? Looking at examples of particular constructions of imaged 
bodies deals with these sorts of questions and establishes a discursive practice 
that enables the subject to form interpretations through power relationships. This   108
in turn paves a way for the subjectivities involved within gift exchange to be 
interpreted under similar forms of investments in power.  
 
Powerful bodies 
 
For Foucault, power is produced, managed, and organised by various socio-
cultural discourses, some of his most famous examples being the discourses of 
medicine and sexuality operating as institutions. In examining these discourses, 
Foucault is analysing the actions that happen on the individual, noting what 
power relations are constructed as a result of these actions. In Discipline and 
Punish (1987) Foucault explains the spectacle of public execution, and uses it to 
exemplify how power relations are established and controlled through the state or 
government as institution, and how this governmentality and state control within 
culture and society is acted out on the body through modes of punishment. 
 
In his analysis of tortured territory, (concerning both body and culture) Foucault 
uses the body as a corporal example, for his new configurations of power and 
power-knowledge. The body works as power’s tangible reality and active 
existence, as from this perspective, this is what power (and power-knowledge 
which is returned to later) enters into and becomes for Foucault.  After creating a 
visual sense of the condemned body, one is taken to the spectacle of the scaffold 
– where the body is put on display as example for other bodies and tortured. (It is 
significant to note that the spectacle of the scaffold is constructed as a discourse 
of the state as a gift to the people. The display of the body of the criminal is 
positioned as the gift of law and power of the authority). The body is a   109
fundamental part of Foucault’s larger research objective – the genealogy of the 
human being becoming a subject and how systems of knowledge and power 
produce each other, their manifestations acted out through visual constructions of 
the body.  
 
These manifestations produce social orders of the body as different power 
structures and relations are imbued with different knowledges. The implications 
of knowledge in this regard are the typologies of discursive practices that form 
multiple interpreting positions. Foucault suggests that the separation of power 
and knowledge be discarded as forms that exist outside of and separate to each 
other, and instead view power and knowledge as inextricably linked, symbiotic 
forces that produce and propel each other through respective connotations:  
power produces knowledge … power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. These 
‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, therefore, not on the 
basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in relation to the 
power system, but, on the contrary, the subject who knows, the objects to 
be known and the modalities of knowledge must be regarded as so many 
effects of these fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their 
historical transformations. 
(Foucault 1987:27-28) 
 
 
Foucault’s neologism ‘power-knowledge’ has little direct connection with the 
image or the gift, but is applicable in terms of construction, development, and 
activity in forming multiple discourses. The subject meets the image with a prior 
corpus of knowledge, possessing a competence in reading images based on an 
archive of various images already seen and ready to be drawn on upon. This   110
produces a typology of knowledge based on the image they find. For the 
observer, it is the power-knowledge combination of power struggles and 
relations that have constructed the image in question that controls and governs 
the knowledges and discursive practices that are invested in. This is how one 
body can generate more than one discourse in the social order. The body 
becomes a supportive structure for relations of power and knowledge allowing 
the subject-that-observes to invest in the corporal image and subjugate it through 
transforming the image into an object of knowledge.  
 
In Gangs of New York, the paternal body presents a multitude of social discourse 
within the characters of Priest Vallon and William Cutting (The Butcher). These 
differing social discourses are viewed from the perspective of Amsterdam who 
functions as the lost child. Vallon and Cutting embody the characteristics of the 
father as carer and barbarian, representations that are formed as a consequence of 
the various social orders that they are produced by and within. Cutting, after 
murdering Vallon, appears to be far removed from any sense of the paternal for 
Amsterdam, yet is connected to him as a father figure both through his desire for 
a son and through Amsterdam’s Hamletesque desire for the return of a father, as 
well as the exacting of his father’s revenge. Cutting’s body generates a 
multiplicity of discourses through the social order of the film all of which can be 
read through a series of gifts. It is not solely the paternal that determines 
Cutting’s corporeality however it is the dominant drive in determining his 
character. Interestingly it is within the clearest paternal acts that the presence of 
the gift appears. As leader of the ‘natives’, he fathers a patriotic culture based on 
racism and xenophobia through giving freedom and liberty via battle. He fathers   111
a part of society (the Five Points) through domination, exploitation, and 
subjection under the guise of the gift regarding protection and manipulative 
benevolence. In a number of scenes Cutting is shown to randomly give cuts of 
meat to his ‘constituency’
11 – this appearing to be a form of controlled debt 
incurrence and carefully syphoned need rather than spontaneous giving. In 
addition to his ‘fathering’ of Amsterdam, looking to the role of Jenny also 
suggests that he enacted a fatherly role with regards to her character. It is through 
his gifts to Jenny (for example a locket – a highly personalised and unusual act 
from this man) that the duality of the paternal body as carer and barbarian is 
enforced.  His control over her is maintained through these ‘gifts’ as they 
consistently inflict a debt to his care and an acknowledgement of the relation of 
power between them.  
 
Paternity is predominantly defined and presented in terms of Amsterdam and this 
compels the observer to connect the film’s paternal bodies in the same way. 
Subsequently, the representations of Cutting and Vallon as fathers are subjected 
(independently and in response to each other) through their corporeality as 
objects of knowledge in that they identify the film’s socio-cultural notion of 
fatherhood in addition to Amsterdam’s own notion. The death of Priest Vallon is 
not framed in battle but as the loss of Amsterdam’s father. Similarly, the 
exposing of Amsterdam’s trickery is not framed as mutiny but as a betrayal of 
Cutting’s love for him – the loss of a son. Amsterdam is reprimanded and 
punished (barbarically albeit) but not killed. His paternity is contextualised in 
terms of a gift economy as all his actions are constitutive of retribution, for 
                                                 
11 Another typology of gift that appears within the film can be likened to the concept and 
deliverance of the threat in the section on pleasure and play, where Tammeny solicits Cutting for 
help in gaining votes illegally.   112
example, the returning or reciprocating the gift of his life and upbringing by 
Priest – his biological father – to revenge his murder and become a good son; but 
there are also conditions of gratitude to acknowledge the opportunities afforded 
by Cutting, such as his elevated station in society, certain privileges, all because 
of Cutting’s adopted paternity for Amsterdam. 
 
Of course this filmic example of the subjection of the corporal into an object of 
knowledge is quite literal but there is a similar investment in the structure of 
power-knowledge even when the social discourses of the body are not so 
apparent. In The Hours (Daldry 2002) the maternal body (which has been read 
consistently here as a cultural configuration of the gift) is not simply a positive 
generative nurturing body but is also self-destructive within its own existence. 
This self-destruction is attached to the maternal body, but also appears separate 
to it. Again, it is through the act of the gift that an investment in the structure of 
power-knowledge is furthered.  
 
Unlike Cutting’s seemingly obsequious gifts, the gifts attached to the maternal 
body that appear in The Hours are failed gifts, in spite of their genuine intention. 
They are excessive, repeated, sometimes absent, and all fail in the sense that they 
deny the maternal body to nurture. In this way the gift can be read as en 
souffrance – the gift as suffering.
12 This is different from the gift that is not 
recognised, as it is a gift that never arrives, both in terms of exchange and 
through investment. Virginia’s gift of ginger for her sister’s children is absent – it 
doesn’t arrive from London and this sets up the pattern of gifts in connection to a 
                                                 
12 This term is taken from Lacan’s ‘Seminar of the Purloined Letter’ found in Yale French Studies 
52 p.38-72 (1975).   113
maternal nurturing for the film. As the ginger is absent, Virginia has no object 
through which to invest and enact her desire to nurture. Her body as maternal 
constantly suffers, finding momentary distraction with her niece who gives a 
dead bird a funeral. Her zealous care for the dead bird reflects the failure of her 
gift and the failure of her capacity to nurture as a maternal body. Clarissa’s gift 
of flowers for Richard represents her excessive need to be accepted as a maternal 
body nurturing. The flowers represent life and indirectly her desire to nurture 
Richard through his sickness (AIDS) but fail as Richard rejects her nurturing 
through his rejection of her body as maternal. The investment in power-
knowledge within this film is determined through the seduction of the nurturing 
mother juxtaposed against the neurotic mother. All women, Virginia, Laura, and 
Clarissa, display characteristics of madness and neuroses, yet in their acts of 
mothering, the moments where they are defined by through their gifts of 
nurturing, they appear sane and without suffering. When Laura decides to bake a 
cake for Dan, it seems as a mammoth and incomprehensible task for her. She 
only seems to narrowly manage it through redefining the action as spending time 
with her son, as a mother making the cake rather than as a domesticated 
housewife. The attempt at baking the cake fails and Laura repeats it after making 
the decision to abandon her body as mother
13, the successful cake only serving to 
remind the observer of its initial failure. For the governed individual, the 
relationship of power-knowledge that is imposed on the image is seductive and 
the observer is the one who is subjected and objectified.  
 
                                                 
13 Interestingly, Laura’s suicide attempt fails because she cannot disassociate herself from any 
nurturing role. She vows to leave her family after the birth of her second child – once she has her 
‘body’ back and can absolve herself from any subjection that she feels a maternal body imposes.   114
Such heterogeneity helps to frame the body as a signifying image that needs to be 
read differently from other bodies, similar bodies and at times, in contrast to the 
same body. In The Hours, the sexualised bodies of Virginia, Claudia and Laura 
are different from their maternal bodies as their separate relations of power 
outlay the differing social orders of the same body. The women as lovers call for 
an investment from the observer in the power relations that recognise the body of 
the feminine, the vulnerable and the object of affection. The observer, to invest in 
the discourse of love, needs to read the costumes, hairstyles, and so on, on their 
bodies in this frame so to construct meaning in the narrative. However, the same 
textual components symbolise a different social order of Virginia, Claudia, and 
Laura’s bodies when they begin to mother. The diegetics of the film foreground 
the discourse and become conventionalising signifiers so that observer can invest 
in a specific power structure that distinguishes the lover’s body from the 
maternal body. Through investing in the power-knowledge of the female bodies 
of Virginia, Claudia, and Laura, and concurrently bodies within the film, the 
observer understands that the bodies of the women haven’t changed but have in 
the sense their bodies have transformed and moved across discourses. The 
women as lovers operate via an alternate set of actions to that of women as 
mothers. The corporal signifier of the mother in The Hours is constant but the 
surrounding signs including the flowers, the cake, the ginger, and even the book 
Mrs Dalloway (both its suggested as well as its literal presence) are typologies of 
signs that have and have not shifted. Relations of power have altered because of 
how their bodies are imaged and constructed in shifting discourses of time and 
space. What this example offers for the gift is the situation wherein the gift 
object need not be the significant focus. The gift object is a space that has   115
surrounding relations of power and it is the investment in these relations that 
affects its value relative to its exchange, particularly between subjectivities. 
 
Using Foucault’s example of the spectacle, we can look at these social orders of 
the body as the spectacle, the body itself as spectacle, and the spectacle of the 
body, to see how the construction of the body image is riddled with actions of 
power.
14 The aim is not to methodically work through the multiple 
representations of the body in varying discourses to see how they are powerful in 
their own right, or to see how a body works within specific social orders, but 
rather to employ the social orders of the body to exemplify how an image, as part 
of a visual culture, is constructed for a specific action. As mothers, Virginia, 
Claudia and Laura possess a sense of meta-corporeality in that their mothering 
not only forms part of the thematic and narrative core of the film but is also 
provides material for each and every maternal or nurturing act that occurs. The 
series of gifts in the form of food works well here. Each gift of food – Virginia’s 
afternoon tea (and absent ginger), Claudia’s party, Laura’s cake, seemingly 
works towards a strengthening of the women’s’ identity as nurturing mothers but 
instead highlights their vulnerability as women and their inability to successfully 
nurture. The failure of each gift adds to their suffering and despondence about 
their role as mother. The bodies of these women are not purely ‘bodies’ in this 
film. They become vessels that carry the issues, morals and problematic of 
femininity and motherhood. In terms of the spectacle, Virginia, Claudia, and 
                                                 
14 Action in this sense referring to Foucault’s reworking of power as a social feature that holds 
currency only once “it is put into action”(Foucault 1983:219) and in terms of power relations 
possessing a discursive function. This is not to deny that representations of the body will play an 
important and central part in such a study of the constructed corporal image, as some discussion 
will be necessary in order to observe how a social order of the body is constructed and how such 
a construction of the imaged body affects the subject-that-observes. 
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Laura corporealise the torture exacerbated by power relations. Their gifts of food 
reflect the emotions within their torture.   
 
This example of the gift as food is similar to the function of the bread and cordial 
in Lewis Hyde’s recounting of the nineteenth century Scottish folk tale, The Girl 
and The Dead Man. This folk tale moves along via a sequence of four gifts that 
revolve around food. Hyde uses the tale to evoke the circular motion of the gift, 
demonstrating that the gift must be kept in motion if it is to ‘survive’. He argues, 
“A gift that cannot move loses its gift properties” (Hyde 1983:8) and this is what 
is observed in the failure of the gifts from the three women in The Hours. Hyde 
further argues the gift as a consumable item, inferring its existence has a use-by 
date, “Another way to describe the motion of the gift is to say that a gift must 
always be used up, consumed, eaten. The gift is property that perishes” (Hyde 
1983:8). The failed gifts in The Hours perish and cause suffering because they 
don’t move, or because they are not ‘eaten’. The maternal body and its need to 
nurture is a typology of feeding. The women’s nurturing is a form of gift in that 
they are giving their ‘children’ the food of their love, the moment it is given it is 
lost, consumed, devoured – a property that perishes or in other words of Hyde’s 
“the gift perishes for the person who gives it away” (Hyde 1983:9). The 
investment in the gift displays the dissolution of one relation of power for the 
sake of another. It is not the literal gift that perishes but the specific investment 
of giftness that is lost, almost forsaken. 
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4. Discursive Practices, the Subject, and the Gift 
4.1 Semiotics and the Gift 
 
4.2 Positionalities within discourse 
 
4.3 The Enunciative Function 
 
 
An inquiry into the discursive practices of the gift presents a number of questions that 
involve the subject and its relationship to both the gift and giftness. Primarily it is the 
fundamental question 'what is a gift?' that invites such investigations, as it involves 
the complexities of the discourse of the gift and must be looked at with specific regard 
to the construction of discursive practice. By linking the image with the gift, the aim 
is to think about the gift from the perspective of how the gift is come to be 
represented through signification rather than look to its literal constitution. This is part 
of the strategy to develop the notion of giftness, here, as a common element that 
undermines different discursive frameworks. A move away from the traditional 
hermeneutic investigation of a gift-in-circumstance (that is its physical manifestation) 
opens up possibilities of negotiations in terms of the gift, the subject, and discursive 
practices. This is not to negate the various models that have been developed within 
and across disciplines, most notably from anthropology to other knowledge systems 
such as philosophy, cultural studies, and their respective textual readings. However it 
is to acknowledge that what lies at the heart of so many recent studies of the gift is 
this need to observe and examine the gift beyond its apparent qualities. For example, 
how is a gift recognised, how are situations of giftness negotiated, and where do these 
discourses operate? Once more the emphasis here will be on the gift and image, and in 
doing so the discussion aims at developing a different discourse concerning the 
interpretation of the gift. In selecting the image as a link with the gift, a myriad of   119
gifts arises forcing us to look at the gift in different ways. The most interesting 
quandary that faces us is to locate and question the relationship between giftness and 
the gift within discursive practice and account for the instability that occurs during 
discursive exchange through another unstable signification system such as visual 
culture. Rather, what we are also looking for is a discursive practice of giftness that 
functions as a thematic drive in visual mediums such as film, painting, television, art 
and photography. By figuring a typology of gifts and a typology of discursive 
practices through theories and examples of the image,  we move towards a definition 
of giftness. 
 
"The discourse disintegrates as soon as it appears" (Foucault 1986a:34) 
 
One of the key issues that Foucault brings to our attention in this disarmingly simple 
sentence is that discourses have the sense of permanence, but are constantly in a state 
of flux. Discursive formations, for Foucault, are inextricably tied to their 
disintegration. Apart from the ramifications this has for the gift itself, it is important 
to acknowledge this Foucauldian point for any study of discourse. To work towards 
the idea of giftness it is essential to consider features of the discourse of the gift (that 
is, the gift in its discursive domain). In order to theorise how we may come to 
recognise a gift, we must first consider the gift through its discursive practices and 
how different forms of discursive practices can be applied to the gift. To do this, two 
different approaches to theorizing discourse will be discussed – a semiotic driven one, 
and one considering ideas from Foucault. By utilising two different theoretical models 
we are able to work through the discursive practices involving the gift and the image 
in a number of interconnected ways. The purpose of employing both a semiotic   120
(mainly looking at work by Kristeva) and Foucauldian argument on discursive 
practices is to widen and broaden conceptions of gift, image and discourse within a 
larger cultural sense. It will also enable us to consider the ways in which the gift is 
rendered as a type of discursive practice. 
 
4.1 Semiotics and the gift 
 
This approach to formations of discourse is important to the present thesis as it draws 
attention to the fundamental function of the gift. In doing so we come to recognise 
one of the key relational dynamics of the gift - its ability to communicate within the 
social order, and consequently, how it is recognised. A gift communicates through its 
intertextual connections to previous gifts and previous gift circumstances. In this 
sense we are always responding to a gift via a variety of other gifts and their 
discursive practices. It can be argued that the pluralism of a gift's meaning becomes 
more important than the gift itself.   This is one of the reasons why a semiotic 
approach is adopted here; it shifts the emphasis from attempting to establish a 
concrete meaning (perhaps even the desire to achieve ‘full’ interpretation) to one that 
deliberates on a multiplicity of meanings. This multiplicity operates both within the 
production and operation of the signifier and within the dynamics and slippages of the 
multiple signifieds. Furthermore, coded processes and their formation and interaction 
within a socio-cultural context  can be seen as a central part of exchange, and in 
particular within the gift. Semiotics allows analyses of discourses through cultural 
systems, structures and codes from a cross-referencing sense.
1 A semiotics analysis 
                                                             
1 To be more precise, Kristeva's argument on intertextuality moves away from referencing and closer 
towards a systematic look at exchange of sign systems.   121
will not only enable a reading of giftness, but also reveal aspects of the discourse 
itself. 
 
Intertextuality 
 
There are many instances within visual culture where intertextual references are made 
easily and without much cross-textual interpretative effort. This relative ease is part of 
the function of many of these references, particularly within popular culture; and in 
this sense part of their process (from economy to pleasure) is not simply to make 
textual references but to provide a sense of communal knowledge. The fact that most 
viewers of these texts will grasp the allusions with ease, or that even if they are not 
grasped very little is lost in terms of interpretation, indicates that what is at hand is a 
different sort of cultural gift. This is the idea that the observer exists in a community 
of users, each one sharing the phenomenon of intertextuality, even if they are not 
necessarily sharing the actual references themselves. (This can be linked back to 
Kant’s theory regarding self-tutelage, where the exchange of subjectivities is based on 
self-reflexive questioning concerning the status of the individual, and to Foucault’s 
invitation to use this criticality to create different and new subjectivities). This is 
described in terms of the gift here because the intertextuality is operating within a 
system of exchange. This is the gift’s dynamic operation of relations through 
exchange. However this is not to say that all intertextuality is gift exchange. This is a 
polysemic system, where exchange is a unifying and identifiable element. Where this 
exchange system of intertextuality becomes part of the discourse of giftness, there 
exists a ‘layer’ of semiotic order of the gift. 
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It is important to isolate both orders of intertextuality clearly here (even if quite often 
the two will be linked) so as separate investigations can occur with specific regard to 
the gift, the image and the gift within the image. To understand this better we can turn 
to a specific example, this time from the Renaissance. Sandro Botticelli's Adoration of 
the Magi (1476-7)
2, as with a great deal of art during this period, was a commissioned 
piece and as such was produced and operated from a strong political and personalised 
perspective. In this particular case the patron was Guaspare di Zanobi del Lama, who 
was a close friend of the Medici family. A number of interesting elements exist within 
this painting that can be directly correlated to the present argument of intertextuality 
and discourse. Botticelli paints the three male members of the Medici family as the 
three wise men. The specific intertextual connection between the socio-cultural 
context of that time (the financial and political position of the Medici family) and a 
Biblical story is the reference to a literary text (Bible) from a visual text (painting)
3. 
What is of particular interest here is the gift of perspective. To the right hand side of 
the painting is what Vasari argued to be a self-portrait of the artist, Botticelli. Leaving 
to one side the historical validity of such a claim, focusing on only the potential of its 
truth - this claim makes room for the core constituent of intertextuality (leading us to 
the other interpretive order of intertextuality). This representation of the artist and 
their gaze creates another text - the text of the spectator. Botticelli's gaze gives an 
undercurrent of self-reflexivity in the painting. The gaze to the spectator invites a 
consideration of what their function is in the event of the image and as a result asks 
the double question of 'what do you see?' and 'how do you see it?’ This meta-
interpretive process call up the semiotic argument of intertextuality whose main focus 
                                                             
2 Botticelli painted five versions of the subject entitled Adoration of the Magi. This particular reference 
is specific to his painting completed in 1476-7. 
3 Only the general sense of intertextuality is being dealt with here- the fundamental level - only to 
move on later to show how such references are actually a solid basis for the more interesting aspect of 
intertextuality - the transposition of signifying practices.   123
was not concerned with purely acknowledging the 'what' questions but more with the 
'how' questions. Such constructions of intertextuality (via either semiotic or generic 
models) are not limited to either/or field. It is important to maintain the fundamental 
premise of intertextuality, which is that ability of both text and spectator to cross over 
and interpret from differing socio-cultural or socio-textual systems, structures and 
orders. It is to this aspect of intertextuality and giftness that the thesis must now turn. 
 
Kristeva 
 
Kristeva's intertextuality is important as it is, by her own volition, not for the 
reference of one text to another. She posits two terms - dialogism and transposition:  
 
The term inter-textuality denotes this transposition of one (or several) sign 
systems into another; but since this term has often been understood in the 
banal sense of 'study of sources,' we prefer the term transposition because it 
specifies that the new passage from one signifying system to another demands 
a new articulation of the thetic ... If one grants that every signifying practice is 
a field of transpositions of various signifying system (an inter-textuality), one 
then understands that its 'place' of enunciation and its denoted 'object' are 
never single, complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, 
shattered, capable of being tabulated.  
(Kristeva 1984b:59-60) 
 
This is also the point at which the idea of giftness and discourse can be understood. It 
is this last aspect of Kristeva's transposition that has particular relevance for an 
intertextual analysis of the gift. If we liken such signifying practices to gazes that 
come from the image and gazes that rest upon the image, we can also specify that 
such gazing positions are never homogenous but are always heterogeneous. These 
multiple viewing positions constructed both by image and by spectator, are the places 
of enunciation that Kristeva argues. If we are to grant that any system of exchange is a   124
signifying practice, then any structure, system or instance of the gift is also a 
signifying practice and is subject to the same assumptions. Therefore the gift, and any 
system of exchange, is a field of transpositions and is able to be classified as 
intertextual, but more importantly, heterogeneously intertextual. These are the 
discursive acts that enable the gift to exist, for it is the formation of relations through 
exchange. 
 
This heterogeneity of the intertextual is directly embedded in the notion of 
experience. Kristeva's field of transpositions not only asks intertextuality to be 
reexamined via a semiotic framework, but asks more specifically to look at the 
signifying systems that are produced by such a practice and also how these 
vacillations establish that there is never any homogenous experience - here no 
homogenous 'gift' experience. No gift is identical to another yet relies on knowledge 
of other gifts (and other displays of giftness) in order to construct separation and 
distinction. Likewise, every gift (every moment of exchange, debt, claim to property 
and ownership, and so on) exists outside of the familiar patterns because it always 
exists in potentia as the non-gift or the unrecognised/unrecognisable gift. Kristeva's 
reading of the intertextual is more important here because of the emphasis she places 
on heterogeneity. Heterogeneity exists within these fields of transpositions because of 
its transcendental referential. By this is meant that the heterogeneity produced or 
emphasised by Kristeva's intertextuality looks beyond the initial referential that 
signifies 'gift'. 'This is a gift' is not so much the focus any more; it is rather the 
transposition of the gift, 'how as this gift is produced does it become recognised as a 
gift' and 'how does it produce again' - that becomes the focus and relevant to   125
heterogeneity. It is in the reading, the process of interpreting the gift and image 
through this field of transpositions that the conception of gift/exchange is formed.  
 
It is necessary to clarify Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic and the Symbolic 
dispositions. As Leon Roudiez points out in his introduction to Revolution in Poetic 
Language (1984b), Kristeva demarcates between la sémiotique in the specific domain 
of semiotics as the general science of signs - containing the other aspect of the 
signifying process of language - the Symbolic, whereas le sémiotique is its antithesis. 
Even though most of Kristeva's theory deals with spoken and written language, the 
ideas on 'language in general' are still the same. Le sémiotique not only disrupts and 
jars systems of language but also offers a space in which discourses can multiply. It is 
because of le sémiotique that discursive practices come to form discourses, and 
discourses form discursive practices, as part of the anarchic nature of le sémiotique is 
its ability to create space outside of the Symbolic. This is not to posit le sémiotique as 
a reversing process but to highlight its function of operating beyond and outside the 
surface/s of language and particular discourses. To dangerously simplify, the gift, 
every gift, works within fields of transposition helping to facilitate situations of 
exchange and further future phenomena of giftness. In doing this, not only is the 
discourse of exchange drawn upon but other discourses (and this is where le 
sémiotique shatters discourse into discursive practices) such as politics, power, 
knowledge (and power/knowledge as observed in the chapter on Foucault), culture, 
and the production of meaning, become part of the overall process of giftness. Whilst 
not directly in correlation with the unconscious/conscious dichotomy, or similar 
dichotomies, there are certain distinctions that apply. The strongest demarcation to 
identify is that le sémiotique/Symbolic distinction Kristeva makes is through   126
language. Keeping with this line of inquiry we can exemplify exchange and its 
phenomenon of gift as a textual system in the manner in which Kristeva views text: 
"the text [gift] that is analysed is actually the effect of the dialectical interplay 
between semiotic and symbolic dispositions ... the text [gift] cannot be thought of as a 
finished piece of cloth; it is in a perpetual state of flux as different readers intervene, 
as their knowledge deepens, and as history moves on" (Kristeva 1984b:5).  
 
If we insert the gift in the place of the text - or modify our reading of the gift to mirror 
that of interpreting a textual system - then Kristeva's theory of le sémiotique holds 
considerable relevance to a better understanding of the function of exchange in a 
cultural sense. Such an approach is highly applicable because of the position from 
which we are looking at exchange, gift and the image. The intent here is to not focus 
on the end product - material representations or literal manifestations of the gift - but 
to look at a heterogeneity that exists within the place of production and operation. In 
this sense we also call upon and involve the argument with other discourses and 
spheres of thought – including history, culture, and politics. This fracturing process of 
production, particularly the production of exchange, is the main concern, and is 
manifested in such textual systems that Kristeva analyses. 
 
This next part will not discuss literal representations of a gift nor will it be solely 
concerned with analysing situations and circumstances of gift presentation. Instead 
this section on discursive practices is directed more towards the production of the gift 
and giftness. Therefore shouldn’t one’s question shift to what the gift produces rather 
than the operations and presentations of the gift? Such a question confines boundaries 
and cultural beliefs and conceptions of giftness within its process of signification.   127
How can a boundary of the gift be produced and encapsulated within its system of 
signification? These questions are aimed at not searching for gifts that are produced 
from a realm of exchange but aimed more at producible gifts. To merely seek out and 
identify operating gifts that articulate their presence via recognition is to only go so 
far in the analytic process. By looking towards the producible gift we are engaging 
with the inside, the structure of giftness phenomena. Heterogeneity, transposition, and 
dialogism - all components relevant to giftness are found here, in the investigation of 
the producible gift. By working from this position the aim is not to side step any 
representation or signification of the gift (as this is an important but different issue). 
Indeed any representation or any signification of the gift immediately sets up a subject 
- object relationship anterior to (re)cognition.  
 
Positing the object (gift), subject (the giver) and signification (the experience of 
giving and receiving) as producible and production, rather than produced - helps to 
uncover the conditions that produce these producibles. What we are trying to 
concentrate on in this part are two things - the production of discursive practices 
(specific to the gift) and in turn, what these discursive practices produce themselves. 
Kristeva's semiotic chora is a good example.  
… no Meaning exists, but there do exist articulations heterogeneous to 
signification and to the sign: the semiotic chora. Though discrete and 
disposed, the chora cannot be unified by a Meaning, which, by contrast, is 
initiated by a thesis, constituting ... a break… 
(Kristeva 1984b:36). 
Kristeva argues by retaining the term semiotic (with regards to describing the chora) 
"[it] will in fact allow us to envisage a heterogeneous functioning, which Freud called 
'psychosomatic'" (Kristeva 1984b:41). Kristeva works through her idea of le 
sémiotique within Freudian theory in order to expand her conceptions of the subject   128
and language. Marrying Freud's term 'psychosomatic' with the semiotic, Kristeva's 
idea is to emphasise the concurrent nature of the biological and the social in both 
terms. Ultimately such a configuration is constructed with the signifying process in 
mind. Here Kristeva is elaborating how signification exists with the process of 
signifying and also alongside, separate to it: "the term 'semiotic' can simultaneously 
be seen as part of a larger process that englobes it: the signifying process" (Kristeva 
1984b:41). This part of Kristevan theory is important to work through carefully as it 
helps to outline how a subject comes to position and be positioned within a signifying 
practice and within discursive practices.  
 
After Kristeva has established her definitions of le sémiotique and Symbolic, she 
distinguishes le sémiotique from the realm of signification in order to establish the 
thetic and the subject's relationship to it. Therefore, the thetic marks and forms the 
threshold of language. It separates le sémiotique from the Symbolic. By being a part 
of each realm, le sémiotique - anarchic and disruptive; the Symbolic - structured and 
ordered, the thetic becomes simultaneously both a fundamental part of each order, yet 
separate from them.  It is the point where the subject enters and becomes part of the 
Symbolic but because it is also part of le sémiotique (through its boundary); it also 
marks the subject's entry into an alternative order. If le sémiotique establishes space 
for new systems (Kristeva's example is for poetic language) then these systems are 
produced to operate anti-thetical to the constructions and rules within the Symbolic 
order. With regard to discursive formations, these spaces are where the gift, and 
potentialities of giftness, resides. The subject's entry into and engagement with a set 
of discursive practices that become discourse formations, and ultimately a 'discourse', 
constitute the thetic boundaries that Kristeva argues.   129
 
By looking at the discursive practice of the gift, it is the interplay of rules and 
regularities between the gift and its differences (to other discursive practices) that help 
the analysis. It is not a comparative look at an object and its counterpart. This is not 
relevant to what is being discussed: "[T]hese rules define not the dumb existence of a 
reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects" (Foucault 
1986a:49). The question being asked is how do discursive practices, specifically 
regarding those concerning the gift, form discourse formations?  And how do these 
discourse formations produce discourses of ‘giftness’? Kristeva’s work on 
transposition offers some illumination particularly in terms of the lifting of one sign-
system that alters slightly with each differing formation. Foucault outlines sites from 
where institutions form their discourse (Foucault 1986a). His specificity is within the 
discursive boundaries of nineteenth century medicine but we can use his methodology 
for our purposes here, broadly, to locate and define certain constructions of discourse 
(primarily those pertaining to the gift) as well as highlighting relative constructions of 
subjectivity.  
 
4.2 Positionalities within discourse 
 
To proceed in this vein, some relatively concrete examples of rudimentary gift sites 
will help to tie down the large, abstract nature of the argument. Such temporal sites as 
birthdays, Christmases, births, holidays (Mother's Day, Father's Day), festive 
occasions (such as Bar Mitzvahs) and random acts of giving are found in a range of 
textual sites like books, films, television, photography and painting. These textual 
sites that represent temporal situations of the gift are long removed from any   130
individual or personal act of giving by the time they produce a gift. Not just 'a' gift but 
particular typologies of gifts specific to the medium in which they are found, which 
become part of the discursive practice of giftness. One example is a picture that could 
easily appear on the front of a Christmas card - a child offering a present to a family 
member, or indeed, a Christmas pictorial representation of the three wise men offering 
gifts to the Christ child. Do these pictorial representations of giving change the way in 
which the gift is read or is the phenomena of the gift the point of departure for 
discussion?
4 Taking these textual mediums as example, it is then easier to ignore the 
traditionally recognised instance of the gift. One could (almost) say the product of the 
phenomena of the gift is to forget the direct instance of 'gift giving' and adhere to 
what such an act itself produces - cultural recognition of a simple set of relations that 
form a signifying practice that becomes the 'gift'. Mediums have created within 
themselves, and through intertextual connection, an archive of discursive practices. 
Thus the way to work through Foucauldian discursive practices and Kristevan 
signifying practices appears to be from a perspective on/of positionalities of discourse 
and signification: "the positions of the subject are also defined by the situation that it 
is possible for him to occupy in relations to the various domains or groups of object" 
(Foucault 1986a:52). 
 
The interplay between the subject and any potentially occupied sites forms relations 
of the Symbolic and le sémiotique, and it is these groups of relations that form 
discursive practices. It might be prudent here to acknowledge that there is little 
connection between Kristeva and Foucault in this area, and indeed no real connection 
between these two theoreticians in the field of the gift. The reason why such two 
                                                             
4 What this example serves to illustrate is the difference between simply recognising a gift and 
recognising a produced gift ethic, such as 'it's the thought that counts', or, as is the ethos with 
Christmas, simply a time for generosity.   131
seemingly incompatible theorists are being compared is largely because of their work 
concerning positionality and its relation to the formation of the subject in discourse 
and signification. By working with these two fields, the aim is to illustrate a different 
set of issues regarding the positionality and formation of the subject and highlight its 
criticality in exemplary mediums such as cinema and painting. This, in turn, will 
allow us to explore giftness in the term of position and subject as discourse. 
 
For both Foucault and Kristeva positionality is important to their conceptions of 
discourse and signification, respectively. (Within such a statement is the caveat that 
discourse and signification are far from being the same thing; however the issue of 
positionality aligns them here). It is the statement that marks the first positioning with 
discourse for Foucault. His analysis and workings of the statement and its part in 
discourse are concerned with discovering how discourses ultimately come to operate 
and be recognised within the Symbolic order. By methodically defining the statement 
- or redefining it in his own terms - Foucault is highlighting discourse's function of 
producibility, specifically producibility of meanings, relations and other discourses. 
For the purpose of the gift, this theoretical field is essential as it allows us to view 
representations of the gift, particularly within visual and textual mediums (such as 
cinema) without limiting ourselves to a sole primary discussion to what the gift is 
representing. It is because of Foucault's archaeological approach that his theories can 
be applied cross-theoretically. Foucault speaks nothing of the gift and nothing of the 
functioning of the gift with visual examples, and yet because of his archaeological 
argument/methodology concerning the producibility of meanings and forming 
contextual relations and subsequent discursive practice - we can use his work to form 
our own connections with discursive practices in other fields.   132
 
Kristeva aids this Foucauldian aspect on discourse as her work on transposition 
complements the approach. Transposition is the vehicle for the method in which we 
are looking at and using Foucault's archaeology of knowledge. Whereas Foucault's 
investigation systematically works through notions and ideas of the formation of 
knowledge and particular discourses, here the aim is not to work in the same manner 
that is from one representation of a gift to another. For example, in the film Manon 
des sources, Ugolin produces a series of gifts (including the gifts of dead animals) to 
the object of his affection, Manon. It is not my objective to involve this section with 
an analysis of this film, and further, not to leap from one cinematic example of a 
representation of the gift to another. Instead, my intent is to focus on the gift as a 
heterogeneous, fluid and disruptive signifying process which functions similarly as a 
discursive practice. So instead of analysing the effect of the individual gifts that 
Ugolin bestows on Manon, this section is looking at what these individual gifts 
produce as part of their action. They become Foucault's statement (the dead rabbit, the 
dead birds), Ugolin's love becomes the discursive practice as his gifts are the fruit of 
his love for Manon - which is the discursive formation of the film - the discourse of 
love. 
 
The gift is not a gift until it is has undergone a hermeneutic process within a specific 
discursive practice and this means until multiple discourses and signifying practices 
have been employed to read the gift in a way that incites a meaning construction. 
Manon does not see Ugolin's gifts as gifts (as for the most part she is consciously 
unaware that they come from him, but eventually becomes conscious that they are his 
gifts). Any act that Ugolin generates for and towards Manon can be viewed as   133
synecdochic exemplars for his meta-discursive gift, his love. Placing a hermeneutic 
value on a discursive practice such as the gift, forces an investigation of the signifying 
practices within it. Using Kristeva's theories in conjunction with Foucault's ideas on 
discourse helps to uncover the way in which the producibility that is being argued 
occurs. Kristeva's term transposition  “specifies that the new passage from one 
signifying system to another demands a new articulation of the thetic” (Kristeva 
1984b:59). With this in mind, Ugolin’s constant production of new gifts for Manon 
can be read as his attempts to find new and fresh ways to introduce his love to her. 
These smaller gifts function as symbolic objects for Ugolin’s ultimate gift of love.   
 
Foucault's ‘Statement’ 
 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1986a), Foucault outlines his conceptions of the 
statement by realising the impossibility of imposing a limiting definition. The 
discursive practice in Foucauldian terms precedes the discursive formation. By the 
time a discursive formation has been reached “a complex group of relations that 
function as a rule” are in place, and  “it lays down that what must be related, in a 
particular discursive practice” (Foucault 1986a:74). If the statement is a constituent 
that determines a subject's positionality within discourse, its connections and form 
help to flesh out specific discursive practices. The statement must always be defined 
via the discursive practice - the relation between two opposing elements - not 
necessarily in binary opposition. This suggests that the subject's position in the 
formation of discursive practice is also a series of statements that move from within a 
set of signifying practices (that form a cohesive set of rules outlining a relational 
context) to a point where subject - object positions become regularities. These sites of 
formations should be viewed in the same way that Kristeva's le sémiotique and   134
Symbolic functions. Le sémiotique, which provides the pervious disruptive boundary 
of the thetic for the Symbolic, is Foucault's statement, in that there is never any unity 
that the statement can provide or be a part of. As a result, the statement is constantly 
rupturing the unity that it so desperately tries to create. The gift in this sense belongs 
in part to the thetic boundary of the statement and discursive practice; and the thetic 
boundary of le sémiotique. This can be further linked back to the idea of glissement, 
where as the endless movement of signification it disrupts the unity of exchange 
through the potential for multiple interpretations that inevitably includes 
misinterpretation, non-interpretation and disorder. 
 
It becomes apparent therefore that sketching out a discursive practice regarding the 
gift must rely on more than statements that group a set of relations based on similar 
form and connection. An apt example to illustrate this is the romantic gift. This 
typology of gift exists parallel to other typologies of gift - mad gifts, traditional, 
political for example. Placing a field of perspective - the romantic gift within film 
clearly has a fixed set of signifiers and codes through which the audience forms the 
fundamental meaning of gift and an attachment of romance (something that can be 
seen as a recurring motif in Mauss). As has been noted in Foucault's work however, 
formations of discourse are never wholly contained and do not produce secular 
identificatory sites of signification. By this is meant when an audience interprets a gift 
as romantic within a particular filmic discourse: 
what one must characterize and individualize is the coexistence of the 
dispersed and heterogeneous statements; the system that governs their 
division, the degree to which they depend on one another, the way in which 
they interlock or exclude one another, the transformation that they undergo, 
and the play of their location, arrangement and replacement 
 (Foucault 1986a:34) 
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The gift they are interpreting is not wholly the gift that they are interpreting. The 
audience's hermeneutic process draws on other signifying practices and 
representations of gifts from other various discourses, in this case other romantic 
discourses, in order to establish and assign a particular meaning to the gift they are 
viewing. What this aspect of statement gives rise to is the following question: are the 
same types of significations and representations always drawn on by the subject in 
order to produce a discursive practice (of the gift)? Foucault poses a question that can 
respond to this: "might it not be possible to establish groups of statements, by 
determining coherent concepts involved?" (Foucault 1986a:34). 
 
Foucault is arguing that through the systematic use of the same statement to define 
some concepts, that a tightly knit group of rules should be enough to form a regularity 
and hence a discursive practice. However, Foucault also points out that limitations 
would soon be encountered if one was to follow this line of argument as in outlining 
all the elements that would make the formation of discursive practice possible; new 
and different concepts would appear - true to the nature of the statement. Configuring 
a discursive practice based on individual representations of the gift (in cinema for 
example) therefore falls thinly on theoretical ground - yet simultaneously allows a 
different sort of discursive unity to be noted. It is possible to recognise the culture of 
the gift operating as a narrative structure within films across genres; and it is possible 
to recognise more about character development and the film's meaning if the gift is 
"not sought in the coherence of concepts but in their simultaneous or successive 
emergence, in the distance that separates them and even their incompatibility" 
(Foucault 1986a:35). The significance of Foucault's theory for the gift is that the 
phenomenon of the gift rests in the 'between' of its appearance and distribution.   136
 
On the last hypothesis of regarding the statement, Foucault turns his attention to the 
thematic drive of the statement. This last hypothesis works to underline all other 
hypotheses of the statement. It would appear from a brief look at the statement and its 
function that the thematic link between statements would be the strongest device for 
forming a discursive unity. However as Foucault points out, thematic links actually 
cross systems of discourse, bridging as well as disclosing, the gaps that separate them. 
What Foucault sees, as central to any thematic connection between statements is the 
"dispersion of the point of choice". This brings us back to the subject's position within 
discourse. The lacunae of the statement, with specific regard to their involvement in 
discursive formation, require the subject to participate in the construction of 
discourse. The unity of discourse, the unity of concept and the unity of statement are 
all shattered because of the subject's position in the formation of a discourse. A 
subject's position, their subjectivity, can never be regularity. In this sense what is 
happening here is concretisation. The subject's position in relation to discursive 
formation is central to it taking place, yet is based solely on undetermined moments 
and undetermined statements. 
 
4.3 The Enunciative Function 
 
The enunciative function operates as part of the positioning of the subject. It is the 
existence of the space that results from the statement's grouping of relations. To work 
through this enunciative function, and its connection to the statement, Foucault sets up 
four conditions.  
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a)  The condition of duplication 
 
"The statement exists outside any possibility of reappearing; and the relation that it 
possesses with what it states is not identical with a group of rules of use" (Foucault 
1986a:89). This positioning of the statement and its operation can be likened to the 
methodologies of Kristeva's thetic function. As the thetic separates the Symbolic 
order from le sémiotique, yet remains an aspect of both, so the statement relates to 
other statements and the enunciative function - autonomous but not independent. It is 
here that the element of the referential is introduced. For Kristeva this is the 
transcendental referential. For Foucault, the referential is characteristic of the 
enunciative level of formation. This particular type of referential is significant to the 
condition of duplication because Foucault uses it to establish a clearer focus on the 
differences and gaps between the statement and other statements. The referential is 
concerned with the laws and rules of an object's phenomena rather than the object 
itself. So with the specific example of the gift, of a statement of the gift, the 
referential for the condition of duplication would not be a referral to a previous gift, 
similar or identical but rather the production of place and the series of instances that 
enabled the statement of the gift to be made.  
 
The referential if the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of 
emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states 
of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it 
defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives 
meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition. 
(Foucault 1986a:91) 
 
The idea behind the condition of duplication for Foucault is that the statement, despite 
the possibility of identical utterance, is never the same statement. A statement, once   138
stated becomes part of the enunciative function and consequently contributes to the 
formation of the subject and their position within discourse. For duplication, or 
reduplication, to occur it would mean that the positionality of the subject never fully 
asserts itself and that the subject is bound to only ever making similar types of 
statements. This in turn suggests that duplication, or rather the lack of it, has a large 
investment in heterogeneity and hermeneutics. For multiplicities of subject positions 
and the potential of corresponding hermeneutic investigations, there is no need to look 
beyond the spaces of differences between statements for insights into statements 
themselves and how they develop the enunciative function. The visual examples help 
to confound this because of their inherent heterogeneous subject positions. An 
example of the condition of duplication can be found in Monet's haystacks, where 
when placed next to each other the images of the haystack represent the same 
haystack but at different times of the day and in different seasons. It cannot be said 
that the same haystack appears in each of the four paintings because of the temporal 
and seasonal differences, yet the condition of duplication is registered because of the 
image of the haystack appearing four times. This visual example is not far removed 
from the gift in terms of duplication. All gifts are duplications - of themselves and of 
the gift process. As with the haystacks, the duplication is not simply replication – 
even if the signifiers remain constant. At one level this is the gift as simulacra, where 
what is duplicated simulates giftness independent of the gift itself. The duplicate gift 
confirms the discourse (in this Foucauldian sense) because it is an active agency. By 
duplicity itself, the gift sustains giftness. 
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b)  the condition of subject position 
 
"The enunciating subject brings into existence outside himself an object that belongs 
to a previously defined domain, whose laws of possibility have already been 
articulated and whose characteristics precede the enunciation that posits it" (Foucault 
1986a:95). In relation, the statement (formed from a grouping of signs) allows the 
position of the subject to be created as it assigns a place or system of signification in 
which the subject can occupy. What Foucault is trying to define as a condition is the 
place from which enunciation takes place and how such a place is formed. Working 
from the statement, and ending at the level of discourse, levels of formulation are 
methodically explored to circumvent any danger of generalisation of the function of 
the statement and the subject. The subject's position in the enunciative function is not 
defined by or through the subject's relation between statement and object. 
Exemplified through the gift, the enunciating position is not produced from any 
presentation or re-presentation of a material gift but rather the spaces between the 
potential of occupying an enunciative position or not. That is, a subject only fulfils the 
enunciative function of giver if he/she can determine, through a series of statements 
that outlay a discursive formulation, that there is/are potential positions to be taken up 
as a subject. The next logical question is how does an individual come to note the 
potential of a position as subject. This leads us to Foucault's third condition of the 
enunciative function. 
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c) The condition of the associated domain 
 
"The third characteristic of the enunciative function: it cannot operate without the 
existence of an associated domain" (Foucault 1986a:96). In order for the individual to 
assume an enunciative position - that is a position of the speaking subject - there are a 
number of domains from which it gains, and needs, support to exist. Foucault argues 
"a statement always has borders peopled by other statements." And this associated 
domain supports and helps establish the enunciative function. It is not a relational or 
contextual establishment and it is not a situation derived from linguistic framework 
that purports contextualisation for the enunciative function. An associated domain, in 
regards to the enunciative function, does not operate this way, as again the concern is 
with production. Such as the phenomena of the gift produces material signifiers 
labelled 'gift' which help to identify sites of subject position as subject-giver, the 
enunciative function must work on and with the assistance of the associated domain 
that helps create and produce the possibility of context rather than provide a context 
'already-made'.
5 This assistance of an associated domain produces the place for the 
enunciating subject. There are four aspects to Foucault's associative domain (Foucault 
1986a:114). 
1)  "It is made up ... by the series of other formulations with which the statement 
appears and forms one element". 
2)  "The associated field is also made up of all the formulations to which the 
statement refers (implicitly or not), either by repeating them, modifying them, 
                                                             
5 Compare this with Foucault's notion of the already-said (Foucault 1986a:110).    141
or adapting them, or by opposing them, or by commenting on them; there can 
be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others". 
3)  "The associative field is also made up of all the formulations whose 
subsequent possibility is determined by the statement and which may follow 
the statement as its consequence, its natural successor, or its conversational 
retort". 
4)  "the associated field is made up of all the formulations whose status the 
statement in question shares". 
 
What these four aspects of the associated domain highlight for the statement is its 
coexistence. To go into and analyse further each aspect of the associated domain 
would be a lengthy and not especially relevant procedure at this point, as the focus is 
on investigating the enunciative function by working through its constitutive 
conditions rather than picking apart the aspects that form the conditions themselves. 
By listing the aspects of the associated domain, what begins to become apparent is the 
nature of enunciative coexistence that assigns the statement (and accordingly the 
subject) as a situating place. Notably this can be read as one of the first components in 
the construction of Foucault's power/knowledge as through the statement's 
interdependence, its place in the enunciative function is also given a rank. As a result, 
accumulation of statements in an enunciative field becomes an accumulation of 
power/knowledge within particular discursive practices. What this means for the 
enunciative function of the gift is that certain gifts are afforded power/knowledge 
through a meeting of all its conditions. These may well be the established (culturally 
speaking) discourses of exchange, or even the highly coded ‘private’ (that is, 
intrasubjective) manifestations of the gift. This second type almost occupying a meta-  142
language of exchange – such as the love letter. One the gift ‘accumulates’ this 
power/knowledge status we are more inclined to see this as giftness. 
 
 
d) The condition of material existence 
 
A statement needs a material existence to have enunciative standing but its 
articulation is not automatic. “The coordinates and the material status of the statement 
are part of its instrinsic characteristics” (Foucault 1986a:100). The statement's 
materiality forms part of its relationship to the discursive practice. A material 
existence gives the statement an identity within a site that enables the discursive 
practice to exist and ultimately positions the subject within the field of discourse. 
When the statement's materiality is altered, its occupation in the site of a particular 
discursive practice shifts to another. This is similar to transpositions - shifting from 
one sign system to another and in the course of it, altering the identity of the 
statement, the system of discursive practice and the positioning of the subject. 
Material existence of the statement therefore contains heterogeneity. Foucault asks, 
"How can one establish the identity of the statement through all these various forms, 
repetitions and transcriptions?" (Foucault 1986a:101). Ironically he answers it by 
setting aside the heterogeneity of enunciations and coins the terms 'repeatable 
materiality'.  
 
This repeatable materiality (which was observed earlier in term of the gift and 
duplication) consists of a number of small differences between statements that are not 
large enough to change the actual articulation of a statement, and does not give   143
recourse to another statement but in its repetition, the materiality produces a space 
enough for a separation and distinguishing of statements. The statement in material 
form is defined through its station as an object (such as the cultural formation and 
manifestation of a gift) but not because it occupies a particular objectified space 
reserved for specific materiality and not because it came into material existence at a 
certain time. What makes the repetition of statements possible without changing their 
identity, is what Foucault calls the field of stablilisation, "no further equivalence, and 
the appearance of a new statement must be recognised." Here another parallel can be 
made between Kristeva's thetic and Foucault's threshold. As the thetic links and 
separates the Symbolic order (the order of things, regularity, law, rules, language) and 
le sémiotique (disorder, rupture, break, separation), the field of stabilisation operates 
as a link between the statement and other statements and the statement's inclusion in 
an ordered discursive practice. The field of stabilisation also links the statement's 
Symbolic identity (recognition within a social order as meaningful and producer of 
potential meaning) and its inclusion as an individual identity separate and distinct 
from another new (or just different) statements. "The constancy of the statement, the 
preservation of its identity through the unique events of the enunciations, its 
duplications through the identity of the forms, constitute the function of the field of 
use in which it is placed" (Foucault 1986a:104). The law of a series, constituted by a 
group or sequence of signs, that is referred to as statements, is discursive formation. 
The gift’s field of stabilisation is embedded in giftness as a discursive process. As 
observed in terms of Lacan’s glissement, the gift stabilizes at the moment in discourse 
where it is most powerfully observing the cultural conditions. Giftness, on the other 
had, reinvests the process with the thetic. For each stabilizing field of the gift, there is 
(in potentia) the force of giftness that disrupts.   144
 
To describe the subject's position within the discursive practice, the existence of the 
position must be looked at closely first. This isn't a topographical questioning, say 
what assigns the giver the name and place of 'giving' status, but a questioning that 
looks to the very threshold of the moment of positionality - the thetic boundary, or in 
Foucauldian terms, "the play of the 'signifier' and the 'signified' - that determines its 
unique and limited existence" (Foucault 1986a:111). This approach towards 
description originates from a concern with production, as it is the signifier that is of 
prime interest. At this point it is fit to sketch out, based on the discussion of the 
statement, discursive practices and discourse formations, a language. What we have is 
fundamentally a production of heterogeneous subject positions through formation of 
language that operates through its threshold of the Symbolic and le sémiotique. The 
enunciative level is found here too. Our involvement with language here is 
purposefully restricted so as to develop a sense of a language of the gift. Language in 
an arranging sense relates to the fundamental notions of productions and 
producibility. The Foucauldian archiving of the statement and the analysis of 
enunciative function help to flesh out a viewing of language in this 'arranging' 
capacity as it attacks the core of subjectivity and is played out on the threshold of 
language formation. The significance of this is considerations of conceptions of unity, 
of wholeness in terms of subjectivity, discourse and the subject in discourse. 
Investigating discourse from its fundamental element - the statement - serves to scale 
back conceptions of discourses operating as individual, secular streams through a 
Symbolic social order and focus not on what discourse produces but what produces 
discourse. This turns to an investigation of what is the meaning behind what is 
produced. Dissociating any idea of unity from discourse breaks down associating the   145
subject's position with concrete roles in discourse. At one level, this is the struggle 
with gift’s meanings. It traces back (in Derrida’s sense of the trace) the gift to 
giftness. In the polysemic capacity of the gift we find the production of 
meaningfulness, but actual meaning will remain slippery. It is this persistence of the 
will to mean within a discourse of resistance that comes to determine, and perhaps 
even define giftness. 
 
The enunciative function that Foucault discusses unveils a function that, to work 
effectively, relies on these conditions of the referential, which is more about spaces of 
difference; of the subject, an uncovering of heterogeneity in potential positions of the 
subject; of the associated domain, which refers to the coexistence of other statements; 
and  of the material existence which refers not to literal, tangible representations of 
materiality, but to a defining and separating status and the potential for duplication. 
Groups of statements form discursive formations and multiple positions for subjects. 
Systematic uses of referentials define the parameters that produce and run modalities 
of enunciation and subsequent positionalities of subjectivities. 
 
This approach towards and perspective on the gift is to make way for further 
investigations on the phenomena surrounding the gift. At this point a step in the 
direction towards phenomenology guides a closer look at the production and 
proliferation of meaning of the gift. Additionally deeper discussion of giftness, the 
space of the gift and illusion of realities are engaged with.  
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5. Disruption & Space: Locating the gift 
5.1 Disruptive Spaces 
5.2 Carnivalesque Spaces 
5.3 Liminal Spaces 
5.4 Utopic Spaces 
 
5.1 Disruptive Spaces 
 
This section considers the idea that there are certain gifts that set up a form of 
resistance and disruption through disguising their very quality of giftness. This 
process operates within a type of space that can be seen as socio-culturally 
defined and played out through various textual orders. To this end this section 
contemplates disruptive spaces, including the idea that the gift itself holds in 
potentia the capacity to disrupt social space. Gifts circulate within defined 
spaces, notably ones of social organisation and exchange. However, one of the 
recurring ideas of this thesis is that gifts resonate outside of their immediate, 
observable contexts. This is the idea of the disruptive gift defined through its 
spatial domain. 
 
To strategically place the gift in representational space,
1 and interpret it through 
forms of resistance, will allow us to consider the disruptive attributes of the gift 
in terms of certain hermeneutic qualities. In turning the theorisation of the gift to 
a consideration of the construction of space, it is claimed that any theorising of 
the gift and giftness is not context specific. This is so that Lefebvrian moments of 
                                                             
1 This is a term coined by Lefebvre and is used intentionally here for two reasons, firstly to link 
‘representational space’ to space itself and secondly, to the gift and representational gifts.   147
space are given importance and its active nature is capitalised on. Social orders 
are examined in to elucidate its construction in terms of space and culture (or a 
lack of culture). By developing the discussion through these differences, the 
intention is to view the gift in situations where it does not appear to possess 
giftness – maintaining the driving theme of disruption and resistance. 
Consequently this section is not solely space-specific, but does engage with ideas 
and concepts that concern and regard space. Work by Henri Lefebvre, Andrew 
Benjamin, Foucault, and others can help us consider the gift in different ways 
through its composition with space.  
 
Establishing space 
 
To gain a clear conception of the space that I want to relate specifically to the 
gift, I turn to Lefebvre’s work concerning social space. In The Production of 
Space (1993), Lefebvre argues that there are three parts to social space:  
 
social space also contains specific representations of this double or triple 
interaction between the social relations of production and reproduction 
[of space]. Symbolic representation serves to maintain these social 
relations in a state of coexistence and cohesion. It displays them while 
displacing them. 
 (Lefebvre 1993:32)  
The three parts are spatial practice, representations of space and representational 
spaces. In each of these three aspects we find implications of an order to such 
social space and a contribution to its production. This work of Lefebvre is vital in 
any discussion that considers a location or theorising of the gift as it looks   148
towards the cultural formation of space, with specific emphasis on cultural 
knowledge and use of social space.   
 
A discussion of how Lefebvre conceptualises space is necessary in order to 
develop a detailed look at the three ‘moments’ of space. Lefebvre’s work on 
social space is concerned with its production and capacity to produce and as such 
the idea of an event can be attached to it. As an event, space is constantly 
moving, occupying places and moving again. What space produces is not a finite 
embodiment of any one particular object but the potential for more space. 
Lefebvre argues that if space is a product, with particular emphasis in/on the 
social, then it is because of a double illusion, “each side of which refers back to 
the other, reinforces the other, and hides behind the other” (Lefebvre 1993:27). 
This hints back to an activity of space that Lefebvre wants to follow, and he 
outlines two illusions to maintain and further the idea of space as constantly 
shifting, and also to disillusion the reader of regarding space as a fixed concept, 
whether it is solely mental, physical or social. It is all three. The two illusions are 
the illusion of transparency and the realistic illusion.  The illusion of 
transparency is where space is an action – it has ‘free reign’, a “transcendental 
illusion”. The illusion here is that there is no transparency, as the transparency of 
the spoken and written word is signification: “the spoken and written word are 
taken for (social) practice” (Lefebvre 1993:28). This is the ‘trap’ of the illusion 
of transparency for Lefebvre, as it tends to negate, or crudely conflate, the 
differences between verbal and non-verbal systems of signification. The realistic 
illusion rejects the dominance of orders of signification over orders of nature, 
“The illusion of transparency has a kinship with philosophical idealism; the   149
realistic illusion is closer to (naturalistic and mechanistic) materialism” 
(Lefebvre 1993:30). Lefebvre is quick to point out that the two illusions work 
symbiotically as well as asserting that they are not fixed mental conceptions of 
illusion. Outlining these two aspects of illusion help form a fundamental 
distinction between Lefebvre’s representations of spaces - which can be likened 
to the illusion of transparency - as here, systems of verbal signs conceptualise 
space. Representational spaces can be paralleled with the realistic illusion, as 
here non-verbal significations (a more ‘naturalistic’) frame space.    
 
Three moments of space 
 
A certain type of order within social space begins to emerge, but it is not an 
ordering, rather it is a connection of places. “Social space contains –and assigns 
(more or less) appropriate places to – (1) the social relations of reproduction … 
(2) the relations of production” (Lefebvre 1993:32). In this instance Lefebvre is 
referring specifically to the order of the family and relates issues of production 
and reproduction to it accordingly. Leaving the issue of the family and its 
specificity to production and reproduction aside, we can take up the idea that the 
two ‘appropriate places’ within a social space need an order, and as Lefebvre 
puts it “to localize them” (Lefebvre 1993:32). From this configuration, the 
‘conceptual triad’ of spatial practice, representations of space and 
representational spaces is formed. Now that a connection of spaces has been 
sketched, typologies of order relative to Lefebvre’s conceptions of social space 
can help define these spaces in terms of the gift. 
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Spatial practice 
 
Spatial practice is the social space’s everyday space in everyday discourse. In 
this moment, practice and space function simultaneously, connecting all spaces 
in the social together through forms of the order in everyday: “… between daily 
reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up 
the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure. This association is a 
paradoxical one, because it includes the most extreme separation between the 
places it links together” (Lefebvre 1993:38). Spatial practice is non-
conceptualised space and shares in the Foucauldian notion of space, in that it is a 
forcing control over its inhabitants.
2 If spatial practice embodies moments of 
physicality, the physical is not descriptive of spatial practice.
3 
 
Spatial practice is disruptive to the social space, as its operative premise is 
fundamentally different to the other moments of space. Similarly the gift is 
                                                             
2 This whole issue of the social space and everyday life is a key theme in Lefebvre’s work. See 
also, for example, Critique of Everyday Life (1990), The Production of Space (1991b), and 
Writings on Cities (1996) that show the significance of this issue. For an analysis and explication 
of some of these key issues see Edward Soja Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other 
Real-and Imagined Places (1996). 
3 In Walkabout everyday space is juxtaposed against the space of the extraordinary. In a scene 
early in the film the Girl begins to unpack a picnic lunch, suitable only for parks and outdoor 
furniture, on the barren desert floor in the middle of the Australian outback. In this striking image 
all elements that occupy and help form physical everyday space (and hence a spatial practice) in 
Australian cities, such as the black Volkswagen, the children’s grey, woollen school uniforms, 
the chicken, ham and cakes, the battery-operated radio, and even the silver cutlery which is set 
out, are elements displayed as unsuitable for daily practice in the arid Australian outback. Such a 
displacement of spatial practice disrupts a reading of space and brings its contextualisation to the 
forefront of spectator consciousness – the very thing which spatial practice endeavours to avoid. 
In this practice is an order that tries to hide itself so that other components of social space can 
take up more of an active role. Keeping to its non-conceptualisation, spatial practice functions as 
a foundation for the spaces that rest and act upon it, as its key purpose is to construct a discourse 
that attempts to organise itself. The diegetics of everyday existence in an Australian city 
presented in a radically different context, such as the Australian Outback, brings the non-
conceptualisation of spatial practice into the spectator’s consciousness. We don’t usually see such 
ordinary spatial practices, and this displacement is a disruption. The most important aspect to this 
organisation is its concealment. Where does this order of spatial practice come from? And what is 
its relevance to disruption?   151
disruptive to the gift process or ‘gift-giving’ through both its relation and its 
distance. Spatial practice is relative to social space but does not form the totality 
of it. Its order or localisation, within social space is dependent on other moments 
and orders of space. In such a typology of order the gift is free and generous. It is 
the reason and stimulus for the ‘gift giving’ but such a process is an ordered 
economy of exchange that cannot integrate the gift into its cycle. This is why the 
gift is relative but distant, and remains disruptive to the giving process.
4 What 
appears to be forging itself through this discussion of moments in social space is 
a typology of orders specific to such moments. If spatial practice is everyday, 
non-conceptualised space, then the order within this moment of space is routine 
and organised – a localising order of ordered space. The order that appears within 
space itself parallels the order of whatever occupies the space. To explain this a 
bit clearer we can borrow a similar structure of order that presents itself in film 
narrative.  
 
The diegetics of a film provide a social order specific to that film and its 
narrative, yet the concept of diegetics is present in all forms and genres of 
cinema. For example, in the new millennium we can still watch a Western film, 
whether it is ‘classic’ or ‘spaghetti’, and interpret it as a Western because of its 
diegetics. This is because we make meaning out of what exists within the film 
(its historical contexts and within the zeitgeist of its particular epoch) in order to 
interpret the present order of the film. Thus a ‘diegetics of space’ is mirrored by 
the space that produces it. This typology of order is easily established as it 
functions in the deepest folds of the Symbolic order. On one level this ‘ordering-
                                                             
4 More discussion occurs later in the section, engaging with Heideggerian notions of sacrifice. 
For the moment, the focus is still on Lefebvre’s social space.   152
order’ creates much of spatial practice because of its assimilation of, and 
integration with, what is familiar in the Symbolic. Because of this, any spatial 
practice, even that which does not appear to be everyday in ‘normal’ 
circumstances functions as though it were – specifically due to the performative 
normalising processes of the Symbolic. This raises the issue of how an order 
becomes applicable to spatial practice and how it is located within it, especially 
within the context of disruption. The disruptive register of concern here is the 
gift. 
 
Such an ordering order, despite all its signals to define itself as otherwise, carries 
the potentiality of disruption through its inherent nature of the ordinary, or 
everyday. A filmic example of this can be found in John Ford’s The Searchers 
(1956), where Comanche kidnap Debbie at an early age. When she is kidnapped, 
Debbie comes to represent the White all-American nuclear family by operating 
as a synecdoche for ‘that, which must be rescued or preserved’. Debbie’s absence 
reinforces the Western genre’s construction of a heteronormative familial order: 
Father, Mother, Son, and Daughter. This unit in turn becomes the spatial practice 
that underpins the narrative of the film. To negotiate all the other present spaces 
in the film, it is this ordering-order of spatial practice to which spaces return. So 
when Debbie is found, speaks the Native American language and articulates her 
desires to be left alone, she disrupts the spatial practice of the American family, 
and subsequently the Symbolic order underpinning the film. The white girl 
doesn’t want to be rescued from the Comanche. Why this is disrupting is because 
Debbie’s refusal comes from this particular film’s Symbolic other. John Wayne 
and his cowboy equivalents represent the White American Symbolic order and   153
all their actions and thoughts are generated and rationalised through it. Anything 
that opposes this order (epitomised solely in the cowboy) is therefore situated as 
mad, incoherent and other. However, the Symbolic order of the Comanche 
mirrors that of the Americans. The patriarchy of Scar parallels the position of 
Ethan, there is a community and family structure, and so Debbie’s refusal to be 
rescued is a refusal of the White American Symbolic order in favour of the 
Indian American Symbolic order. 
 
What is of particular interest here is that the negotiation of these parallel family 
orders – the spaces within (familial) spaces – is played out in terms of the gift. 
Ethan needs (very much in the psychoanalytic sense of pulsion/drive) to return to 
Debbie, as her giftness is a return to an ideological order/space of whiteness. The 
‘corruption’ of this order for Ethan leads to madness. The gift of Debbie is the 
attempt to rebalance his world order, where space operates, as he understands it. 
(Hence his return to the ‘wilderness’ at the end of the film). The discussion shall 
return to these spaces of giftness shortly.  
 
 
Representations of space 
 
This is intellectualised space, particular to the sciences or spaces with a scientific 
agenda, such as architectural space. This moment of social space is interested in 
the measurement of space and the disciplines that build space through and with 
such measurement. A cinematic example is the matrix in The Matrix 
(Wachowski Bros 1999). The matrix as pure construction and fabrication is the   154
ultimate representation of space. The central issue here is how can measured 
space, carefully thought out and planned through science (keeping to Lefebvre’s 
model) be disruptive or function as a disruptive space? Representations of space 
are disruptive through challenging the space of the Symbolic order, not forms of 
the Symbolic order, as was the case with spatial practice. How such challenges 
present themselves are best seen through comparative analysis. Within the matrix 
all moments of social space are present. How they are different is where 
challenges between the moments of space and that space of the Symbolic order 
will be found. Through a comparison of their differences we find the disruptive 
spaces. One interpretation could be that social space on the whole operates and is 
produced through a series of disruptions caused by the differences between the 
moments of space and order within them. Social space contains an amalgamation 
of contexts, orders and varying spaces regardless, and may be the final 
expression of all challenges, disruptions, contestations and inversions that occur 
in the moments of its space. Paradoxically the balance that these three moments 
of social space creates is born out of their disruptive conflicts.  The threats to the 
space of the Symbolic order are the heterogeneous spaces and orders that are 
constantly produced through the conflicts between the three moments of space, 
as each and every production of a type of space threatens to dismantle the 
stability of the Symbolic order (social space). Representations of space are 
measured and intellectualised for the reason that they are a representation and 
reflection of how the Symbolic order functions. Such measurements of space are 
reminders that their position is an active one in any construction or moment of 
space. In The Matrix, cleanliness, regimental order, mass consumerism and 
cultural homogeneity are elements composing the ideological impetus behind its   155
Symbolic order. Consequently all that is found in the matrix reflects such 
ideologies of the agents (people who want to destroy the real world).  
 
The gift’s representation of space challenges its own Symbolic space. The 
unrecognised gift exists outside the three moments of space, its representation 
being the giving process where an order of economy through exchange is 
formed. Challenge to the gift’s Symbolic space is always there as such space 
defines itself on a gift that is measured that has been given or is in the process of 
being given. An unrecognised gift is not measured and it is not negotiated via 
representation either. Representations of space “are tied to relations of 
production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose” (Lefebvre 1993:33), 
hence the giving process produces a representation of the gift but it is a 
representational gift. Like its spatial counterpart, it disrupts any consistency but 
still is a gift that has been represented. 
 
 
 
 
Representational Spaces 
 
Representational spaces are viewed from an arts perspective. Their differences 
from the other spaces – of representation and spatial practice – are a result of 
their having been negotiated through other spaces that have been represented. As 
Lefebvre states, “[representational space] overlays physical space, making 
symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre 1993:39). Representational space finds its   156
disruptions through individual moments that resist conformity with the monotony 
of spatial practice and the measurement of the occupation of space. An order that 
we can find in representational space is an order of the individual response to 
representation. As all three moments of Lefebvre’s social space are connected, 
any order that can be related to representational space is a disruption in itself but 
is a response to any or all of the moments of space nonetheless. These 
connections are important as out of the three spaces, representational space 
possesses the strongest sense of activity in its movement. This stems from being 
negotiated via spatial practice and representations of spaces and the effect is a 
constant struggle against conforming to or being defined by the other two 
moments of space. “This is the dominated – and hence passively experienced – 
space which imagination seeks to change and appropriate” (Lefebvre 1993:39). 
Yet because of this struggle against spatial practice and representations of space, 
representational space produces transgressive and fragmented loci and this 
chaotic relationship becomes the definition of the connection of representational 
space to the other moments. Individual acts are the best examples. Using cinema 
as example, interpretation of space within a film negotiates these three moments. 
A spectator when watching a film “acknowledges the textual world order of the 
film (and all its specifications) and operates within at least one of the cultural 
orders. These include the cultural order of the production of the film…or the 
cultural world order of the reception of the film…or the cultural order of the 
critical analysis of the film…or the cultural order of its interpretation” (Fuery 
2000:113). The act of interpreting social space is a further disruption and puts us 
back at the configuration of what social space is. It is made up of fluctuating, 
disruptive moments and it never finds a concrete localisation. It is always active   157
and transforming because of its disruptive nature. The orders aligned to each of 
these spaces are not prescriptive, rather a working through of the potential of 
each space. At best spatial practice, representations of space and representational 
spaces are moments of social space that should be conceived of as processes that 
are always forming other moments of space, and resisting the order, or any 
ordering of space. 
 
Cinematic examples 
 
The Matrix is a representation of space. That which it is not - the Real world - 
measures its space. It is a world that is built up via disciplines of strict order and 
purpose intending to blind its inhabitants through a misrepresentation of truthful 
existence. Occupied space within the matrix reflects a space that is carefully 
thought out and planned so as to conceal its true nature. The myth of the matrix 
is that of space. Being an architectural space, built from computer code and 
systems, the matrix can only become space through representation. This is why 
Neo functions as representational space. Neo moves between the matrix and the 
real world, resisting any conformity to the spatial practice of the matrix. He gives 
up his life as an accountant (typifying the epitome of the mundane), and the 
confinement of operating within a disciplined space (he learns ju-jitsu only in 
virtual space yet practices it in the matrix). Neo sees through and splits open the 
matrix through subverting the pretence of a space that isn’t there, exemplified in 
the final scenes where he sees space as code and nothing more. He disrupts the 
representation of the matrix through operating as a representational space   158
providing enough disruption to create another social space – the real world. Neo 
becomes a gift for the Real world via his resistance to the system of the matrix.
5 
 
The interaction of space and the gift has been touched on in the working through 
of the three moments in Lefebvre’s social space. The space of the gift and its 
potential as a disruptive space can now be looked at further.  
 
The space of the gift: sacrifice and event 
 
“If there is either undecidability or the absence of a fixed determination which 
are not taken as ends in themselves then what is important is how the relationship 
between the elements comprising these states of affairs is to be understood” 
(Benjamin 1993:113). 
 
The space of the gift is defined through relation and distance. In his chapter 
‘Opening Gifts’, Benjamin begins with a questioning of the return of the gift and 
more specifically, “what does the process mark and what is marked in the 
process?” (Benjamin 1993:129). Benjamin is concerned with the idea of the 
event and reads the gift accordingly. For the gift to be situated as an event, issues 
of difference and repetition need to be discussed. However as the space of the 
                                                             
5 Equally in Walkabout, the Aboriginal guide and Girl function as representational spaces that 
collapse when they enter into the other’s Symbolic order. Space is an all-consuming activity in 
Walkabout. The clashing spaces of the outback and the city reflect Lefebvre’s shifting illusion of 
transparency and realistic illusion. The movement of the city based on an illusion of transparency 
is signified space and clashes when it moves into the outback where the space of realistic illusion 
presents itself. In the outback there is no movement for the transparency of signification (found in 
the city) and most of the verbal language is usurped by an employment of the surrounding space 
to communicate. For the Girl’s father, his inability to assimilate into the socio-cultural order of 
Australia is portrayed in the extremity of his presence in outback Australia, and his subsequent 
suicide. This is mirrored in the final stages of the film where the Aboriginal guide commits 
suicide for the same reasons.  
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gift is our focus and so the connection of the gift to its event will be what we take 
from Benjamin’s argument. 
 
The situation is complex since not only is there a return to the event, its 
being given again such that the gift comes to be present as a form of 
repetition, there is also the occurrence of the repetition. What happens 
therefore is marked by the process of giving and giving again. How 
therefore is this move within giving to be understood? 
(Benjamin 1993:129) 
 
The problem for Benjamin is in presenting repetition – an issue already 
encountered in terms of Foucauldian duplication. The possibility of the gift’s 
existence lies in its delimitation. There is a need to separate the gift from its 
giving process – its event – if we are to discuss the disruptive space of the gift. A 
gift must be located prior to the economy of exchange if it is to remain a gift. 
Benjamin works through this concept via Heidegger’s questioning of the essence 
of Being. Benjamin argues that in Heidegger’s questioning of the essence of 
Being, its possibility exists only “if metaphysics has been given away” 
(Benjamin 1993:136) that is, in effect gifted. Regarding the gift as event, 
Benjamin takes the giver as example to explicate how Heidegger’s questioning is 
his sacrifice: 
the giver – located within thinking and thus gives in order to be, and to 
have been, in the position of thinking – not retain any trace of the gift that 
was given. Therefore, rather than there just being a gift prior to an   160
economy of exchange here, there must be both a giving and a gift with 
neither forming part of such an economy 
 (Benjamin 1993:136-137)  
Therefore the sacrifice exists in the giving away – the action that separates the 
gift event from the economy of exchange. Furthermore, the issue of space is 
important because it is the location of the giver, as well as the gift, that informs 
this idea of event. Thus giftness becomes spatialised. This is complimentary to 
the usual theorising, and practice, of the gift in time. The gift is given (in time) 
from a space located as giftness.
6 This idea is premised on Heidegger’s 
Destruktion
7 – it needs sacrifice in order to transpire just as Derrida’s différance 
needs deferral and difference to deconstruct. Here we witness the temporality of 
deferral and the spatiality of difference. The gift is central to such a discussion as 
metaphysics becomes the gift to Heidegger’s questioning of the essence of Being 
because it is, that which is ‘given away’.  Thus the notion of sacrifice is 
inextricably linked with all concepts – space, gift and disruption.  
 
Benjamin outlines a logic of sacrifice ‘as already present’ in Heidegger’s theory 
of Destruktion. This defines sacrifice (and the gift) through relation at a distance. 
The impetus behind this logic of sacrifice is that if something is offered up to 
achieve a goal, “then that which has been offered is sacrificed” (Benjamin 
1993:137). This suggests that while the sacrificial act is a result of sacrifice, 
sacrifice itself is not what is sacrificed as it is distinct from what is actually being 
sacrificed. In terms of the gift, the ‘giving away’ is not part of the gift and does 
                                                             
6 Derrida discusses the gift and time in great depth in Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. 
7 There is more in Destruktion than the concept of ‘destruction’ and this is of particular relevance 
to the gift as it addresses the subtle complexities that exist within exchange, similar to the subtle 
complexities of sacrifice. Heidegger does not use the German for ‘destruction’ (Zerstörung) but 
rather the Latin-German term to continue and modify Husserl’s ‘critical dissmantling’.    161
not form part of the economy of exchange as that which is given has already 
distanced itself from the purity of the gift and entered into the event of offering. 
The space of the conception is apart from the space of the event but is 
inextricably linked to, and is a result of it. Or in other terms, the intellectual 
space is apart from the physical and negotiated spaces. In the Heideggarian sense 
of which it is being argued and presented, the logic of sacrifice is the sacrifice of 
the gift. In its relation to its localisation, it is connected to, but not part of the 
offer (or economy of exchange). After configuring this logic, Benjamin returns to 
the metaphysical sacrifice for the questioning of the essence of Being, “the 
present differentiation of the present from itself that in denying the possibility of 
relation and in eschewing any eventuality of working within abeyance must, as a 
consequence sacrifice the present for the future” (Benjamin 1993:138) and sets 
up the connection between sacrifice and the ritual. 
 
Ritual repetition 
 
The ritual assures the relation of distance of the gift (or sacrifice) from its event. 
“Ritual involves a cyclical repetition in which the same is repeated; a repetition 
within the Same. Within it the consequence of sacrifice is assured by the 
continuity of its repetition. Within ritual that which is sacrificed can stand for the 
whole” (Benjamin 1993:138). This repetition perpetuates the cycle of the gift, 
and the sacrifice, and keeps both separate to their respective events. The 
disruption of the gift here is its standing apart from its economy of exchange. 
The action of the gift – giftness – becomes the sacrifice, as when the gift is given 
away it is no longer a gift. Giftness becomes that which is given away.    162
 
Benjamin asks why such a sacrifice is necessary in order for the event to occur. 
This line of questioning also looks more closely at what it means to say ‘the 
same is repeated; a repetition within the Same’. The return is important here as it 
reminds us what the gift is for and why sacrifice occurred. It is more productive 
to apply these theoretical positions to a different example than Heidegger’s 
metaphysical one. This will allow us to see if it can be sustained outside the 
discipline in which it is argued. A metaphorical sacrifice to further the issue of 
the return. The Searchers begins with Ethan Edwards returning home to his 
family from a civil war, seemingly out of nowhere except the great expanse of 
the desert. The overt narrative of the film is Ethan Edwards’ mission to save his 
young niece, Debbie, from a group of Comanches. After many years, and despite 
all the hardships he has to endure, Ethan finally saves Debbie, although she is no 
longer a young girl. The closing scene of the film mirrors that of the opening. 
Ethan is outside the homestead against a backdrop of expansive space. However 
in this final scene, Ethan does not enter the house. His gift is the returning of 
Debbie safely to her family, but he himself cannot return to the site of what he 
has given. In other words, what Ethan has given cannot be returned to as, even 
though the event of the gift can be repeated, the gift that is given cannot. Ethan’s 
inability to enter the home is more than just the cultural sense of homelessness. 
In this body, framed paregonally and as part of the mise-en-scène, we witness the 
Lefebvrean idea of representational space. This is the gift’s negation of 
subjectivity. If the subject is defined as the giver, once the gift is presented this 
‘giver’ subjectivity becomes sous rature and his/her existence is brought into   163
question. Ethan’s inability to enter the space of the family is tied to the negation 
of his being (sous rature) as giver. 
 
Another example from the film is the gift of the gold locket. On a previous visit, 
we are told that Ethan gave a gold locket to Laurie. Debbie asks for the same gift. 
Ethan repeats the gift event, in that he gives her a gold locket, but that which is 
given away - the ‘gold locket’ - is a war medal resembling a gold locket. In order 
for ritual to repeat, each sacrifice, or gift, must be surrendered with each 
respective event. This is the consequence of the gift. In order to continue its 
cycle, what is given away must be sacrificed in total. For Ethan to return Debbie 
to the family, he must renounce his part within their family and return to his 
homelessness. This is the disruption of the gift’s distant relation to its event. 
Heidegger’s Destruktion is similar to disruption, “it resists repetition and thereby 
fails to think the possibility of renewal as a form of repetition” (Benjamin 
1993:139). In order for this to take place – all these exchanges and repetitions of 
the gift – there must be this Lefebvrean disruption of spatial practice. Debbie’s 
return, the gold locket, and Ethan’s necessary absence are part of the disruption 
of the social space of giftness.  
 
Lacan’s mustard or jam pot illustrates this theme of repetition within the same 
even further. 
 
I once spoke to you about a mustard pot. If I draw three pots here, I 
simply demonstrate that you have a whole row of mustard or jam pots. 
They stand on shelves and are numerous enough to satisfy your   164
contemplative appetites. Note that it is insofar as the pots are identical 
that they are irreducible. Thus at this level we come up against the 
condition of individuation. And that’s as far as the problem usually goes, 
namely, that there is this one, which isn’t that one. 
(Lacan 1992:198) 
 
Lacan’s analogy of jam pots to the condition of individuation supports 
Benjamin’s ritual. The ritual works on the basis of a repetitive cycle. This is 
relevant to Lacan's jam pot as the ritual only operates if the cyclical 
repetitiveness is of the same. As such each ritualistic act is a template for the next 
and so on. Each gift that is given away becomes the precedent for the next 
because of the condition of individuation. Just as each jam pot’s difference lies 
within its sameness, the same can be argued of the gift. Lacan illustrates the idea 
of same and difference within the psychoanalytic process; a relationship that we 
find within the cultural circulation of the formation and enacting of giftness. 
 
 
5.2 Carnivalesque Spaces 
 
Many aspects of the carnival contribute to a space that can be termed 
carnivalesque. Discussing the space of the gift through the carnivalesque helps to 
identify how the gift is disruptive in two ways. Following Benjamin’s model, 
where the gift remains separate but a seminal part of that which is given away, 
the gift functions as carnivalesque space in direct relation to what is given away. 
Delicatessen (Jeunet and Caro 1991), The Last Supper (Title 1995) and Fight 
Club (Fincher 1999) are three examples where gift functions as carnivalesque 
space. Secondly, the gift as carnivalesque space disrupts the social space in   165
which it presents itself as an event through a multiplicity of styles. Read in this 
way, the gift has the potential to be disruptive in any social space based on its 
dialogic processes and manifestations. 
 
Gift as carnivalesque space 
 
Looking at the gift as carnivalesque space suggests a fragmentation of space 
within an order that is unruly, rebellious and unstructured. Rather the aim of this 
tangent is to argue the space of the gift, functioning as carnivalesque, within a 
larger space that is dominated by hegemony. Notions of carnivalesque structure 
and order are aimed to reflect those present within a hegemonic order. Gift as 
carnivalesque space draws on specifications and definitions particular to the gift 
in order to outline the type of the social space in which it presents itself. These 
include how the gift comes to represent what is carnivalesque about its 
presentation within such a space. In Delicatessen, the Butcher’s gift answers the 
famine of his customers by masquerading human remains as meat. Here it is the 
condition of the gift that renders it as carnivalesque space and as such fragments 
not only the social space it presents itself in, but also within its own discourse of 
giving. To clarify this dual fragmentation, the gift is the answer to famine. There 
is no meat available, so to avoid hunger and famine, the butcher finds a solution 
(for his own ends albeit) to the town’s problem. Giftness in this sense is not 
carnivalesque, but the gift is. When related to what is given away, (the translation 
of gift to human remains as meat) what disrupts as carnivalesque is the impetus 
behind the giving away. The giftness in the gift event is not the butcher’s 
altruism in feeding his clients but rather selfishness, as this act merely sustains   166
his business despite moral and social boundaries. Thus gift as carnivalesque 
space works because the carnivalesque space disrupts in between the relation of 
the gift to its being given away. 
 
Not all gifts are disruptive via this carnivalesque condition. Gift can also function 
as carnivalesque space through its capacity to fragment the social space in which 
it appears. This is different to the previous gift as carnivalesque space, as here it 
is the gift event operating within social space, rather than the in-between of gift 
and its being given away, that is the focus. To discuss the gift as carnivalesque 
space in these terms, we need to look at examples of social space where the 
practice of the gift is challenged by resistance or is ignored altogether. Disruption 
is caused here through the interruption of the practice of the gift. What is 
carnivalesque now is the discursive structure of the gift.  
 
In Manon des sources an almost comical exchange of gifts is played out in the 
hills. In true carnivalesque style, a breakdown in the character’s narrative 
highlights the structure of communication between Manon and Ugolin. It is often 
misread and thus functions as a metaphor for communication in a general social 
order, and between a film and its spectator – although these are not the only 
limitations. A breakdown in communication between characters in a film, like 
Manon and Ugolin, is a common manipulation of cinematic narrative particularly 
in terms of romance. This resistance to a straightforward playing out of events is 
a good example of how carnivalesque space operates within and against social 
orders. For example, within the context of cinema, certain genres have a film 
language that contributes to the audience’s construction of meaning in the film.   167
Resistances such as Manon’s misinterpretation of Ugolin’s gifts keep the film 
audience engaged. So the resistances function as carnivalesque cohesion in that 
they help propel or further the monologic narrative of the film. In this sense little 
resistances, like twists or misinterpretations, in cinema become part of film 
language (the larger film order) and are in themselves dialogic in comparison to 
other stages of narrative. Carnivalesque space here then are these dialogic 
resistances within film narrative that provide a spectator with moments of 
multiple narrative, guessing what is going to happen next whilst still being able 
to follow the meta-narrative of the film. 
  
 
Relating this to the gift, carnivalesque space conflict opposes epistemic ideals of 
gift exchange. Ugolin provides Manon with a series of gifts: birds, rabbits, etc. 
Manon meets a hunter and believes these gifts come from him, and subsequently 
enters into another discourse of exchange with him based on Ugolin’s. This is 
disruptive to the epistemic ideal of the gift, as part of the gift’s conditioning 
within socio-cultural discourse is its structure of giving and receiving. Keeping 
simply to the fundamental basis of what is given is returned, Ugolin’s gifts are 
not returned to him but to the hunter. The gift is carnivalesque space here as it 
fragments the socially inscribed practice of giving through challenging its usual 
presentations or representations. On another level, Ugolin’s gifts are symbols of 
his love for Manon, and consequently her lack of gift acknowledgement 
symbolises her lack of love for Ugolin and simultaneously her interest in the 
hunter. The result is a heterogeneity of gift practice. The gift as carnivalesque   168
space has the capacity to alter its operation in social space through challenging 
its traditional order. It can and does do this in a number of ways. 
 
Dialogism and Polyphony 
The carnivalesque space, in this condition, is furthered through a doubling effect 
through challenge and juxtaposition. “Bakhtin’s term dialogism as a semic 
complex thus implies the double language, and another logic…the world 
‘dialogism’; the logic of distance and relationship between the different units of 
a sentence or narrative structure, indicating a becoming” (Kristeva 1984:71). 
This is more than a doubling effect, however, as it offers a multiplicity of gifts 
and gift practices and is articulated through unpredictable events of the carnival, 
which appear as concurrently confinable and excessive.
8 Including Bakhtin’s 
dialogism in a discussion of the gift furthers the idea of heterogeneity of gift 
practice. A dialogical approach helps to enforce the idea that an array of gifts 
exists in a number of varying socio-cultural orders, as repetitions and as 
differences. Its main influence is its conception of multiplicity. Bakhtin is 
specifically referring to the novel and in particular a linguistic tradition when he 
talks of dialogism, yet its inherent qualities aid this work on the gift if we read 
the gift as a discursive practice. The heterogeneity that dialogism offers is 
directed as language against monologism. This conflict sets up a resistance 
within language, specifically to deriving meaning within a text. Dialogism 
encourages a movement towards manifold meanings and interpretations, whereas 
                                                             
8 An example of this is the Mardi Gras. While the costumes, dances. music and abundant shows 
of homosexual flesh are excessive within a heterosexual order, the order of the carnival’s 
progression, the number of floats and adherence to time structures (beginning and ending of the 
actual carnival) is deeply rooted in heteronormative structure. The Mardi Gras appears on a 
particular day, thus in its occasion it can function as an event that inverts the social order because 
the social order contains its excessiveness to this particular day.   169
monologism was focused on fixed meanings, “discourse lives, as it were, beyond 
itself in a living impulse toward the object” (Bakhtin 1981:292). Dialogism is 
important as it opens up an avenue of multiple structures that we can apply to the 
gift as carnivalesque space. This allows a presentation of multiple spaces and 
places where the gift can be carnivalesque not dependent on any one aspect.  
Thus gift, as carnivalesque space is not restricted in any particular way to certain 
conditions of the carnival. This opens up space within the gift, its event and the 
space in which it is exacted instead of the role of the carnivalesque. This lack of 
specification is further disruption to the social space surrounding the gift, the 
gift-event and also the space of the gift as carnivalesque space. Bakhtin’s 
polyphony, we can argue, is both a consequence and necessary component of 
such carnivalesque space; and as part of the argument here is that the gift is 
polyphonic, the link to the carnivalesque is made even more pronounced. 
   
1)  Resistance 
 
Carnivalesque rebellion lies in dialogism and inverts the social order through 
challenging hegemony (often within the social practices of space). A multiplicity 
of orders threatens the structure and stability of the hegemonic order and this is 
the rebellion. Sexuality is a good example of resistance within/to the 
carnivalesque. The greater the repression of sexuality is, the greater the potential 
for carnivalesque expression.
9  
                                                             
9 In a comparable, yet antithetical, fashion this is the point Foucault makes with the repressive 
hypothesis and the Victorian era. The repressed sexuality of the time didn’t lead to negation, but 
rather an explosion of discourses on and of sexuality, including the medical, psychoanalytic, and 
sociological. Such discourses are not in themselves carnivalesque, and yet they are performing a   170
 
Largely gift as carnivalesque space operates as a mechanism to further its gift 
event. Dialogic moments are a fundamental function of a sequential orders that, 
together with monologic content, achieve a comprehensible event - like a giving 
a gift. Moments of excess, resistance and rebellion help to characterise the gift as 
carnivalesque space through challenging logical order or narrative. Along these 
lines the gift carries with it the capacity to create its discursive structures and 
thwart them at the same time. A more interesting localising of the carnivalesque 
space is in margins of orders where elements of the carnival are played out but 
not through differences, but through a bordering or containing effect within a 
particular social order. At this point it is worth turning briefly to consider a 
discussion of liminalities to further this space.  
 
5.3 Liminal Spaces 
 
Carnivalesque space has been posited as a space that operates out of and through 
rebellion and resistance. However another sense of the carnivalesque is its 
marginalisation within wider social or cultural spaces. This relegation of space is 
liminal space. The carnivalesque that is found in liminal spaces is not overt, but 
rather subtle and intimated. However it is not the carnivalesque within liminal 
space that is the focus here but instead, the operation and significance of the 
liminal zone. This is not intended to negate any presence of the carnivalesque 
within such a space, as for the most part it is a fundamental aspect of it. Liminal 
space has other functions other than representing, containing and signifying the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
remarkably similar function. See Foucault’s The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Volume 1 
(1979).   171
carnivalesque, and these are to be the main concerns here. As an alternative to 
discussing the carnivalesque in liminal spaces and looking at liminal spaces as 
carnivalesque, we can borrow determining characteristics of both to further ideas 
and conceptions on how liminal space operates and how it operates in relation to 
other spaces. Ambiguity, the double, inversions and traversing of social orders 
are these points that we can adapt and elaborate on.  Freud’s work on repression 
and the uncanny can be read as interesting theories of liminal spaces because 
they are concurrently ambiguous, double and transverse. It is important to clarify 
that liminal space in these contexts is not a mere reflection of opposites but rather 
an integration of the other as a crucial point in its own construction. Giftness 
operates in a liminal space because it is so unstable. Fixing a meaning to giftness 
is an impossibility, and because of this the gift itself challenges meaning. The 
liminal space of the gift is perhaps best illustrated by the tension of gift and debt. 
The theorising of the gift (certainly from Mauss onwards) ascribes a liminality to 
it, even when the practice of gift giving is heavily encoded in cultural practice. 
The liminality of the gift is necessary because it is a vital part of the way in 
which it resists meaning. 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Utopic Spaces 
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Foucault’s utopias are a form of liminal space when compared to ‘real’ spaces 
such as Lefebvre’s social space.
10 One point of departure for utopic space is to 
elaborate how it embodies the potential to disrupt. As utopia, its fundamental 
capacity to disrupt exists in its opposition to real space, yet to keep to this 
definition is to reduce the function of utopic space and to limit its activity. The 
gift is set apart from its gift event whilst remaining an important driving force, 
and utopic space works in a similar way using its in-between status to create its 
own place. It is in between as it represents a fantastic space within real space, 
seemingly offering the opportunity to enter it, but simultaneously maintaining its 
ambiguity. Utopic space exists in between these sites of real space through a 
sequence of linkages that he terms emplacements. Whilst utopic space is 
concurrently located within and forms part of social space, it never exists wholly 
within it. 
 
Emplacements 
 
For Foucault we are in an age of space. Space exists as a set of relations via 
juxtapositions, oppositions and connections. Foucault’s working through of space 
is not meant to deny the link of time to space but rather he establishes a history 
of space to order or historicise its relation and connection with time. To briefly 
engage with this, Foucault primitively outlines a history of space (and thus a 
history of time) from Middle Ages to present day via Galileo. “to retrace very 
crudely this history of space, that in the Middle Ages there was a hierarchized 
ensemble of places  ... It was this whole hierarchy, this opposition, this 
                                                             
10 Derrida’s supplement has a certain resonance here in that through the chain of endless 
supplementarity, we can see a connection of spaces that stem from liminality rather than any 
sense of definite origin.    173
interconnection of places that constituted what be called … a space of 
localisation” (Foucault 1998:176). This sketching out of how space has been 
regarded throughout history is an attempt to order it and highlight how each age 
of space reflects the order it has been categorised within. The space of 
localisation reflects an order of hierarchy and appropriation through arrangement. 
Space was ordered through a succession of places. This thinking and defining of 
space was limited in that space could only be created or conceived based on the 
space preceding it. Localisation needed a concrete place of space to continue its 
hierarchy.  
 
Galileo
11 becomes Foucault’s example of how the next age of space was created. 
A sequential progression of space was replaced with a delimitation of space. This 
age of ‘extension’ kept the idea of order within space but applied it to the idea 
that spaces were not solely local, “the real scandal of Galileo’s work was not so 
much in having discovered, or rather rediscovered, that the earth revolves around 
the sun, but in having constituted a space that was infinite, and infinitely open” 
(Foucault 2000:176).
12 For Foucault, the next age in space exists now and is 
termed the age of emplacement. As with the previous epochs of space, order is a 
central aspect but it is how order is applied that changes the fundamental nature 
                                                             
11 It is no accident or surprise that Galileo marks the change in how the ensuing age of space is 
conceived for Foucault. Galileo resisted conformity to the widely enforced institution of 
Aristotelian thought and rejected his geocentric theory of the Earth in perfect orbits. Instead, 
Galileo agreed with Nicholas Copernicus’s heliocentric theories, and in 1610 published The 
Starry Messenger wherein he noticed that Venus had phases and seemed to change in size 
suggesting that it moved around the Sun and not the Earth. Foucault’s point in using Galileo is to 
demarcate a break from progressive conceptualising of space via localisation, evidenced in 
Aristotle’s geocentric theory. Instead of relating to space from the Earth’s perspective, Galileo’s 
work created room for a thinking of space outside of Earth. Consequently, as Foucault argues, 
Galileo’s Starry Messenger does not simply prove or assert the notion that the Earth moves 
around the Sun but that the Solar System revolves around the Sun. The importance of this 
Galilean theory is that perceptions of space were able to expand beyond forms of geocentric 
localisation.  
12 Socrates exemplifies this threat of infinite space in his method of questioning and thinking, 
refusing to accept a finite and concrete answer.   174
of space. The order within emplacement comes from its relativity between 
spaces, “Emplacement is defined by the relations of proximity between points or 
elements” (Foucault 1998:176). Foucault has retained aspects of delimitation and 
order within his outlining of a new age of space but he has also gone a step 
further and looked at the space that exists in between each place both as a secular 
unit and also as a seminal part of the space it connects with and relates to.  
 
Foucault goes outside of space to define what he means by emplacement as a 
relation of proximity. By moving outside of space in order to discuss it, Foucault 
posits emplacement, and subsequently space, as a heterogeneous experience. 
Space is not discussed and constructed via an outlining of its definitive 
constituents such as what is this space made up of, or what fills this or that space; 
rather space is arranged and argued through an investigation of the relations that 
link it to other spaces.  The heterogeneity of space is inextricably linked to the 
theory of heterogeneity of space. In creating and analysing this in-between 
linking of emplacements, heterogeneity infuses all aspects of space and a spatial 
argument. Emplacement develops not as a particular linking system or a linear 
means of connection between one space and another but rather it relates space as 
it moves. In other words, emplacement is an appropriation of the movement of 
space. In this manner, the gift-event ‘emplaces’ the gift. In so far as the gift 
remains distant but part of the gift event, the giving process requires a form of 
appropriation specific to its context. Emplacement allows room for heterogeneity 
in the gift and also within in the event of giving. No gifts are the same, and thus 
no appropriation of gift events can be identical. This theory and contextualisation 
of emplacement offers a discursive and spatial locality to each gift event as it   175
arises. Appropriation of the gift-event in this sense is the effect of relativity (of 
both the gift and the subject) to the space of the process of giving. Emplacement 
is not a tangible or concrete grasping of a specific space or place. As space 
moves from one place to another, emplacement is the formation of their 
relativity. Arguably the process of emplacement aids the hermeneutics of the gift 
and its event in each specific circumstance.  
 
This line would seem to be arguing that the gift event has changed in 
contemporary times, as it has become part of the emplacement process. This 
argument can be sustained on at least two levels. Firstly, the gift event has indeed 
changed, as it always must do. The processes of giftness are fluid, altering across 
time, cultures and even the individual event. Such fluidity, as noted elsewhere 
here, is an essential part of the gift. Indeed, the gift can often be defined by its 
fluidity and alternatives as much as its actual manifestations. The emplacement 
of the gift is part of its contemporisation/contemporality. Emplacement is part of 
the status of the gift now because this is how space and relations have come to be 
ordered (in the Foucauldian post modern era). The second aspect that allows us 
to read the gift and emplacement (and thus produce a different type of giftness) is 
the interplay of theory itself and the gift event. This is the intervention of theory 
on the gift. In other words this is the idea that the theorising that has taken place 
(since Mauss, at least) on the gift has altered its cultural position. It is argued 
here that the calibre and tenor of this theorising is part of the emplacement of the 
gift. Theorising the gift has transformed what the gift is, its has transferred its 
giftness. 
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Foucault uses the example of a train, “a train is an extraordinary bundle of 
relations, since it’s something through which one passes; it is also something 
through which one can pass from one point to another, and then it is something 
that passes by” (Foucault 2000:178) to exemplify how an emplacement may be 
described as a particular place or a placing of space, but this is not his only 
example. His other examples of emplacement are also spaces wound up of 
intricate socio-cultural relations, like the beach, café, cinema but there are others 
that could easily be included like the work place, and so too the factions within 
each of these places. If space is linked by emplacement then what links up and 
ties space together exists simultaneously inside and outside of space. This is the 
function of emplacement and as such moves with space. Similarly, relativity of 
the gift to its gift-event must reside both within and outside of the gift-giving 
process. As its emplacement is derived from its relativity to space, each gift-
giving process is influenced by its ‘outside’. Where the giving takes place 
determines the space of the gift within a constant ideal of movement. Emplacing 
the gift therefore, ensures its cyclical characteristic and its possibility of 
repetition. The movement of emplacement is not one of motion but of elasticity. 
Of all the emplacements that exist, the two that Foucault focuses on are those 
that “suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set or relations that are designated, 
reflected, or represented by them. Those spaces that are linked with all the others, 
and yet at variance somehow with all the other emplacements, are of two great 
types” (Foucault 2000:178). 
 
Utopias 
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These two great types of emplacements are utopias and realised utopias – 
heterotopias. These two categories of space further Foucault’s conception of 
emplacement as an elastic medium as by revealing more about the spaces they 
separate and link, the actual space of utopia is opened up for investigation, 
“Utopias are emplacements having no real place” (Foucault 2000:178).  Utopias 
are emplacements that relate spaces within the proximity of real social space but 
are not real. A good example of this is found in the cinema. Here utopic space 
reflects social space in perfection or in inversion but only exists in temporal 
celluloid. For as long as a film runs, there is a utopia that can be sustained and 
enjoyed as one type of emplacement. There are other examples where such 
utopias exist momentarily, in cinema posters or in brief showings of previews, 
and even arguably in appearances of celebrities in magazines, premiers, video 
clips – any virtual image or image in general. These moments function as 
synecdochic utopias, quickly offering an indication of a sustainable utopia or 
fantastic space included within but existing outside any real social space. Utopic 
emplacement relates the proximity of fantasy to reality – social space as it could 
be but isn’t.  
 
The gift is utopia as it is never given away. The gift event is the emplacing of the 
gift but once emplaced, the utopia of the gift has been lost as now, as gift-event, 
an unreal space has been placed. Cinematic representations of love work in this 
way. The gift of love is manifested via a gift event of either a kiss – an act of 
love undertaken to represent the emotion of love one has for another, or via a 
material gift event – a small token, again given to convey the idea of love one 
has for its object of affection. Some signifiers of love are rated higher than others   178
in varying mediums, but none is greater than the kiss. Love itself is never given, 
only through a series of events and acts is its giftness conveyed and understood. 
Once a utopia has entered into the Symbolic Order it must be articulated through 
it. As a result, love is the most perfect utopia and the gift is the signifier above all 
others in this utopia. Although it is sought in vain, it is never ‘placed’ or 
obtained. It is both within and yet outside of itself. This occupation of space as 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive brings us to heterotopias. Foucault uses 
the mirror to connect utopic and heterotopic space to each other and to social 
space respectively.  
 
The mirror is a good example for both types of emplacement as it functions both 
as utopic and heterotopic space. As utopic space, the mirror is a synecdoche, 
reflecting a space that relates to social space but does not reside within it. For 
Foucault, the mirror typifies the in between nature of utopic space as it exists as a 
“mixed, intermediate experience” (Foucault 2000:179). Like the poster 
advertising the latest movie, the mirror is a reflection of that which exist not 
completely within reality. As Foucault argues, the mirror is utopia as it reflects a 
space that exists and does not exist; which is the status of giftness that has been 
being developed throughout this thesis. Its utopia is the projection of desire of the 
‘viewer’. The projection of desire is directed towards the mirror but only ever 
rests on it. 
 
Lacan’s inverted bouquet  
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This schema (figure 5.1) is Lacan’s model aimed at an integration of the 
Imaginary, Symbolic and the Real. This is relevant to a Foucauldian discussion 
concerning the mirror as the schema of the inverted bouquet is Lacan’s attempt 
to progress with his notion of the inter and intra relationships of the subject of the 
image. For Lacan, in the act of looking, “subjectivity is implicated at every 
moment” (Lacan 1988:77). The operation of the gaze is more than an act of 
looking, rather it is about the formation of subjectivity and as such, the 
relationship between the gaze and its scopic object is continuously fluid. The 
gaze locates the subject in its act of looking and this is why the mirror can work 
at a utopic space. What the subject sees in the mirror is not a true reflection of the 
self but a projection of the self, so what is seen in the mirror is a disruption to 
true reflection and representation but utopia in space and reflection. What is 
viewed on the plane mirror – the flowers in the vase – is the disruption of the 
mirror. The vase of flowers is both utopia and disruption as what is seen is not 
really there. What allows this to happen is the gaze of the subject – it allows the 
connection of the reflection of reality (real space) and the reflection of fantasy 
(utopia). The subject’s image in the mirror as utopia is similarly viewed. What is 
seen is not a reflection of real space – the true representation of the subject, 
instead the subject sees a utopic image of their self, and the projection of what 
they would like to look like becomes infused with what they see. Their gaze 
disrupts the image in the mirror and forces it into a utopia. This is a version of 
the ideal-ego - a false utopia at one level, as it draws on a version of the ego 
within the pre-Symbolic. This is why Lacan’s schema is so heavily invested with 
a self-reflexive subject caught between the demands of the Symbolic and his/her 
own demands and desires.   180
 
Looking at another emplacement of the mirror, the heterotopia, offers more. The 
heterotopia exists as:  
 
real places, actual places, places that are designed into the very institution 
of society, which are sorts of actually realized utopias in which the real 
emplacements … are, at the same time, represented, contested, and 
reversed, sorts of places that are outside all places, although they are 
actually localizable 
(Foucault 2000:178) 
 
As far as the mirror is a possible utopia, it is also a possible heterotopia in the 
sense that it possesses tangibility. When Foucault discusses the mirror as a 
heterotopia, its tangibility relates specifically to the space of the mirror to the 
space of the subject rather than the concrete object ‘mirror’ – although this is 
included in the terms of relations of proximity. The heterotopic mirror highlights 
the age of emplacement because of its relative function. Foucault argues that by 
looking into the mirror, the heterotopic function allows the subject’s reflection to 
appear as a reality, a connection of fantastic (mirrored) space to real (social) 
space. There is a sense of depth to Foucault’s distinction between utopias and its 
sub-category of heterotopias, as though heterotopias lie on top of utopias and 
afford the potential of a transition from real social space to utopia via a 
heterotopic experience. Arguably each heterotopic principle outlined by Foucault 
is posited as a gateway to a utopic space in this manner, heterotopias act as a 
disruption towards the possibility of utopic experience.    181
 
Foucault argues that places of no space are other spaces - spaces that have always 
been used but simply not looked at - spaces within spaces. His argument of other 
spaces comes through juxtaposition. Space and no space; place and no place. Yet 
it is not a direct establishment of polarities that he sets up in order to argue 
different spaces, rather it is the acknowledgement of pre-conceived binaries 
which creates the "ensemble of relations that makes them appear as juxtaposed, 
set off against one another, implicated by each other - that makes them appear, in 
short, as a sort of configuration" (Foucault 1998:237). What is fundamental to 
Foucault's argument of space is interested in configuring how occupation that is 
space/of space is created, how it comes about, what signifies spaceness. Space 
becomes objectified as it is viewed as a construction. Space becomes an 'it' that 
works in and out of places that are attributed qualities of space and clutter 
alternatively. From the perspective of giftness, Foucault’s observation alerts us to 
the infiltration of giftness in social space. The give-take relationship is part of the 
interaction with social space whether it is within an interpersonal or intrapersonal 
frame; or whether it rests in potentia. Fundamental to this Foucauldian sense of 
space is how giftness is disseminated. Through this age of space giftness can be 
found within the connection of spaces. Its emplacement is relative, particularly in 
terms of relations be they of power, sexuality, morality, ethics, and so on.  
 
Relations among sites 
 
"we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one 
another and absolutely not superimposable on one another" (Foucault 1998:239).   182
 
Foucault argues that different sites allow spaces to be created and abolished, both 
temporarily and permanently. He identifies conceptual sites that embody 'real' 
spaces, "sites of transportation ... sites of temporary relaxation..." (Foucault 
1998:239), but it is not these relations among these sites that he is primarily 
concerned with as they reflect each other with similar definitive sets of relations. 
What Foucault is ultimately concerned with is the sites which "have the curious 
property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to 
suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, 
mirror or reflect" (Foucault 1998:239).  
 
The creation of space, temporary or otherwise, occurs through the relationship 
with different sites and the set of relations that define them – an issue central to 
the understanding of the gift as a processional event. For example, a space that 
locates giftness is defined by a set of signifiers that typify what it is to give and 
how one gives a gift – time and place (such as occasion) – generous nature, other 
signifiers of paper, ribbon, cards, and so on. These signifiers come to form a set 
of relations that separate this site (of giving) from others, such as a site of 
inheritance, gratuity, or donation. These sites however do nothing other than 
distinguish different spaces, reflecting through separation and difference. While 
these reflective sites acknowledge and define certain spaces and occupiers of 
space, they are only concerned with the initial paradigm of space. The inversions 
of space - the oppositional structures are taken for granted as just the other space, 
as though their function as binary is to merely reflect. As Foucault observes: 
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These are oppositions that we regard as simple givens: for example 
between private space and public space, between family space and social 
space, between cultural space and useful space, between the space of 
leisure and that of work. 
(Foucault 1998:238) 
 
This oppositional element within relative sites functions on a higher level. It 
reflects through difference and deferral that which it is not to assert that which it 
is, but more fundamental to that is its make-up of the other. According to 
Foucault, this perverting of relations between sites so that there is an inversion is 
dependant on his separation of the two categories of utopias. The first is utopias. 
"Utopias are sites with no real place" (Foucault 1998:239). The other being, 
heterotopias - Foucault's real places "counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted 
utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the 
culture are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted". Ironically, 
because of the imbedded structure of opposites within cultural dynamics, these 
two categories are inevitably
13 placed as a binarism, which works and doesn't 
concurrently. 
 
Taking the categories as they are at this moment - simply categories - so too are 
their sites defined through deferral and difference. Utopias are utopias because 
they are not heterotopias and heterotopias are heterotopias because they are not 
utopias. What this means is that within each of their respective sites, there is a 
space that possesses qualities of its other in order to be distinctive from it. That 
                                                             
13 Admittedly there are other explanatory schemes. For example, polarities in a continuum, 
rhizomic relations, dynamic systems, relations and so on.   184
is, within utopia there are heterotopic qualities and within heterotopias there are 
utopic qualities. This rests solely in the conceptual space of words at this moment 
- at the site of language begins the inverting of the set of relations that they are 
supposed to designate. 
 
Effectively enacted utopias 
 
Sites begin to slip and spaces occupy multiple sites simultaneously. Taking this 
argument to the concept of the gift, immediately we have an opposite - gift and 
debt. This fits well into Foucault's argument of utopias and heterotopias as the 
gift is not a tangible space, rather it is a site that momentarily attracts space for 
giving, like the pre-determined Christmas morning of gift exchange. This 
presents us with the potential idea that the gift’s utopia contains the heterotopia 
of debt. This is not inversion, but much more along the lines of the Lacanian 
inverted bouquet. Just as Lacan develops the idea of ‘planes’ of subjectivity 
within the schema (his ongoing investigation of interval intrasubjectivity 
formulated through the self reflexive moment of the mirror – in particular the 
Imaginary and its relationship to the Real); so the relationship of utopia and 
heterotopia is possible only because they exist on distinct yet inseparable 
‘planes’. The utopic gift and heterotopic debt (and of course it is entirely possible 
to have the heterotopic gift and utopic debt) presents a different approach to the 
debate typified in the ‘exchange’ between Derrida and Cixous, namely is the gift 
possible without a sense of debt? The utopic gift, to follow Foucault, is certainly 
not debtless. Rather the debt exists on another place. This is the subject – virtual 
subject of Lacan’s inversion played out in terms of giftness. That is, the gift-as-
subject/utopic and the virtual gift-as-subject/heterotopic debt. Just as in the   185
inverted bouquet to different orders of existence are transposed to form an 
illusion of unity,  
 
the gift in the space of emplacement is unified with its debts. What is presented is 
the illusion of gift/debt as unified, but this is only the case through the trick of 
the mirrors. Gift and debt may well operate in a variety of relations, but their 
fusion is not one of simplicity. Gift and debt (utopia and heterotopia) need to be 
understood as discreet and bonded elements in this space of emplacement. 
 
The gift, and subsequently the debt, “[can be interpreted as] sites that have a 
general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society ... 
these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces" (Foucault 1998:239). While the 
gift, figured in at a conceptual level at this moment, occupies utopic spaces, its 
materialisation operates within heterotopias. The times for giving, the codes 
under which one gives (and receives) have no real places. Even down to the 
choosing of the gift - we choose what we think the receiver would like to have - 
an ultimately biased choice based on our own desire to receive a similar gift or 
an investment of how we ‘understand’ their subjectivity. Thus the reception of 
our chosen gift rests in a utopia. We think that the gift (whatever it may be) will 
be welcomed and ecstatically received because we like it.
14 This materialising of 
the gift from conceptual to realised, signifies a movement between utopia and 
heterotopia.  
 
                                                             
14 Further to this - we send a gift in order to receive its likeness. A mirror of its event or act - a 
big gift incurs a big debt and vice versa.    186
A fundamental part of the utopia of the gift and gift giving is its reception. 
Foucault's heterotopias differ from utopias in that they are "counter-sites, a kind 
of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that 
can be found within culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and 
inverted" (Foucault 1998: 239). This is an aspect of post-structuralist thought, in 
that there is no society, only a multiplicity of societies - fragments as it were that 
collate in order to function alongside of each other.  
 
Foucault's argument is much for the individual, in that we all have heterotopias - 
our individual effectively enacted utopias are the spaces in which we live, in the 
sites that we occupy. Whilst there are larger socio-cultural laws and systems that 
we all recognise, our interpretation of these laws and system differ due to these 
individual enacted utopias. The gift requires this status of enacted utopia 
precisely to exist, for this is the enacting of giftness that reveals its impossibility. 
Heterotopias are these differences within spaces. They are a collection of spaces 
that make up a heterotopia. Thus utopias and heterotopias form a web of spaces 
and sites through which cultural codification and systems are played. Another 
example of these 'real' sites (heterotopias) is the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi 
Gras. For one night of the year, Sydney, Australia performs a freedom for gay 
and lesbian expression - that everyone is equal regardless of sexual choice and 
lifestyle - that being homosexual is acknowledged and accepted and that 
everyone has a big party. What is ignored for this time is that Liverpool Street, 
Oxford Street, Flinders Street and Moore Park
15 are not places where gays and 
lesbians are celebrated every day of the year, indeed not even for one whole day. 
                                                             
15 This is the course of the parade from start to finish - although this is the route taken by the 
parade entrants; the site of Mardi Gras has a space that reaches much further on the night through 
television exposure and other forms of media.   187
This parade exhibits the heterotopia of gay and lesbian liberation because for a 
few hours a site is created for their assertion of homosexual space. The Mardi 
gras initially captures a homogenous space like a birthday and Christmas, 
whereas the everyday lifestyle for gays and lesbians is one of heterogeneous sites 
and spaces.  
 
As with all space, the space of the Mardi gras is polysemic. The Mardi gras 
Parade begins as a homogenous space as all that come to watch, or who watch on 
television are celebrating the celebration. However, the subject of celebration 
enjoys fragmentation. As the concept of Mardi gras is to celebrate difference and 
its expression, varying sites begin to attract heterogeneity. Within the parade 
there are lesbians, dykes on bikes, bisexuals, gay pride, gay and lesbians in the 
armed forces - in short many different groups and factions that even though they 
come under one parade (Mardi Gras) and have one agenda (to be celebrated), 
their space is different from each other despite the fact that they walk in front and 
behind each other. Consecutive numbers marks their places and there is a pause 
after each section. They are all effecting their enacted utopias within a temporary 
utopia. In doing so these enacted utopias are moments of giftness that can 
operate simultaneously as a part of the Symbolic, and a disruption of it (of course 
this is the frame device of the carnivalesque). The gift is to the self as well as a 
disruptive gift to the social order and, somewhat perversely, a hegemonic gift 
from the dominant social order to the marginalised.
16 Part of the complication 
with such an example is the ideological revisionism of a heteronormative social 
                                                             
16 Chapter three of the thesis, which examines certain aspects of Foucault’s theory of the body, 
takes up the issue of the spectacle of the scaffold in terms of the gift of Law. This is similar to 
what takes place in the carnivalesque and the hegemonic gift of the State.   188
order offering the gift of a space for the carnivalesque. This is a gift that is very 
carefully controlled. 
 
Foucault argues that between the sites of utopia and heterotopia, "there might be 
a sort of mixed, joint experience, which would be the mirror" (Foucault 
1998:239). This is the overlap between each site of space, "a utopia, since it is a 
placeless place." Parades like the Mardi gras, birthdays - where you get to have 
your own way, wishes, and get presents for it; and Christmases - where everyone 
gets presents, lots of food and excess. It is the excess of all of these occasions, 
which effects an overlap - a temporary utopia within individually enacted 
utopias. I choose these occasions as nothing features more predominately on any 
of these dates than the gift, its giving, and its reception. The concept of virtual 
space is exemplified by an analogy of the mirror by Foucault. This 'mirror' space, 
which exists between the two sites of utopic and heterotopic space, is the self-
reflexive aspect of all sites and spaces. Amongst utopias and effectively, enacted 
utopias, there is the overlap, the temporary site of the 'mirror' wherein both 
spaces engage in the same site. It is at this point where we get the chance to 
virtually act out our utopias. When we give a gift, is the joy really in the giving - 
and what joy is this? Certainly it is not solely the joy of making someone happy - 
despite all immediate protests that it is- but rather our own joy superimposed 
onto the receiver of our gift. Within this site of exchange/gift-giving, there is 
potential for a myriad "mixed, joint experience" between the two sites of space. 
The utopia of the perfect gift; the heterotopias of the giver and the receiver. They 
seem to keep separate sites of space, but the site of exchange is the ultimate site 
that inverts and contradicts its spaces.    189
 
In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual 
space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am 
not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables 
me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. 
(Foucault 1998:240) 
 
The gift-giver sees him/her self where he/she is not. The giver gives a gift that 
she/he would have liked to receive him/herself. The exchange takes place in this 
'unreal, virtual space' where giver and receiver simultaneously engage and switch 
between their respective sites. They mirror each other. The giver and receiver, 
after the initial material exchange, enter into a heterogeneity of exchange. "The 
heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several 
sites that are in themselves incompatible" (Foucault 1998:241). The indebtedness 
begins the required mirroring of duties where the giver no longer exists in that 
capacity but now becomes the awaiting receiver. It is through the heterotopia of 
gift giving that the giver reaches their utopia of receiving - they can only be 
placed in the space of receiving once they have given their gift. The site of 
exchange, the heterotopia of the gift "exerts a sort of counteraction on the 
position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror, I discover my absence 
from the place where I am, since I see myself over there" (Foucault 1998:240). 
 
 
Spaces identify sites through contextualisation. A site for space becomes enacted 
through the identification of the range of possible meanings. There are no   190
identical sites. Experiences of sites and spaces therein are never the same on 
account of their inherent heterogeneity. Nonetheless the concept of a utopia 
embodies a site that is identical because of its purpose. Conceptually parallel 
sites exist, and without definition heterotopias become indistinguishable. Spaces 
exist in temporary states because of a site's inability to be concretely, uniformly 
contexualised. Sites have temporary contexts in order for spaces to identify 
themselves and other spaces. Through this relationship between sites and space, 
there exists inevitable overlapping - the unreal, virtual space. But its reality of 
unrealness is what creates the contesting of the set of relations among sites with 
its spaces.  
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6. Pleasure and play: Object, Transition, Subject, & Gift 
6.1 On Pleasure 
6.2 Communication and play: Bateson 
6.3 Abstraction 
 
6.4 The Frame 
 
6.5 Paradox and Repetition 
 
This section concentrates on the relationships, associations and connections 
between pleasure, play and the gift as circumstances of exchange with respect to 
the subject, its positioning and formation of subjectivity. The inter-subjective 
paradigm that can be called the gift revolves around the fundamental element of 
the subject, more specifically, where the subject creates, invests in, or forms 
certain typologies of subjectivity. The aim in bringing psychoanalysis to the gift 
is to use such situations like Freud’s fort/da, Winnicott’s theory of illusion, and 
Bateson’s nip
1 to investigate the relationships between the subject, and the 
formation of subjectivity in terms of giftness using pleasure and play as 
structures or circumstances that contribute to gift exchange. In doing so the 
psychoanalytic imperative of the gift is foregrounded. That is, not only does 
psychoanalysis provide an analytic structure for examining the gift, but also 
giftness is fundamental to psychoanalysis, its operation and theoretical 
functioning. To illustrate the structures involved within these typologies of 
exchange, the image (and its place in visual culture) provides ample ground for 
cultural expression of the connection between gift and pleasure, and gift and 
play. The focus here is how pleasure and play operate in terms of the subject as 
well as the subject and their involvement with the gift. Teaming pleasure with 
                                                 
1 It is the application of this example that is psychoanalytical, not the example in itself.   192
play carries the sense that they are connected in some manner, or that one is a 
result or constituent of the other, and in this regard they are – much like the 
irreducible duality of gift and debt.  Keeping these two concepts symbiotic is to 
emphasise the sense and circumstance of exchange and paradox that pleasure and 
play supply.   
 
If play is to be read as a circumstance of, or contributing factor towards gift 
exchange, then pleasure must be seen to operate as a supporting and fundamental 
element in the creativity of play. Creativity in this sense is taken from a 
Winnicottian perspective, and therefore does not refer to those acts of artistic 
endeavour or expression (although Winnicott himself does acknowledge that acts 
of creativity and a subject who lives creatively does produce culturally 
conceivable ‘creations’)
2, rather creativity here is directly connected to 
Winnicott’s notion of the subject’s “whole attitude to external reality” (Winnicott 
1999:65). In connection with pleasure and play, these expressions of creativity 
are to be read only as necessary aspects, or circumstances toward gift exchange 
that ultimately do not form the act of giving but rather are important sustainable 
acts within themselves. There is no sense of a forward chain or cumulative 
sequence between the structures of pleasure and play. By this it is meant that 
pleasure does not produce play and is not the satisfying goal of play, and 
similarly, play does not solely produce pleasure. Together they equal acts of 
                                                 
2 “In order to look into the theory that analysts use in their work to see where creativeness has a 
place it is necessary, as I have already stated, to separate the idea of creation from works of art. It 
is true that a creation can be a picture or a house or a garden or a costume or a hairstyle or a 
symphony or a sculpture; anything from a meal cooked at home. It would perhaps be better to say 
that these things could be creations” (Winnicott 1999:67). This perspective that Winnicott 
establishes is interesting for the gift and creativity in terms of the image as it forces one to view 
the subject’s involvement with any visual representation on the basis of production – especially 
in terms of the formation of subjectivity.   193
creativity - both sites of pleasure and unpleasure existing (and herein is their 
importance) as acts of creativity. It is necessary to clarify the position and 
context of pleasure with respect to play and the gift, especially before we move 
on a discussion of the subject. We can hear the echo of the pleasures and 
unpleasures associated with gift giving in Emerson’s definition of the gift and 
their influence on the subjectivity of the giver, “[t]hey eat your service like 
apples, and leave you out. But love them, and they feel you, and delight in you 
all the time” (Emerson in Schrift 1997:27). 
 
Pleasure, in all its manifestations, cannot be read simply as constructions of play 
or of the gift, but instead as constructions that seek to create continuous forms of 
pleasure. It is through play, and the gift that is play, that pleasure is able to 
achieve this in the creativity of the subject. Pleasure becomes a primary tool in 
the communication of the gift, particularly through the exchange in and of play 
and its interpretation. Adopting these considerations of pleasure and play brings 
us to the psychoanalytic theories of Winnicott and Freud, and the social 
anthropology of Bateson  - all of whom consider play and pleasure in different, 
but equally significant and creative ways. 
 
6.1 On Pleasure 
 
Freud’s concept of the ‘pleasure principle’ can be read in terms of a typology of 
pleasure to the present economy of the gift. Pleasure, in this sense, exists prior to 
the gift. Ultimately it is the circumstance of exchange and the situation that 
allows transition (between gift and debt; giver and receiver; illusion and 
disillusion) that is the main concern. In this section, the gift is posited as a   194
reflection of the construction of playing, illustrating a capacity for exchange and 
economy within the conceptions of pleasure and play. The creation of debt - the 
return of the gift - is pleasure configured through transition and draws on 
conditions of the paradox found embedded with the processes of communication 
present in a gift-giving economy. The issue of paradox is dealt with in particular 
depth later in the section, with specific regard to Freud, Bateson, Wilden, and 
Winnicott through the structure of play, as it is arguably the most fundamental 
aspect found in the form of exchanges that present themselves here. 
 
Freud's definition of pleasure is primarily constituted in terms of unpleasure. 
This is because, for Freud, pleasure is produced through the avoidance of 
unpleasure - or at least defined by what is unpleasurable. The reality principle 
manages pleasure through controlling it and allowing its expression only in small 
amounts. The pleasure principle is dangerous, having no meter to guide itself, 
just a desire to fulfil its aims. The reality principle does not seek to strike out 
pleasure but attempts to keep it restricted to measurable doses. The pleasure 
principle operates on stability and it holds no dominance within the mental 
process, "The pleasure principle follows from the principle of constancy" (Freud 
1987:277). Freud does concede however, "that there exists in the mind a strong 
tendency towards the pleasure principle, but that that tendency is opposed by 
certain other forces or circumstances" (Freud 1987:278). This opposition is the 
reason why such an ideal of balance is central to the success of the pleasure and 
reality principles, and this balancing is particularly relevant to the economics and 
dynamics of the gift:   195
Under the influence of the ego's instincts of self-preservation, the 
pleasure principle is replaced by the reality principle. The latter principle 
does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it 
nevertheless demands and carries into effect the postponement of 
satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of possibilities in gaining 
satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a step on the 
indirect road to pleasure 
(Freud 1987:278) 
 
Freud further explains his conception of the pleasure principle in a discussion of 
"innate instinctual impulses" (Freud 1987:279). In order to fully configure his 
notion of pleasure, Freud carefully outlines resistances to formations of pleasure 
and pleasure itself. These 'innate instinctual impulses' work compulsively 
towards their aims in the hope of gaining satisfaction - pleasure. However, 
according to Freud, not all impulses achieve their aims and as such, these 
residual part impulses are repressed and forbidden direct satisfactions. In doing 
so, what is left is a foundation for repetition, as these 'innate instinctual impulses' 
keep attempting to gain satisfaction via any means possible. If these repressions 
manage to somehow subversively achieve the satisfaction/pleasure they aim for, 
it is perceived as unpleasure by the ego as is blocks what Freud refers to as "fresh 
pleasure" (Freud 1987:279) from being gained. This particular emphasis on the 
manifestation of unpleasure is explicated by Freud in order to make the point that 
"most of the unpleasure that we experience is perceptual unpleasure" (Freud 
1987:280). In creating such a contextual basis for the pleasure and reality 
principles, Freud's case example of fort/da is able to further the notion of   196
pleasure and unpleasure based on subjective perceptions of repetitive instances, 
and help to determine the relationship of pleasure and play as circumstances for 
gift exchange, as well as introduce the notion of paradox and its role and 
relevance.  
 
Fort/Da – Pleasure and play 
 
Admittedly, fort/da – one of the cornerstones of the Freudian theory of pleasure - 
has been widely discussed and theorised almost to the extent that to include it 
here is going over old ground. However, to exclude some discussion on fort/da is 
to ignore the foundation for the construction of pleasure, particularly within 
psychoanalytic theory. A treatment of fort/da has been included here as it 
represents the most primitive level of the gift as a communicative event. It 
illustrates how a simple relationship and construction such as a child’s game (that 
exemplifies Freud’s concept of pleasure) is a relationship and communication 
with the self through gift as play in and through pleasure. The following section 
on fort/da is used with this specific intention of highlighting the issues of 
pleasure and play in terms of the gift, communication and exchange. 
 
In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’, Freud sets out in his example of fort/da play 
as "a great cultural achievement" (Freud 1987:285) to further his concept of 
pleasure. Here pleasure functions as the creative force behind play and its 
communication, and it is around this notion of play that one is able to develop the 
gift within the psychoanalytic terming of pleasure. In this context, 'play' operates 
as the creative social order for the subject that releases certain manifestations of 
pleasure. In System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange   197
(1980), Anthony Wilden comments on Gregory Bateson's example of the nip and 
the bite in animal play, citing that his example of a nip is used to connote how a 
shift in signification occurs in an order of play. In this situation, both the reader 
(nipped) and sender (nipper) are vital to the message (nip) being successfully 
delivered, "play, could only occur if the particular organisms were capable of 
some degree of metacommunication, i.e., of exchanging signals which would 
carry the message 'this is play'"(Bateson 1978:152). 
3 The deliverable success of 
the nip is dependent on a 'correct' reading and interpretation of the message as 
being a nip instead of a bite. 
 
Within Bateson’s example both parties must acknowledge each other through a 
sense of play, the falsification of the signifiers via specific code systems, so that 
the sense of pleasure can operate. In Freud's example of his grandson's game 
(fort/da), it is the child who is (through creating the game and its rules, and more 
importantly the repetition of the game) the party who acknowledges the sense of 
play and in so doing, establishes a system of communication. By creating a strict 
set of rules within a controlled manifestation of presence and absence, the child 
creates a falsification of signifiers, where the disappearance of the spool on a 
string is equated with absence (fort) and its re-turn (da) is equated with presence. 
The child's control of play (specifically the exchange between the absence and 
presence within this example of play) finds pleasure in the repetition. This 
repetition of play and pleasure forms the communicative event that can be read 
as a circumstance for, or element within gift exchange. The gift is the child’s 
discovery in that it is not only the game that has been created that is pleasurable, 
                                                 
3 To contextualise this reference, Bateson is referring to his observation of monkeys playing at a 
zoo. The focal point of his argument is the meaning derived from signification denoting that 
which appears as their opposite.   198
but also the pattern that is established by repeating it. In this version of the gift 
we also see the foregrounding of power. The spool in fort/da is a signifier to be 
controlled, for the subject to assert itself as a powerful entity. This controlling 
subject allows it, in turn, to be the dispenser of gifts; hence this is the site of 
egocentric giftness that can only be manifested through a type of power. Once 
this ego driven subject has a sense of control – of the spool and the nip – the 
he/she allows the signifier a sense of giftness. That is, ‘I allow this to be a gift, 
and I give it to you (the mother, the nipped, and even the self)’. This pleasure is 
not a conscious or secondary process of thinking for the child, rather it is a result 
from the ‘innate instinctual impulses’ of which Freud argued. The child, through 
their game, seeks to master their own position in terms of inner and external 
realities
4 and works towards this through repeating the play. The paradox here is 
found within such repetitive pattern. The more the child plays the game, the more 
the pleasure is repeated.
5 However to escape Freud’s dialectic of absence and 
presence, it is better to equate fort with deferred presence, because in terms of 
material and tangible signifiers, it is the spool that denotes both the fort and the 
da of the fort/da. Its difference effected only through alternating systems of 
signification.  
 
In positing play as 'a great cultural achievement', a specific order is aligned to it.  
In child's play, what is drawn on for imagination comes from their individual 
experiences within the cultural order. Freud’s view and consequent analysis of 
play depends on regarding the use of play, that is solely through its content, 
which differs from Winnicott’s view on child’s play which looks to play as a 
                                                 
4 More of the negotiation regarding inner and external realities of the infant will be taken up in 
depth later in the section with regard to both Freud and Winnicott. 
5 This particular point of gift exchange can be related to the economic law of diminishing return.   199
thing in itself that creates a form of pleasure, “playing is an experience, always a 
creative experience, and it is an experience in the space-time continuum, a basic 
form of living. The precariousness of play belongs to the fact that it is always on 
the theoretical line between the subjective and that which is objectively 
perceived” (Winnicott 1999:50). Indeed Wilden reads Lévi-Strauss’s work on 
gift exchange and symbolic function through the act rather than the object, 
“Unlike monetary exchange and contemporary systems of commodity exchange, 
in such a system of symbolic exchange, the [gift] objects of exchange are 
insignificant compared with the function of the ACT OF EXCHANGE” (Wilden 
1980:16, sic). Play, and its link with pleasure, functions as a typology of ‘glue’ in 
the process of communication within the order of play that the child produces. 
This ‘glue’ then progresses to form a communicative event, organised by play 
and pleasure so that its exchange can take place.
6  
 
Here it would seem that different orders of play are presented. However both 
seek to establish an order of play based on experience and types of pleasure. For 
Winnicott, playing as experience relates to the ‘intermediate area of experience’ 
between Mother and child, resulting from a smooth transition through the 
illusion-disillusionment process (using transitional objects and transitional 
phenomena) and on to cultural experiences. The child uses “objects or 
phenomena from external reality and uses these in the service of some sample 
                                                 
6 By looking at the act of gift exchange and the act of playing instead of what is played within 
this manner, one finds a certain resonance in Gasché’s argument in Heliocentric Exchange 
(1972). Gasché takes up Mauss’s work on the gift, denying that there is a single original gift that 
‘begins’ any economy or exchange, “ Thus the gift which, for Mauss, inaugurates each and every 
exchange circuit never explains why there is a gift: the force in things makes clear only why the 
gift is given back” (Gasché 1972:67). For Gasché, gifts are “the products of a transfer, carry is 
only their transferential power: metaphoric in the broadest sense of the word, they say nothing 
except their metaphoricity; they redouble, ad infinitum” (ibid). 
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derived from inner or personal reality” (Winnicott 1999:50). For Freud, part of 
the order of play in fort/da is a mastering of the situation, a ‘handling’ of the 
return of the repressed. These discussions regarding orders of play realise that the 
happening of play is a form of communication based on specific organisation that 
help to create an ‘event’. In play the child’s interest is occupied within an area 
and of an order that is not easily interrupted. The organisation of play and 
pleasure becomes paramount to the act of exchange. The spool must disappear 
before it can return, and while this may seem a simple statement to make, it is 
incredibly important as it illustrates how play and pleasure interrelate through 
organisation. This interrelation and structure of organisation sets up the 
communication of exchange as circumstance of gift practice.  
 
Communication in this sense is a result from play, both in terms of content and 
theory that relies on a gift to the self. The child uses play as a satisfying event to 
seek pleasure and then repeats it, so that through repetition he/she establishes this 
organised cycle of exchange that forms gift practice. In repeating their ‘play’ 
(from fort/da to any action of play that has a repetitive theme) the child 
subsequently repeats their pleasure and gives to itself.
7 The pleasure from play is 
communication as gift exchange. As Winnicott argues, “Playing is essentially 
satisfying. This is true even when it leads to a high degree of anxiety” (Winnicott 
1999:52, original emphasis). Freud argues a similar line through outlining the 
potential for pleasure through an avoidance of unpleasure. In fort/da, Freud’s 
                                                 
7 In a short paragraph in The ‘Uncanny’ (1919), Freud clearly outlines the involvement of a 
compulsion to repeat in terms of the pleasure principle. He does this mainly to emphasise the 
recurrences that appear and present themselves as uncanny, and within instances of an uncanny 
nature, highlighting the force of the unconscious and innate instinctual impulses. This force to 
repeat, Freud argues, is “a compulsion powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle…very 
clearly expressed in the impulses of small children” (Freud 1990:361). 
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grandson’s spool functions as what Wilden refers to as ‘markers’ that generate 
information for the act of play. Wilden equates Winnicott’s transitional object as 
a typology of marker that gains their information and importance, alongside 
creating pleasure, in the process of communication that develops from play.  
Bateson’s nip as the message ‘This is play’ thus functions as a clear indicator of 
how communication in the act of exchange is a result from an organisation of 
play and pleasure. Despite that Bateson’s example stems from animal play, it is 
possible to take his theory as a standard of play in general. In distinguishing the 
nip from the bite, communication must revolve around the orders of exchange 
involved with play and pleasure. Bateson claims that in order to distinguish the 
nip from the bite, a second order of communication is necessary that is termed as 
meta-communication. It is the ordering in and of play that becomes essential to 
the exchange involved in these levels of communication. At this point it is 
worthwhile to look at Bateson’ work in depth regarding how meta-
communication ignites the paradox of play. Meta-communication may likewise 
be stipulated as a condition of giftness as it directs the circularity of the gift in 
such a heterogeneous manner. Issues of paradox, semantic instability and play 
are central to the composition of the gift and any ensuing interpretation. How 
does one distinguish a gift? Through comparison? It is via the circle of the gift, 
the meta-communication of giftness within the discourse of the gift that allows 
the paradox to evolve and deepen the instability of the gift – much like the 
paradox of play.  
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6.2 Communication and play: Bateson   
 
Bateson’s paper, ‘A Theory of Play and Fantasy’ in Steps to an Ecology of Mind 
(1978) outlines his approach to play and its relationship to the exchange that 
occurs in communication and meta-communication. Through a “series of 
generalizations” Bateson finds and outlines an agenda for a specific typology of 
communication (what Wilden refers to as analog communication) through 
looking at the message of play. Initially, it is the levels of abstraction within 
modes of communication (mainly verbal) that Bateson is attracted to. This 
provides the fundamental basis for Bateson to build on in determining his 
definition of meta-communication. All messages, whether they are about play, 
threat or the gift, are dependant on these “contrasting levels of abstraction” 
(Bateson 1978:150). These levels are a further variation on what has been argued 
here as the theoretical context of understanding the gift, as well as the imperative 
operation of giftness. Levels of abstraction, like emplacement (gift in/as space), 
or gift as supplement, and so on, are part of how the gift operates as well as the 
discourse of interpreting it. From here, Bateson looks towards the exchange 
involved within communication and finds that it is through the ambiguity of 
“signals [as] only signals, which can be trusted, distrusted, falsified, denied, 
amplified, corrected and so forth” (Bateson 1978:151) that levels of abstraction 
feed into layers of communication. The exchange of signals at different levels of 
specificity (or generality) is what Bateson decides to denote as meta-
communication and uses the message ‘This is play’ to further the function and 
operation of meta-communication.  
   203
Here, allowing signals to sign and to communicate ambiguously generates 
abstraction within communication. This degree of ambiguity paired with 
abstraction in Basteon’s example is attractive to any study on the gift as it allows 
a different perspective regarding the operation of gift exchange. In animal play, 
what is communicated as play is dependant on ambiguity and abstraction and so 
it is with the gift. As the gift is played (exchanged), its value is understood 
differently as the event of giving – the causality – is no longer the focus. Rather, 
the focus shifts from the object that is exchanged to the entire structure and 
process of what comprises the act of ‘gift-exchange’. The value of what is given 
as gift must be ordered and organised ambiguously and abstractly. This returns 
us to the instability of interpretation that surrounds the gift. This instability, 
rather than a ‘fault’ or problem of giftness, is exactly what is desired. Like the 
polysemic nature of the literary, giftness in its metacommunication insists on 
destabilising the interpretative act. Looking at Bateson’s analysis of 
communication and play, we can identify similar paradoxical communicative 
processes at work in the gift.  
 
Bateson looked at the message of play and saw how the generation of abstraction 
initiated paradox within not only the message ‘This is play’ but in a larger sense 
– within meta-communication in general, “a negative statement containing an 
implicit negative meta-statement. Expanded, the statement ‘This is play’ looks 
something like this: ‘these actions in which we now engage do not denote what 
these actions for which they stand for would denote” (Bateson 1978:152). This 
description of the message ‘This is play’ identifies one of the main elements of 
gift composition – duality of meaning or the paradox. It has been one of the main   204
contentions and driving themes of the thesis to extrapolate and analyse the gift in 
terms of value, exchange and (in a Freudian sense) das Ding as a ‘thing’ 
containing its opposite. Bateson’s concept of meta-communication, developed 
through an analysis of the message ‘This is play’ contains these elements found 
in the gift, as the gift possesses similar levels of abstraction. The gift and its act 
of exchange ‘do not denote what those actions for which they stand’ but rather 
something quite different – a debt. Nevertheless, its status as a meta-
communicative statement depends on abstraction, especially with regard to the 
gift-object and its part in gift exchange. The gift-object must only be read as that 
which it is not in order to become part of what is exchanged. The gift, if it is to 
be exchanged cannot be acknowledged as a hidden debt, indeed as nothing else 
but the gift despite its status as a signal (or symbol) not denoting the actions for 
which it stands. As John Frow argues in Time and Commodity Culture: Essays in 
Cultural Theory and Postmodernity (1997), “There can be no possible ‘logic of 
the gift’, no discourse which could coherently take the gift as its object, since the 
gift is just whatever escapes the measure of discourse, whatever cancels itself as 
soon as it signifies itself as gift” (Frow 1997:112). Here Frow is remarking on 
Derrida’s impossible/possible analysis of the gift, wherein the concept of an 
original gift is debated and contested. This returns us to Gasché’s similar claim in 
Heliocentric Exchange. The paradox of the gift begins to develop here and finds 
a strong parallel within meta-communication.
8 
 
Bateson draws on Korzybski’s theory regarding the relationship between map 
and territory to establish his own theory of levels of abstraction within 
                                                 
8 A more developed analysis of Derrida’s argument regarding the impossibility/possibility of the 
gift is taken up in chapter seven.   205
communication exchange and meta-communication. The map and territory 
relationship highlights the falsity of language contained in a message and in the 
exchange of the message: 
  the fact that a message, of whatever kind, does not consist of those 
  objects which it denotes (‘The word “cat” cannot scratch us’) … It 
  appears from what is said above that play is a phenomenon in which 
  actions of ‘play’ are related to, or denote, other actions of ‘not play’. We 
  therefore meet in play with an instance of signals standing for other 
  events and it appears, therefore, that the evolution of play may have been 
  an important step in the evolution of communication. 
(Bateson 1978:153)  
This quotation is useful as it offers a clear connection between this consideration 
and perspective of the phenomenon of play with that of the gift, particularly with 
respect to their individual associations of exchange. The phenomenon of the gift 
works in the same manner as Bateson’s theory of play in that it manipulates these 
signals within levels of abstraction that create the act of exchange within meta-
communication to the extent that the simple message ‘This is gift’ is loaded with 
paradox. The reason for this is its exchange belongs within its opposite. It is not 
‘gift’ or ‘giftness’ that is communicated or exchanged, or even the opposite – 
debt (these are the levels of abstraction of both gift and debt). Rather it is the 
paradox, the falsity of the signal/symbol and the meta-communication that is 
exchanged.  
 
Indeed as Bateson recognises within his examination of ‘This is play’, it is the 
threat that operates on the same pre-text. The threat exists because it is not   206
delivered – its object (the message) does not denote the action for which it stands 
in the message. The message that states ‘This is play’ is functioning on the 
abstraction of what it is not. The nip is a playful nip only because it is not a bite. 
The ambiguity of the message rests on establishing play and generating a 
pleasure directly resulting from that play (for both the nipper and the nipped). 
The threat remains a threat only because its proposition is not acted upon. What 
is communicated here, what is exchanged, is Bateson’s secondary layer of 
communication, meta-communication. This is exactly the mode of the gift. The 
message ‘This is gift’ can only exchange on the ambiguity and abstraction found 
in its opposite value. It is the gift but only because it cannot be given. As with 
‘This is play’, these messages become trusted acts of communication through 
distrusting the signals, or alternatively, through acknowledging the falsification 
of signals. In this sense ‘this is play’ becomes ‘this is gift/giftness’. 
 
6.3 Abstraction 
 
Whilst the central part to this typology of meta-communication is the level of 
abstraction present in the signals exchanged in the event of the message, more 
importantly it is the issue of repetition or the repeated message that allows the 
paradox of play, threat, and ultimately the gift to guide meta-communication. 
“Not only does the playful nip not denote what would be denoted by the bite for 
which it stands, but in addition, the bite itself is fictional” (Bateson 1978:155). 
For play to have meaning in the message ‘This is play’, or for the gift in ‘This is 
gift’, the communicative event needs to be established and repeated enough times 
in order for the meta-communication to come about. The exchanges of signals 
denoting gift or play are repeated within the same parameters as previous   207
messages to the same degrees of abstraction. This generates a trust in the false 
signal, and subsequently introduces the fulcrum of all further meta-
communication – the paradox in the message. 
 
This form of paradox in a message can be given a playful visual example, and 
introduces the idea of repetition that is so important to any message of play and 
indeed the gift. In Swabian’s painting, Portrait of a Woman of the Hofer Family 
(1470), one can see a fly on/in the top left hand corner. As with Trompe L’oeil 
pieces of art, the trickery (or abstract ambiguity) is not found in the fly nor in the 
painting, but in the exchange between spectator and art. Here the message, ‘This 
is art’, is abstracted via the presence of a filthy insect juxtaposed against the 
purity of the white headdress. The trickery and paradox of such a message is 
dependant on the spectator’s realisation that the fly is part of the painterly text –
its existence playing. Is it on it or in it?
9 The fly typifies the paradox in play and 
illustrates how this particular typology of paradoxical play is paramount in 
working towards a comprehensive theorisation of the gift, as it highlights the 
falsity of the signal within an act of exchange. The presence of the fly
10 allows 
the spectator to communicate with the painterly text, participating meta-
communicatively, exchanging signals belonging to the discourse of art, yet at the 
same time denying the frame of this meta-communicative exchange by drawing 
attention to its own small part in a much larger piece of art. The paradox 
reflected by the signal/symbol of the fly is that it is play within art, denoting art 
                                                 
9 Bateson refers to the concept of the frame in terms of peculiarities of play that is referred to 
later in the section with reference to paradox. 
10 This presence of the fly is interesting especially in terms of size. The fly provides a reality 
effect for Swabian’s text and outside its playful intention, can be linked to the Barthesian concept 
of punctum. The fly arrests the spectator’s gaze towards the image and shatters the studium that 
constructs and supports the painting.   208
and denying art, through its playful positioning. Giftness participates via a 
similar paradox in the gift – it simultaneously denotes and denies the gift through 
exchange and circularity. Once the gift has been played (‘delivered’) it is denied 
by both giver and receiver. For the giver it is no longer their gift – it is the 
property of the receiver.
11If the fly in this image can be seen as part of the play 
(of image and reality, of art and disgust) then the ‘fly’ in the gift process are 
those elements that draw attention to giftness. In this sense giftness is part of the 
parergonal   logic that Kant and Derrida speak of. It is neither inside or outside 
the gift itself, yet without it the gift could not be recognised. 
                                                 
11 A similar adornment of art exists within Crivelli’s I Santi Pietro e Paolo, but of a different 
order of message. Part of Crivelli’s artistic technique is to adorn his work with man-made objects 
such as glass, to represent jewels. These adornments are similar to Swabian’s fly but only in as 
much as they further the art. In Crivelli’s case, these jewels that adorn the religious costume of 
Saint Augustine celebrating not only the image but also his canonicity and the canonicity of 
Catholicism. If Swabian’s fly is to be read as an addition to the image, being part of it but not at 
the same time, then Crivelli’s glass jewels are the image. They extend the discourse of art 
through spectator recognition. The spectator is offered the image and that which it celebrates 
(religion) through this closing in of spatial distance. The spectator is positioned by Crivelli to 
acknowledge the jewels as part of the image, not through playful exchange but celebration and 
offer. Enjoy this image, enjoy this religion. Whereas Crivelli’s adornment of jewels work to 
sustain the exchange of what is to be celebrated between the spectator and his art (the value of 
Catholicism), Swabian’s fly represents another agenda of exchange through disruption. This 
addition disrupts the discourse of painting and this where the messages of play and gift intersect. 
In another visual example, the Dutch painting The Soldier and The Girl, (Frans Van Mieris 
1659), one can see a parallel sense of play that disrupts and negates the message of a painterly 
text, and also finds the echo of the repetition that presents itself in fort/da (and as a return of the 
message ‘This is play’). In the right hand corner, one observes two dogs in the act of mating. 
Initially this is not seen and the more central theme of seduction is very much fore-grounded. In 
Van Mieris’s painting, one can see an act of play within the act of seduction. His human subjects 
represent what is cultural – clothing, eating and drinking with objects, and they are surrounded 
with further instruments and products of culture and cultural life (the lute, the furniture, the 
bedding, even the drink from the pitcher). In terms of culture, the soldier and the girl disguise the 
act of seduction through the gift of flattery and wine and the pre-text of service. However, the 
presence of the dogs to the right of the soldier represent nature’s act of seduction in a much 
rougher fashion. Here there are no pre-texts available and as such their mating disrupts the 
painting. One of the functions of these two dogs is that they are the moment of disruption and are 
connected to nature, a parallel to be found in Swabian’s painting with the fly, whereas the woman 
of the Hoffer family and the soldier and the girl are products of culture – signals that represent 
civility and disguised acts of disruption. More importantly however, is that the mating of the dogs 
allow the play (and the pleasure that the spectator derives from it) within Van Mieris’s text to 
circulate and continue for however long the spectator looks at the painting. Their gaze returns to 
both the relationship between the soldier and the girl as a meta-communicative statement ‘This is 
seduction’ as well as the relationship (and subsequent disruption of the non-metacommunicative 
statement ‘this is just sex’) of the dogs. As in Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors, where the 
anamorphosis underpins and determines the message of the painting, the dogs communicate the 
message of The Soldier and the Girl – the crudeness within their act of seduction.  Such 
disruption and peculiarity of paradox relies on false signals being trusted for their falsity, their 
play.   209
 
6.4 The Frame 
 
Bateson’s peculiarities of play are stated as, “a) that the messages or signals 
exchanged in play are in a certain sense untrue or not meant; and b) that that 
which is denoted by these signals is non-existent” (Bateson 1978:156). This 
reflects the positivity of the paradox involved in play and also in Winnicott’s 
illusion-disillusionment theory
12, as the messages that work on exchange require 
such ‘peculiarities’ in order to be delivered and received. It can be argued that 
the gift and gift exchange operate on the same basis as Bateson’s paradoxical 
peculiarities of play for within gift exchange there are messages or signals 
exchanged which must be untrue and not meant. For the gift to circulate its 
exchange needs to possess the dynamic of paradox – the gift can only deliver if 
‘it’ (its giftness) does not exist but is read as though it does. Bateson equates the 
example of a frame (see figure 4.1) to his work on meta-communication ‘This is 
play’ to further its paradoxical function.  
 
Bateson does not outline the frame in the sense of what follows, but to plainly 
identify the paradoxical element of the frame it is worth setting out its qualities in 
this way:  
•  There is an initial self-contradictory proposition; 
•  Reversibility is essential and inherent to all paradoxes and 
paradoxical frames; and 
•  The frame contains the irresolvable component of the paradox. 
                                                 
12 Further in this section, I discuss how Winnicott’s illusion-disillusion theory provides the basis 
for his theory of play.   210
It can be further stipulated that: 
•  An economic dynamic of exchange is necessary for a paradox to sustain 
itself, in order for a frame to operate; 
•  In order for the paradox to work within the frame, it must rely on meta-
communication. 
According to Bateson “the paradoxical play frame depends upon [the 
unconscious]”, yet is not completely a product of it (Bateson 1978:157). Play is 
therefore a combination of both conscious and unconscious processes. 
Highlighting this factor of the make-up of play aids Bateson’s contextualisation 
of the frame more coherently. 
 
The frame of which Bateson argues is not solely a literal concrete, tangible 
apparatus. He uses the frame as a metaphor for the psychical contextualising and 
ordering within meta-communication (play is his example). This acknowledges 
the psychological frame that helps human beings to externalise realities. The 
application of a frame offers the subject a platform from which to form their 
subjectivity. The methods through which this formation occurs revolve around 
the frame. For example, whatever subjectivity is formed ‘inside’ the frame, 
another separate and distinct subjectivity exists ‘outside’ the frame. Within the 
exchange of the gift (and of play), this idea of the frame helps to demonstrate 
how a giver is able to shift positions between what is subjectively perceived to 
what is objectively perceived within the same circumstance. What the frame 
provides is a psychical apparatus for the movement that occurs when different 
subjectivities are formed. More specifically, the gift is what metaphorically 
frames the subjectivities of giver and receiver. It is clear that these are temporary   211
subjectivities defined entirely through their connection to the gift, prior to the act 
of exchange. The gift becomes the frame that allows the assembly of giver and 
receiver subjectivities. 
 
In fort/da, the child employs such a frame in producing pleasure via repeating the 
disappearance and return of the wooden toy. The message of disappearance is 
‘inside’ the frame, whilst the message of return is ‘outside’. The pleasure of the 
child resonates in their mastering of the messages and the distinction and shifting 
between their alternating inclusions within the psychical frame. It is through 
these two meta-communications, revolving and repeating that the child masters 
their subjectivity. Similarly, the mother’s breast affords the infant the same sense 
of mastering over the formation of subjectivity through the mother’s adaptation 
to the infant’s needs. What occurs within the infant’s realm of illusion is a 
psychical frame of omnipotent control that allows the exchange between illusion 
and disillusion to take place. The meta-communication of the messages found in 
these exchanges operates on what messages are included and excluded from such 
psychical framing. 
 
In arguing frames are exclusive, Bateson includes and carries the sense and 
function of the paradox, as initially the frame appears to be performing the same 
action by excluding and including messages within its single meta-
communicative psychical apparatus. Yet, as has been demonstrated through the 
differing potential orders of play, such distinction is too simple. The giver, 
working with the psychical frame of gift exchange, believes or works under the 
notion of giving. In ‘including’ messages within a certain frame of exchange,   212
Bateson insists that what is included must overshadow, dominate rather than 
negate, what is excluded from the same frame. This suggests for the gift that 
although the concept of the debt is excluded from the psychical frame of gift 
exchange, it nevertheless is somewhat included as part of the picture despite its 
psychical existence as excluded. It is this particular construction of the 
relationship of the messages within meta-communication operating as a typology 
of exchange that embodies that crucial paradox. The giver gives the gift within 
the psychical frame of gift exchange that seemingly excludes its opposite – the 
debt. The value of the message inside the frame (and subsequently the exchange) 
is dependant on the message outside the frame possessing a lesser value – purely 
as a result of their situation with regards to the frame. Such distinction between 
messages shows how formation of subjectivity and any following shifting within 
exchange works. 
 
Bateson claims that the frame forms part of the message. Specifically in play, it 
is within the interpretation of play where the frame is included or as a pervious 
boundary keeping interpretation within limits (Bateson 1978:160).  Messages 
outside the frame cannot be ignored if the message/s within the frame is/are to 
remain meta-communicative (which is the parergonal logic referred to earlier). 
Bateson argues however, that the frame itself is meta-communicative through the 
messages that sandwich it and also acknowledges a reversibility, “Every 
metacommunicative or metalinguistics message defines, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the set of messages about which it communicates, i.e., every 
metacommunicative message is or defines a psychological frame” (Bateson 
1978:161). Bateson’s entire example of the frame (both his literal example of the   213
painting frame and the psychological frame) is an analogy of how logic works. In 
effect, this example of play and the ensuing analysis of order and organisation 
within the meta-communicative statement ‘This is play’, is employed as an in-
depth example for his larger agenda regarding the effects of the break down of 
logical systems, for example in schizophrenia.  
 
The messages that are included and excluded from the frame are these different 
systems of classifications, or logical types. In the messages that are included 
inside the psychical frame, or indeed in the painting frame, one finds that the 
figures and the background present two logical types, “[t]he picture frame then, 
because it delimits a background, is here regarded as an external representation 
of a very special and important type of psychological frame – namely a frame 
whose function is to delimit a logical type” (Bateson 1978:162). Bateson claims 
this typology of frame is what instigates the paradox. To avoid any sense of 
paradox connected to the frame or meta-communication is to correlate the logical 
types (or messages) that exist inside and outside the frame.  ‘This is play’ 
represents the sort of message that personifies the paradox however, and also 
reflects the necessity of the paradox within meta-communication, as through the 
paradox the distinction between logical types can be made. It makes sense to 
claim that the paradox within meta-communication creates the potential for 
exchange between these different logical types. The child applies a psychical 
frame to the disappearance of the wooden toy and in doing so creates a logical 
type. Another logical type is applied when it is ‘returned’. The paradox that 
allows this play to be a meta-communication is what propels the exchange and in 
turn precipitates repetition. The child, in manipulating their psychical frames,   214
produces the paradoxes within the meta-communicative messages of play, and 
establishes the difference of logical types creating exchange.
13  
 
6.5 Paradox and Repetition 
 
Returning to the issue of order in play, an inverted social order, that of the 
carnivalesque, creates space for pleasure through its limit-creating capacities. 
The pleasure of the carnivalesque lies in its anti-thetical nature because it 
prescribes to the fortunes of the illogical, or rather the 'antilogical', for it does 
have its own internal and systemic logic. By segregating the carnivalesque from 
the vraisemblance of the cultural order drawn on by the child-at-play, helps to 
contextualise and perhaps offer the possibility of fort/da residing in one order or 
both. What such an offering provides is a delimitation of play as a strict social 
order, and within each and every subsequent repetition of play lays the potential 
for difference. Issues of control and pleasure are fundamental to the possibility of 
difference. Without the option of the carnivalesque, the control of play (and 
repetition) produces no pleasure; as such control of repetition without the 
potential of disorder offers no 'fresh pleasure'. In the order of play, repetition is 
exacted in conjunction with what is the same, as well as the possibility of what 
could be different. In terms of gift exchange, this suggestion of difference within 
an order of play confounds the importance that the integration of play and 
pleasure holds for its communication. Whilst the opportunity for diversity 
presents itself, the need for a structured arrangement of communication is 
essential for any production of meaning, gift related or not. All play is based on 
                                                 
13 A different development of this is looked at in terms of Freudian transference and counter-
transference as a discourse of the gift in chapter seven.   215
configurations of presence and absence, and the pleasure of play is to be found in 
the double semiotics of this interplay of presence/absence with the insertion of 
the subject, and the disturbing of the cultural order, that is the momentary 
arresting of the reality principle. If child’s play, or any form of play, is to be 
correlated with pleasure and read as a circumstance of gift exchange, especially 
in terms of the self, then it is this sense of double semiotics, or Bateson’s double 
layers of communication, that is significant for repetition. Outside the primary 
level of communication, in the case of the spool, its simple disappearance and 
return; or in the case of the transitional object, its shift between illusion and 
disillusion, it is the secondary layer of what the act is signifying in terms of 
pleasure that becomes the gift practice for the subject (and subsequently the 
reason for desire to repeat).  
 
Pleasure in repetition, despite the negativity in the re-experience of the act, is 
largely due to the control of the subject, in Freud's example the child-in-play. 
Involved in the cycle of repetition is this notion of inversion, in the sense that the 
pleasure derived from repetition is negative in its nature. For Freud, "it is clear 
that in their play children repeat everything that has made a great impression on 
them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression 
and, as one might put it, make themselves master of the situation" (Freud 
1987:286).  The giver and the receiver within the economy of gift exchange are 
similarly entered into a negativity of repetition through continuing the cycle of 
giving. Fundamental to the repetition of pleasure within the act of play is the 
exchange in communication and the use of the play-object. Using Freud's case as 
exemplar, the child through its play moves between sites of pleasure and   216
unpleasure using repetition as the function of transition. The child's game enables 
an effect of his/her own exchange in subjectivity from a child who experiences 
pleasure, to a child who experiences unpleasure, and so on. The act that is 
repeated here through the play-object, the throwing and retrieving of a spool - 
works in cycles constantly founding two particular sites of subject position. This 
shifting mirrors the movement of pleasures and unpleasures through different 
stages of play, as well as concretes the interrelationship of play and pleasure that 
is creative in terms of gift exchange. The repetition of the game, as well as 
repeating the pleasure and gaining stronger control over the act of exchange in 
the play, develops an economy of continuous gifts to the child. The child is 
consistently putting themselves in the position of giver and receiver and this tight 
control is what makes his game so pleasurable.  
 
Freud argues that in repeating experiences of unpleasure (such as the giving 
away of a desired gift
14 or the delay in giving within an act of exchange) the act 
is a movement from the position of passivity to activity. For Freud, the repetition 
of an act creates transition in subject position within the same cultural event.
15 
When the child throws away the spool, he/she is operating within a passive field, 
but on retrieval of the spool, the child has managed to shift not only their position 
from passive to active subject but also the signification of the spool. The 
retrieved spool is significantly different from the spool that was thrown because 
                                                 
14 On this matter Marilyn Strathern’s analysis of gift exchange is relevant, “As I understand it, 
what Euro-Americans call gifts in late twentieth-century consumer culture, whether body 
substance or merchandise, are regarded as extensions of the self insofar as they carry the 
expression of sentiments. Sentiments are commonly expressed toward other persons, but they 
may equally well be directed to abstract entities such as “society” … They thus appear as the 
person would like to appear, autonomous, charitable” (Strathern 1988:97). 
15 See also Freud’s example of the unconscious mediation for the “accidental” breaking of the 
vase – a gift from someone Freud disliked.    217
of what it is able to (re)signify for the child. Here one is able to see an inverted 
social order of play as well as the potential for multiple exchanges of pleasure 
within a (seemingly) single act of play. What this shift in signification of an 
individual play-object demonstrates is that through any combination of pleasure 
and play, it is the ordering and organisation of communication within the act of 
exchange that sets up the parameters for what becomes the circumstances for the 
gift. Additionally this shifting in signification of the spool registers the 
heterogeneity of the gift and its inherence within all acts of communication 
across all levels of communication –through exchange and as paradox.  
 
Freud uses another example of a child who 'moves' their unpleasurable (passive) 
experience of a doctor's appointment to a situation of a game, thereby creating an 
active subject position, "the unpleasurable nature of an experience does not 
always unsuit it for play" (Freud 1987:286). This movement symbolises a 
'handing-over' of unpleasure within the experience and reaffirms Freud's original 
claim that production of pleasure can be achieved through the avoidance of 
unpleasure, and indeed reaffirms Winnicott’s claim that playing is essentially 
satisfying, "As the child passes over from the passivity of the experience to the 
activity of the game, he hands on the disagreeable experience to one of his 
playmates and in this way revenges himself on a substitute" (Freud 1987:286). 
This issue of control over repetition is complementary to Derrida's reading of 
Freud's argument of pleasure.  
 
Derrida views repetition in a dialectical fashion, focusing on its paradox. For 
Derrida, negativity is imparted from the repetition, "Dialectics is the movement   218
through which expenditure is reappropriated into presence - it is the economy of 
repetition. The economy of truth. Repetition summarizes negativity, gathers and 
maintains the past present as truth, as ideality" (Derrida 1978:246).  This 
negativity within the repetition of an act is crucial to the effect of pleasure 
because of its paradox. Superficially it would seem that no pleasure can be 
gained from a re-experience of an act that primarily causes a feeling of 
unpleasure, especially not a series of 'identical' repetitive acts. How can this be a 
form or circumstance of the gift? The paradox in this instance results from the 
initial experience of unpleasure, that pleasure can be gained through repetition. 
Freud speculates that for a child, their repetitive game might "make themselves 
master of the situation" (Freud 1987:286). The situation of play creates room for 
re-experience and the promise of control, and subsequent pleasure. This is 
another reflection of how play operates within the gift – through repetition. For 
Derrida, repetition functions in an economy, a series of cycles, yet the pleasure 
derived from such economics stems not from any prediction in the result of the 
act. Derrida's reasoning also highlights the aforementioned play of subjectivity 
within the fort/da. Subjectivity is tied to control over the domains of a subject's 
passive and active subjectivity. The image of the self is invested in both elements 
of appearance and disappearance within the fort/da. In repeating the game, the 
child is able to create control over all aspects of the fort/da. The negativity within 
Derrida's dialectics becomes pleasure through the subject gaining control over 
different sites of subjectivity and all elements of the fort/da. This ‘mastering’ of 
the subject’s position in play enables a progression towards the release of 'stale 
pleasure' and satisfaction of 'fresh pleasure'. 
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In applying the pleasure in the repetition of play to the economy of the gift, it 
becomes evident that any productions of pleasure/avoidance of unpleasure, and 
issues of control over subjectivity are situated and established in the act of 
exchange. Within this gift exchange the giver has knowledge of the inevitable 
return, just as the subject knows what part of play produces a certain typology of 
pleasure. The absence of the initial gift predicts the presence of its 'return'. In 
choosing a gift, part of a subject's subjectivity is invested in, and directed 
towards, giftness.  The formation of giftness is the abstraction of giving, and 
directs the flow of the material gift. Such a unique combination means that to 
part with the gift is to part with a materialised/ manifested aspect of one’s own 
desire and conception of giftness. Such a gift depends on reciprocation, a 're-
investment' of desire from the previous receiver. The gift cycle and the re-gift are 
necessary for both the giver and receiver to gain pleasure in repetition. The 
received gift is a replacement of desire - the signifier of the shift from a passive 
position as giver, and active position as receiver. The subject becomes active by 
the repetition of the reconstructed return. 
 
At the core of the fort/da is the notion of transition. Specifically the sites of 
passivity and activity create a fluctuation of exchange, which is highly relevant 
to subjectivity. Effectively, the act of repetition is an act of re-affirmation of the 
subject's own subjectivity. In terms of the gift, the giver must operate as though 
they are 'master of the situation' through-making choices of the gift, deciding the 
moment of transition (departing of the gift) and the receiver also works in this 
way. For the receiver, control of the situation is also constructed as though they 
are 'master of the situation', albeit in an inverted sense. For the receiver to master   220
the situation, they must await affirmation of their subjectivity from the giver. The 
control of receiver is that closely attached to reconstructed return and of deferred 
presence. The control of giver is that of presentation and presence. The passive 
and active belong in both sites of subjectivity. The giver's action of giving 
renders their position as passive - a seemingly reversal of control. This action 
however is almost a stricter control that those sites that move from a passive act 
(such as the child in Freud's example of fort/da). The giver constructs return of 
the gift. Through this shift in subjectivity the subject indirectly experiences a 
transition and subsequently produces pleasure through an act of deferral. 
 
Winnicott’s Paradox: Illusion-disillusion 
The gift, if nothing else, is an irreducible paradox. One of the key aspects of the 
gift for the current concerns is that which appears as its opposite. Within such a 
concern one finds many connections to circumstances of paradox, especially in 
terms of the practice of pleasure and play. Winnicott’s theories on playing and 
creativity are interesting for this discussion on the gift as it is within the use of 
play, looking at playing rather than what is played with, which holds the 
resonance of paradox. The paradox that has been looked at here, from a number 
of different perspectives, is based on the predicate of communication. In this 
light, one can read the paradox as a fulcrum for circumstances of exchange, 
whether it is pleasure, play or gift specific. Winnicott’s paradox is to be found in 
the infant’s use of the transitional object – not in the manner of how a child 
relates to the object but how the child using transitional phenomena uses the 
object. This particular paradox is interesting for this thesis and the discussion of 
the gift, as it is a paradox that is to be left alone. In order for the gift to operate 
and circulate, to possess a social and cultural meaning, its aporia and irreducible   221
duality must also be left alone and allowed to exchange under the cloak of 
paradox.  
 
Like Derrida’s conception of the gift through and in language, Winnicott’s 
transitional object is an inherent aspect to the formation of the child as it operates 
on the basis of paradox. For Winnicott, the transitional object is the infant’s first 
‘not-me’ possession (where the infant has “the capacity to recognize the object as 
‘not-me’”) “some soft object or other type of object [that] has been found and 
used by the infant” (Winnicott 1999:4) and combined with transitional 
phenomena, outlines the intermediate area of experience. Transitional 
phenomena are methods through which the transitional object is utilised. These 
methods help to establish the area of experience for the infant – the initial 
creative site - the most common of which is auto-erotic experience. The most 
important function of transitional phenomena and transitional object is that 
combined, they operate ‘in’ illusion. They help form Winnicott’s ‘intermediate 
area of experience’ along with the Mother’s ability to aid the illusion through 
providing the breast when needed, or as Winnicott specifies, adapting to the 
infant’s needs.  
 
Specifically Winnicott offers the following as examples of transitional 
phenomena - babbling noises, or soft cloth that is caressed, sucked or stroked, or 
collection of soft and comforting material (Winnicott’s example is wool), or the 
introduction of an object into the mouth (Winnicott 1999:3). Winnicott does 
acknowledge that in some cases the transitional object is the Mother; yet again it 
is not the actual object that is involved with the paradox but the use of it. The   222
infant develops a personal pattern with the transitional object that accompanies 
thumb-sucking or dummy-sucking. By forming a pattern with the transitional 
object and within transitional phenomena, the infant is able to establish the 
paradox that begins in sphere of illusion and disillusion, which in turn is “at the 
basis of initiation of experience” (Winnicott 1999:14). 
 
It is the transitional aspects of the objects and phenomena of Winnicott’s theory 
that is interesting for the gift as they can only become transitional on a giving 
and taking foundation found in an experiential pattern similar to illusion-
disillusionment. It is neither the objects nor the phenomena themselves that are 
of specific interest in terms of gift exchange, rather it is their capacity to help 
initiate the illusion-disillusionment process – the negotiation of internal and 
external realities of the infant – that relates to the gift and paradox in play and 
pleasure: 
  in playing, and perhaps only in playing, the child or adult is free to be 
  creative. This consideration arises in my mind as a development of the 
  concept of transitional phenomena and it takes into account the difficult 
  part of the theory of the transitional object, which is that a paradox is 
  involved which needs to be accepted, tolerated, and not resolved.  
(Winnicott 1999:53) 
 
This paradox is essential for the transitional object to be used effectively and to 
work effectively, likewise for the gift. By the time that transitional phenomena 
has become apparent, a pattern has been established, suggesting that patterning is 
an essential component of paradox, particularly in Winnicott’s sense. Part of the 
paradox that belongs to the pattern of transitional phenomena can bear upon the   223
relationship and patterning of pleasure and play in terms of the gift, and the 
production that transpires within the repetitive relationship between giving and 
taking.  
 
The smooth functioning of the paradox (smooth in that it must be a paradox that 
is not questioned but accepted) is paramount in order for the infant to create a 
‘normal’ concept of reality. For example, when putting an infant to rest, or 
settling their anxiety, a placator or comforter may be used such as a dummy, or 
the child may suck their thumb. A particular type of material may be touched or 
caressed during this auto-erotic experience. These transitional phenomena are 
imbued with importance for the infant as through the pattern of repeated usage 
(or one is tempted to argue a typology of play as the infant has become master of 
their subjectivity and hence producer of pleasure through the repetition of this 
act) a meta-communication has been established, stating ‘This is safe’, ‘This is 
pleasure’. Safety and pleasure further arises from the concept of illusion wherein 
the infant believes the mother’s breast is under its own control as an internal 
object, part of their inner reality. As the infant navigates its way through the 
process of illusion and disillusion, the transitional object loses its importance 
(eventually becomes “decathected, especially as cultural interests develop” 
(Winnicott 1999:14) ) as the transition of the object from an infant’s inner reality 
to external reality has been worked through to the extent that the infant realises 
their individual existence. With this recognition of a separate external reality to 
the infant’s inner reality, disillusion has succeeded and the infant has attained a 
notion of individual, separate reality to the Mother. Without transitional 
phenomena, patterns are unable to evolve, meta-communication is unable to be   224
established and the paradox necessary to the functioning of illusion and 
disillusion is annulled. The infant cannot make its passage to a separate reality 
outside that of the Mother, through the psychical paradigms of illusion and 
disillusion. 
 
Transitional objects and the concept of gift exchange can be paralleled through 
Winnicott’s illusion and disillusion. Such a parallel is important as it foregrounds 
the idea of the pattern that is so intrinsic to the gift. Using Freud’s observations 
of pleasure through the play-object in the fort/da, the transitional status present 
within gift exchange appears as its most defining aspect. Similar to the 
transitional object, gift exchange resides in the limbo of illusion and disillusion. 
The value of exchange is derived from the causality of the gift. The cause is 
specific to the subject’s (infant’s) external reality, and its affect relates to the 
subject’s inner reality. Gift exchange operates within the same capacity as 
transitional objects by relating to illusion and disillusion in the same way. These 
dichotomies that Winnicott identifies enable the infant to shift from inner reality 
to external reality through the use of the transitional object, and are comparable 
to the shifting of reciprocity in the economy of the gift.    
 
Through illusion-disillusionment, the infant distinguishes between their inner self 
and external reality. This distinction is based on the illusion of the mother’s 
breast as being immediately adaptable to the infant’s desires, needs and wishes, 
“The mother’s adaptation to the infant’s needs, when good enough, gives the 
infant the illusion that there is an external reality that corresponds to the infant’s 
own capacity to create” (Winnicott 1999:12, sic). Fort/da, the external reality is   225
dependant on the illusion created by the infant of pleasure in both the 
disappearance of the spool and its return. It is the inextricable connection 
between the disappearance and return in Freud’s example of play that allows 
pleasure to generate and repeat. In the same way, illusion and disillusion cannot 
work independently of each other. Winnicott uses two figures to explicate his 
theory of how transitional objects and illusion relate.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Figure 6.2 
 
These two figures illustrate the process of illusion and how transitional objects 
relate in terms of creativity. The illusion/disillusion development is the 
circumstance for the infant’s negotiation of inner and external realities – a 
process that Winnicott claims stays with us throughout life, “no human being is 
free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this 
strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience which is not challenged 
(arts, religion for example). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the 
play area of the small child who is ‘lost’ in play” (Winnicott 1999:13). It is 
within this intermediate area that we find the initiation of paradox. Figure 1 sets 
out the psychical arena for Winnicott’s illusion-disillusionment, and arguably the 
arena wherein Freud’s grandchild begins to master his situation over the 
disappearance and return of the spool, as it becomes the foundation for creativity. 
In this sense the transitional object theory of Winnicott explicate certain aspects   226
of the gift. The other aspect that becomes evident is that the transitional object is 
a type of gift in itself. It is the gift given to the self  – and so is the gift that 
cannot be given.  
 
Figure 6.1 represents the first situation of play. In his theory of play, Winnicott 
states that “baby and object are merged with one another. Baby’s view of the 
object is subjective and the mother is oriented towards the making actual of what 
the baby is ready to find” (Winnicott 1999:47). This is the illusion both within 
play and within the infant’s negotiation of inner and external realities. It is where 
the paradox of further exchange begins. In this primary process of playing, the 
sense of giftness is evident. Play is to develop for the infant and enable them to 
experience a ‘normal’ reality completely based on gifts. Here the gift comes from 
the mother through her ‘adaptation’ to the infant’s needs. Winnicott offers Figure 
6.2 to elucidate where transitional objects and transitional phenomena function 
for the infant and to what purpose. Within these figures, Winnicott is slowly 
working towards a development of play stemming from an intermediate area of 
experience that remains unchallenged but is wholly based on forms of exchange 
and gifts (here between infant and mother). In this ‘unchallenged area’ one finds 
the arena where a child can be ‘lost’ in play.   
 
Disillusionment provides the second half of the paradox and provides an 
additional step to the theory of play and gift exchange. It is important to realise 
this paradox as positive as this is key to its acceptance, tolerance, and being left 
alone.  The primary paradox of illusion-disillusionment sets up the basis for 
further paradoxes in the developments of play and gift exchange as it is intrinsic   227
in a subject’s construction of self/other, inner/external reality, as well as the 
foundation of other subjectivities such as giver/receiver. Part of the positivity of 
the paradox (and other subsequent paradoxes) is its reversibility, and hence the 
necessity for such a paradox to be accepted, tolerated and not resolved. The 
illusory feature of illusion is disillusionment. Illusion’s capacity and function is 
dependant on the paradox that illusion-disillusionment sustains (and here we 
witness a Batesonian reading of schizophrenia, for this is the reality paradox par 
excellence). The infant’s illusion of the mother’s breast appearing at its hunger is 
disillusion, in that it belies external reality. The mother’s adaptation to her 
infant’s needs is essential in order for illusion to take place (and subsequently 
disillusion). Therefore what is illusion for the infant is disillusion for external 
reality.  
 
This disillusionment process is not a negative psychical function and does not 
negate the operation of illusion. Instead, disillusionment enhances the illusory 
nature of illusion by enforcing its value through setting up the paradox and 
exchange. It is because there is disillusionment that illusion can become part of 
exchange. In terms of a theory of play, disillusionment affords the birth of 
creativity, “[t]his complex process is highly dependant on there being a mother, 
or mother-figure prepared to participate and to give back what is handed out” 
(Winnicott 1999:47). The infant, through the gift of maternal adaptation, is 
allowed to be creative, allowed to begin to play through the exchange of illusion-
disillusionment. This is a form of pleasure through exchange (and thus 
connectable to play and gift exchange) as what is being accepted is a certain   228
subjectivity, what is being tolerated is the paradox, and what is not resolved is 
the finality of the illusion-disillusionment negotiation. 
 
Through the reversibility of illusion-disillusionment a ‘normal’ reality is reached 
for the infant. The illusion of a mastered subjectivity, as illustrated in Freud’s 
fort/da analysis, demonstrates precisely this construction of a normal reality 
through reversibility.  This reversibility participates in the act of exchange that 
takes place in fort/da, illusion-disillusion and the economy of the gift. The 
crucial tie that runs through these typologies of exchange is play as each of these 
situations of paradox revolve around and depend on the area stipulated by 
Winnicott in Figure 1 – the “neutral area of experience which will not be 
challenged” (Winnicott 1999:12). This area is the fundamental construct of 
reality and the subsequent acceptance and tolerance of the reality of the paradox. 
Arguing the possession of the transitional object is important as it clearly 
separates between internal (mental) and external object, giving the use of the 
object the status of significance in the transition or exchange from inner to 
external reality. Without such possession, the exchange cannot take place. 
Despite the fact that the object is not transitional, its presence as catalyst for 
exchange is essential. In fort/da, it is not the wooden spool that produces 
pleasure in itself, nor is its materiality that incurs the play. What the wooden 
spool provides is a tangible signifier for exchange to take place within a ‘neutral 
area of experience’ and allows Freud’s grandson (through the use of the wooden 
toy) to create the illusion of his play of disappearance and return. The gift’s 
illusion is sustained in a similar manner, as the gift cannot be recognised as it is 
the signifier for the transpiring of giftness. The gift signals the process of giving   229
and the illusion of altruism, just as the play-object allows the creativity in play to 
effect the illusion. The infant is able, through using the object, to identify ‘me’ 
and ‘not-me’, to take part in the illusion of an object that is still ‘me’, 
concurrently displacing the object as ‘not-me’ via disillusionment. The 
subjectivities of giver and receiver are connected through the gift in comparable 
terms of relativity. It is through the connection of ownership and control that 
‘giver’ and ‘not-giver’ help to circulate giftness, identifying that the gift is the 
object that exchange denies.  
 
Pleasure, as it appears in play and gift exchange, is illusion as its expenditure 
rests on the amount of unpleasure to be avoided – just as the illusion-
disllusionment must be balanced out, so too with pleasure and unpleasure, gift 
and debt. This dichotomous dynamic works to keep these two psychical binary 
states connected through forms of exchange, particularly when viewing paradox. 
What emerges here is a paralleling of dynamic paradoxes as they both seek to 
reach a plateau, or stable subjectivity via exchanging their opposites 
economically.  
 
In chapter seven, the subjectivities of giver and receiver are paralleled to those of 
analyst and analysand. This is done to further consider the discourse of the gift, 
exemplifying psychoanalytic treatment as a gift economy with emphasis on the 
impossible possibility of its duality. Indeed, given that analysis is a highly 
circular engagement between two people, it is evident that a concentration of 
giftness exists in this discursive practice. The ambiguity of the gift is looked at in   230
depth, with specific reference to Derrida’s discussion in Given Time: I. 
Counterfeit Money. 
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7. Transference and Countertransference: A discourse of the gift 
7.1 Transference, Countertransference, Dora 
7.2 Transference as gift 
7.3 The circular ambiguity 
7.4 The Impossible Possible, the Possible Impossible 
 
This section continues the themes of paradox and instability considering such drives 
of giftness with regards to the formation of subjectivity. Given that Derrida’s paradox, 
the impossible possibility of the gift, is dependent on reading the gift, it is important 
that the context of relationship is looked at. We find a highly concentrated 
relationship of giftness within psychoanalytic treatment where both analyst and 
analysand continuously shift roles of giver and receiver. In this relationship, words are 
given and returned as treatment. Ambiguity presents itself as a technique of delivery 
here, particularly with regards to subjectivity (its formation and positioning). As 
Bateson notes, “the resemblance between the process of therapy and the phenomenon 
of play is, in fact, profound” (Bateson 1978:164). Transference and 
countertransference are viewed as a form of gift practice and as a form of gift 
exchange for these reasons but also because they lend themselves to the paramount 
problematic of the gift – as a phenomenon that does not have ‘cure’ as its goal.  
 
Transference is postulated as gift to analyse the reversibility of ‘giver’ subjectivity, 
the famous case study of Dora is used as example. Lacan’s Intervention on 
Transference (1985) is central to such a discussion of the gift as its different 
perspective regarding the countertransference is presented in terms of cycles and 
investment, undeniably key elements of giftness. Derrida claims:   232
the simple consciousness of the gift right away sends itself back the gratifying 
image of goodness or generosity, of the giving being who, knowing itself to be 
such, recognizes itself in a circular, specular fashion, in a sort of auto-
recognition, self-approval, and narcissistic gratitude. 
(Derrida 1994c:23) 
 
This specular forethought to gifting guides the presupposition of a ‘true’ gift and 
confirms the importance of subjectivity in the deliberation of the gift and giftness. 
Hélène Cixous resists Derrida’s theorising of the gift, believing that only within 
patriarchal culture can the gift be viewed as non-existent. Cixous’s analysis of the gift 
has poignant resonance in terms of its economics, as much of her discussion of the 
gift concerns the formation of subjectivity in the realm of the proper. As Jean 
François Lyotard has noted, “[t]he category of the gift is a theatrical idea, it belongs to 
semiology, and it presupposes a subject, a limit of his proper body and his property, 
and the generous transgression of this property” (Lyotard 1993:123). As such, this 
section establishes the significant position of subjectivity in gifting and continues to 
frame the consideration of the gift as Alan D. Schrift has pointed out, “is a political 
question, a question of the polis, that addresses fundamental issues of intersubjective 
interaction” (Schrift 2001:119). The last part of this section takes into account 
Cixous’s gendering of the gift in response to Hegelian and Derridean configurations 
of the gift in order to offer an alternative sense and reasoning of giving and the gift. 
 
7.1 Transference, Countertransference, Dora 
 
The 'cure' is not a final result - or a guaranteed end to the analysand's complaint. One 
of the aims of psychoanalysis is to, through the transference between analysand and 
analyst, move the repressed unconscious desire/s into the conscious mind thus 
creating awareness and relieve the symptoms of the analysand. The transference   233
figures predominantly as through it, the analyst is able to 'unknot' the analysand's 
unconscious to discover the underlying problem. In most cases, the present problem is 
not the direct cause of the analysand's complaint. The transference allows an intimacy 
to form in the analytic situation, and the analysand's history can be shared and is 
situated as necessary excess in the process of transference. These excesses can be 
found in those areas of history concerning the analysand infancy and primary love-
object choice. These historical 'excesses' are located within a circuit but are not being 
used, yet are still needed in order for the entire transferential process to work. The 
excesses of transference form part of the process of the transference that helps to 
construct it but are not always a part of the transference in the time of its operation. 
To explain this it helps to draw on further definition from Freud. In his introductory 
lectures, Freud summarises what he means by transference.  
We mean a transference of feelings on to the person of the doctor, since we do 
not believe that the situation in the treatment could justify the development of 
such feelings. We suspect, on the contrary, that the whole readiness for these 
feelings is derived from elsewhere, that they were already prepared in the 
patient and, upon the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment, are 
transferred on to the person of the doctor.  
(Freud 1986:494) 
 
In this definition of transference the economy for exchange is hinted at, as are the 
ingredients of the symbolic exchange of the gift to which Lyotard refers. Freud is 
establishing a relationship (between analyst and analysand – a discourse) that depends 
on the machinations of a cycle and in arguing that the transference exists prior to the 
engagement of an analytic relationship, he is suggesting that there is no ‘original’ 
transference. Rather a series of transferences have already occurred, the transference 
presenting itself in analysis is simply another transference in the cycle.
1 It is during 
                                                             
1 See section six where it is noted that Gasché argues that there is no original gift. Indeed, here we find 
traces of forgetting that are integral to a Derridean conception of the gift, “forgetting would be in the 
condition of the gift and the gift in the condition of forgetting” (Derrida 1994c:18).  The forgetting that   234
analysis that the analysand transfers previous desires, 'imagoes', from childhood onto 
the analyst. The analysand is continuing to transfer this infantile 'imago' love onto 
different love-objects during the transference via a series of what Freud terms as 
'stereotype plates'. 
 
Through the combined operation of his [the analysand] innate disposition and 
the influences brought to bear on him during his early years, has acquired a 
specific method of his own in his conduct of his erotic life - that is, in the 
preconditions to falling in love which he lays down, in the instincts he satisfies 
and the aims he sets himself in the course of it. This produces what might be 
described as a stereotype plate (or several such), which is constantly repeated - 
constantly reprinted afresh - in the course of the person's life, so far as external 
circumstances and the nature of the love-objects accessible to him permit, and 
which is certainly not entirely insusceptible to change in the face of recent 
experiences. 
(Freud 1914:99) 
 
These stereotype plates are part of the excesses that form the transference in 
psychoanalysis. The layering effect of these plates adds to the analysand's history of 
transferences, but continues the transferential process, as its ‘success’ or continuation 
relies on a compulsion to repeat. So in effect, there are two excesses within stereotype 
plates - the excess of history and the excess of repetition (determined in Freud as the 
compulsion to repeat). Whilst the transference that presents itself within the analytic 
situation appears as ‘new and refreshed', for the analysand it is simply a different 
picture on the same canvas. To explain this cyclical nature another way, for Freud the 
transference in analysis is a case of history repeating, an effect of the compulsion to 
repeat, and what is being repeated here are the imagoes that were formed in from the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
occurs here concerns the transference of the analysand’s object-choice onto the analyst. This is an 
unconscious process of forgetting and gifting imperative to the success of analytic economy. Without 
forgetting (or repressing) the reason the analyst chooses particular love-objects, there is no causality or 
circularity within the transference and no gift like economy. Of course there is also further resonance 
here regarding Heidegger’s es gibt. However, I am not the first to see this. Schrift notes that “ The link 
between giving, gifts and forgetting allows Derrida to move the discussion to Heidegger insofar as for 
Heidegger the event (Ereignis) of the gift (of Being) has been forgotten, and the recollection of this 
event, which is to say, the appropriate reception of this gift, which is to say, the overcoming of this 
forgetfulness is now, at present, the task of thinking” (Schrift 2001:121n).   235
experiences in the analysand's childhood. These imagoes are also considered as part 
of the historical excesses of transference, as whilst they do not directly have a playing 
role (that is the initial love object has changed) in the analytic situation between 
analyst and analysand, it is primarily due to their foundation that the transference can 
occur in psychoanalysis at all. The gift carries the similar excesses of history and 
repetition in that is must always be re-presenting itself within acts of exchange in 
order to survive. The gift must re-present itself based on previous presentations but 
with the condition of failing to remember its existence as a gift. As Charles 
Champetier has noted (with specific reference to a Derridean gift) “the gift cannot be 
linked to thought without becoming alienated, without entering the vicious circle of 
an intention and a volition that annul it inasmuch as they appropriate it” (Champetier 
2001:16). Its history of cyclical exchange is what identifies its existence as gift, and 
the repetition of giving mirrors the repetition of the analysand’s imagoes – always 
hoping to reach betterment through another cycle.  
 
Another component of these transferential excesses is repression. The analysand is 
unaware of the stereotype they are replaying continuously and ironically. While 
repression is an element that forms part of the transference, it is only through the 
enactment of transference that the repression of the stereotype plates becomes 
apparent. Through transference, the analysand acts out their infantile imagoes; these 
stereotype plates are brought into conscious reality through present translation. For 
Freud, the father-imago was at the centre of the transference and his analysis and 
interpretation of transference was inhibited by this patriarchal structure. In his case 
study of Dora, it is through her father that Freud believes Dora introduces him into 
the transference, as he believes that Dora's infantile imago was her love for her father,   236
"[a]s long as the patient is in the treatment he cannot escape from this compulsion to 
repeat and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering" (Freud 
1914:150). Freud's conception of transference (and this returns us to the theoretical 
importance and relativity of transference), suggests that whom we love, and arguably 
how we love, is a further enactment of the stereotype plates. Our first experiences of 
love, both in giving and receiving, lay the foundation for our later loves - in forming 
our object-choices and object-relations. In this way it is undeniable that our identities 
and subjectivities are formed within gift-giving economies. 
 
A number of gifts present themselves in the analytic situation. Most notably there is 
the transference itself that continues the analysand’s on-going exchange and replaying 
of their repressed childhood imagoes. This begins or at least instigates the exchange 
within the analytic situation. Additionally, the compulsion to repeat is another 
symbolic gift, as its centrality to the economy of exchange within psychoanalytic 
transference forms the return of the imagoes (what is repressed) for the analysand. It 
is in Dora that transference and countertransference is most clearly illustrated, and an 
interpretation of its unfolding situation as gift exchange cannot be excluded from a 
thesis on the gift. More points regarding different typologies of gifts within the 
psychoanalytic situation will offer themselves as the section progresses. 
 
Dora 
It is said that Dora reads like a story. Freud warns against this particular seductive 
quality, yet this engaging narrative has particular relevance with respect to 
transference as in no small part is Freud’s construction of the narrative a gift in itself. 
As previously stated, transference is partly formed by included excesses including   237
stereotype plates, repressions and infantile imagoes. Positioning Dora as an included 
excess within transference theory, it can be viewed with the same stereotype plate 
effect, with its own repressions - here those of the analyst, Freud. Lacan introduces 
the countertransference in Intervention on Transference, using the example of Freud's 
own countertransference to extend the theory of transference and add the dimensions 
Freud's blindness (concerning his own transference) failed to notice. Lacan concedes 
that it was Freud’s inability to acknowledge and address his own countertransference 
that lead to the failure of Dora’s analysis, yet maintains that one is still able to find a 
diamond in the rough, as it were. Lacan believes that through methodically working 
through the dialectical relationship that exists between Freud and Dora (or more 
commonly analyst and analysand) it becomes apparent where his analysis failed and 
how it can be rectified.  
 
In her response to Lacan’s article, Suzanne Gearhart views countertransference as a 
problematic, which is “the distortion or bias imposed on his [Freud’s] psychoanalytic 
theory and practiced by those limitations and desires" (Gearhart 1985:105). For Lacan 
she stipulates that, “countertransference is the negative phase of a dialectical process 
that leads, practically speaking, to the positive transference - the key to all successful 
analyses - and theoretically speaking, to an ultimately coherent, unified, scientific 
theory” (Gearhart 1985:105). Gearhart's discussion of transference begins with an 
analysis of the seduction scene at the lake between Dora and Herr K. She argues that 
Freud saw this scene as “a knife that cuts both ways. The accusation against the father 
went with and concealed an accusation directed by the patient against herself - that 
she had desired a child by her own father” (Gearhart 1985:107). Much of Gearhart's 
analysis is focused on Lacan's Intervention on Transference as a disclaimer to Freud's   238
Dora.
2 Gearhart highlights the flaws, as she sees them, within Freud's initial 
conception of transference by using Lacan's analysis as a platform. The primary fault 
within Freud's interpretation hinges on his loyalty to the belief of the paternal figure 
operating as a ‘natural referent’.
3 Gearhart's use of the term ‘natural referent’ relates 
to the primary love-object for the girl - her father. This first experience of love, the 
first love object, forms the stereotype plate for every ensuing love-object, object-
choice and object-relation.  
 
Capitalising on this specific case study allows us to clearly see how transference and 
countertransference function as gifts, with particular emphasis on the fluctuation 
between subjectivities of giver and receiver. The richness of the analytic situation for 
the gift lies in its semantic status as the basis for success and failure within treatment 
rests on the same signifiers and conditions to gift exchange. For this reason it is 
worthwhile looking at Lacan’s article Intervention on Transference in depth where 
Freud’s Dora is analysed from the perspective of countertransference. Lacan takes us 
through a system of dialectical reversals and developments of truth to highlight the 
cycle that occurs between Dora and Freud, and countertransference and transference. 
In his analysis, Lacan discusses the discourse of the analyst and analysand in terms of 
a series of cycles. The plurality involved in such continuous processes of turn taking 
between analyst and analysand is what can be read as a form of gift exchange. 
Lacan’s account is of particular relevance as it acknowledges that even within a 
seemingly dual exchange of transference and countertransference there is always a 
                                                             
2 Lacan’s article is developed in depth further on in the section. 
3 The term 'natural referent' becomes a social construction of loving and sexual identity. Originally, this 
is a reference to the Oedipus complex, which signifies the movement into the Symbolic order. Prior to 
the Oedipus complex, according to Freud, we are 'polymorphously perverse'. When we pass through 
the Oedipus complex we become sexually socialised. The 'natural referent' thus functions as a term that 
denotes the passing into the Symbolic order and subsequently the process of socialising sexuality.   239
more complicated structure. One example of this is found in Lewis Hyde’s book The 
Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property (1983), wherein he discusses the 
circle of the gift. He argues that, “[t]he gift moves in a circle, and two people do not 
make much of a circle. Two points establish a line, but a circle lies in a plane and 
needs at least three points” (Hyde 1983:16). Comparatively, Lacan’s analysis of 
countertransference takes the analytic situation and argues its discourse as something 
far more complicated and diverse. He views the discourse between Freud and Dora as 
something more than an exchange between two people. It becomes the template for 
understanding the psychoanalytic interpretation of a particular psychical and social 
structure invested in power and a complex historical moment. However, before this 
particular Lacanian critique begins, it is worthwhile looking at some key definitional 
aspects of countertransference.  
 
Countertransference 
 
Laplanche and Pontalis outline countertransference as “the whole of the analyst's 
unconscious reactions to the individual analysand - especially to the analysand's own 
transference” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1980:92). In determining the parameters of 
countertransference, two positions emerge. The first position is to attach everything 
within the analyst's experience to influence and configure their countertransference, 
whilst the second is to limit the countertransference to the respective transference in 
each individual analytic situation. Laplanche and Pontalis further cite Daniel Lagache 
who extends the second position. For Lagache, the countertransference is not specific 
to the analyst, or the transference to the analysand. As a result, the analytic situation is 
to be viewed as both analyst and analysand possessing aspects of countertransference 
and transference. This duality within each subject adds to the formation of   240
subjectivity with the analytic situation. Briefly here, as this is expanded on later, it is 
the treatment itself that is used as the signifier for subject formation. By recognising 
that countertransference and transference exists in both parties of the analytic 
situation, the site of psychoanalysis lends itself to the concept of a cycle, similar to 
that of the gift. In gift exchange, each subject (giver and receiver) takes turns in filling 
each other place. The treatment works on the basis of investment in subjectivity, as by 
repeating the transference (and countertransference) one’s subjectivity becomes 
stronger, where the sensibility of giftness becomes deep-seated.  This idea of analysis 
possessing cyclical qualities returns us to Lacan's article. 
 
Lacan’s intertwining of dialectical reversals and developments of truth provide the 
structure for his analysis of countertransference and transference and the case study of 
Dora. Through instituting a series of dialectical relations, Lacan aims to discover the 
point in the process of analysis where the transference failed for Freud. These 
dialectical relations are comprised of developments of truth and dialectical reversals, 
constituting the countertransference. Lacan is working towards a positive transference 
as a result from the analytic situation:  
What is involved is a scansion of structures in which truth is transmuted for 
the subject, affecting not only her comprehension of things but her very 
position as subject of which her "objects" are a function. This means that the 
conception of the case history is identical to the progress of the subject, that is, 
to the reality of the treatment. 
(Lacan, 1985:95, original emphasis) 
 
His term ‘developments of truth’ are moments that occur with countertransference 
and are the analysand’s contribution to the dialogue that exists between him/her and 
the analyst. As this dialectical relationship is dependent on words, the words help to 
form the act of exchange that transpires within the treatment. It is through this   241
conception that Lacan introduces his argument - "psychoanalysis is a dialectical 
experience" (Lacan 1985:93, original emphasis) and aims to define transference 
through such dialectics. Lacan begins with a first development, “exemplary in that it 
carries us straight onto to the plane where truth asserts itself” (Lacan 1985:95) where 
the ‘truth’ in the analytic situation is tested. It is precisely here that the analysand 
resists (but also concedes) placing their trust in the analyst. The formation of 
subjectivity within psychoanalytic treatment begins with the investment of power in 
the analyst as becoming sujet supposé savoir. With this investment, transference 
commences. From this position and fundamental basis of analysis, a set of processes 
has been put into action; a cycle has begun. What passes between analyst and 
analysand are a gift of truths belying their investment within their psychoanalytic 
exchange. Using Dora as an example, Dora uncovers the truths of her dreams, desires 
and happenings in her life - her gift is that of trust, honesty and openness in her 
words. Dora begins her treatment through entering into a dialogue with Freud, 
outlining her memories and experiences. In Freudian terms it is the question "This is 
all perfectly correct and true, isn't it? What do you want to change in it?" (Freud 
1983:67) that continues the treatment, as it invites Dora to again trust in Freud and 
return to her words to re-examine them in light of her own involvement. For Lacan, it 
is this challenging question that ignites the set of dialectic reversals and moves onto to 
further potential developments of truth, as the words of the analysand cause the 
pattern of development that Lacan indicates.  
 
In answering this question the analyst turns the analysand's question back on them - 
marking the “first dialectical reversal” (Lacan 1985:96), and consequently stimulates 
an economy of exchange. In this moment, the analyst begins to participate in the   242
process of exchange through returning this ‘development of truth’ to the analysand. 
The treatment moves onto a second development of truth wherein Dora is seen to 
invest a large part of her subjectivity into the analytic situation through retelling her 
story to Freud. Her story becomes “caught up in a subtle circulation of gifts, serving 
to compensate the deficiency in sexual services, a circulation that starts with her 
father in relation to Herr K., and then comes back to the patient through the liberality 
it releases in Herr K” (Lacan 1985:96, emphasis added). The second development of 
truth, Freud’s return to Dora’s words, maintains the pattern of treatment so that from 
this point onwards, the analysis hosts a series of dialectical reversals and 
developments of truth that are exchanged to define treatment and countertransference, 
working towards a positive transference for the analysand. What is clearly developing 
through this countertransference is a series of exchanges based on the dialogue that 
exists between analyst and analysand. The words of Dora are constantly being 
returned to her in the hope that positive transference will result. In this sense it is 
negative for the subject, as the questioning of the words appears to be a questioning of 
the truths rather than a constant return and reexamination of them. The purpose of 
these dialectical reversals is to revisit the analysand’s words (or ‘truths’) and 
determine what they are hiding. The words are given to the analyst who returns them 
to his/her analysand – this return aiming to produce new words or at the very least a 
different perspective of these words as truths. This turn taking reflects the exchange of 
giftness as glissement in that it is a floating concept, with each return signifying a gift 
invested in difference with the final aim of lifting repression. 
  
The second dialectical reversal within the Dora case study occurs when Dora is 
confronted with Freud's analysis of her jealousy pertaining to her father's love affair,   243
“it conceals an interest in the person of the subject-rival [Frau K.]” (Freud 1983:97), 
leading to a third development of truth which is the exchange between Frau K. and 
Dora, pleasantries regarding Dora's father. Dora's gift here is the maintenance of 
civility to Frau K., despite her sadness at the perceived loss. However, Dora is also 
upset in losing the intimacy of her relationship with Frau K. (which she sees has 
moved to between Frau K. and her father). The affair between Frau K. and Dora's 
father is important in terms of Dora's subjectivity, because their intimate connection 
threatens Dora. This leads to a third dialectical reversal that shows “real value of 
object that Frau K. is for Dora. That is, not an individual, but a mystery of her 
femininity, by which I mean her bodily femininity” (Lacan 1985:97-98). By 
excluding Dora as object of affection, both Frau K. and Dora's fathers have taken 
away the signifier which Dora had invested her subjectivity. Dora is threatened with 
aphanisis by the presence of the affair. It is because of this significant grounding of 
subjectivity within affection from Frau K. and her father, that Dora is faced with a 
loss of identity. To acknowledge the affair between Frau K. and her father is to 
acknowledge, for Dora, that she no longer exists as the same 'Dora' with respect to 
each person, which as we shall note in a moment has specific resonance for the 
theorising of the gift. 
 
By working the Dora case study in terms of dialectical reversals and developments of 
truth, Lacan brings Freud's countertransference to the forefront as the reason for the 
failure of the treatment. It is possible to argue that it was important for Freud to invest 
his subjectivity in the treatment to assert his position as both analyst and sujet supposé 
savoir. Freud's identifies too strongly with Herr K., which is a direct result of his 
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it is because he put himself rather too much in the place of Herr K. that, this 
time, Freud did not succeed ... Because of his countertransference, Freud 
keeps reverting to the love that Herr K. might have inspired in Dora, and it is 
odd to see how he always interprets as confessions what are in fact the very 
varied responses that Dora argues against him. 
(Lacan 1985:101) 
 
Lacan's main argument is that Freud mistook Dora's dialectical reversals and 
developments of truth as signification of transference-love instead of limiting the 
emotion developed to the dialectical point in which it occurred. The result of this is 
his blindness to his own countertransference.  
 
It is possible to read this presentation of countertransference as a series of gifts based 
on the exchange of words. The treatment of psychoanalysis is dependent on an honest 
and open dialogue between analyst and analysand and in the case of Freud and Dora 
this occurred only in part. Dora’s gifts to Freud were overlooked in favour of his 
questions to her. This development of truth that Lacan claims come from the 
analysand is the primary gift that appears, and from this first development of truth 
stems the entire economy of exchange within the treatment. Freud’s dialectical 
reversals – the constant returning to Dora’s words – is another form of gift in that it 
allows a different perspective of truth be uncovered – slowly working towards the gift 
of transference. However, in this case, as has previously been stated, the 
countertransference caused the analysis to fail because Freud’s returns (dialectical 
reversals) were not aimed at the right words in Dora’s development of truths.  On the 
whole, the back and forth exchange between developments of truth and dialectical 
reversals are gifts in as much as they contribute to the continuation of economic 
exchange. It can be further argued that Lacan’s critique of transference and tightly 
constructed paradigm of countertransference parallels the series of gifts that appear   245
within Freud’s case study, offering us the sense that what are exchanged are a series 
of gifts and countergifts – all given on the basis of expecting reciprocity.  
 
There are further transferential processes found in sites that belong to the cultural 
order - sites of power and knowledge, and specifically here, sites of gift exchange. 
Invested in the cultural order is this sense of transference which foregrounds 
individual sites (such as that of the gift and the debt) as transferential processes. 
Psychoanalysis - the site of therapy - uses transference to progress towards a lifting of 
repressions and a working through of the unconscious. This function of 
transferentiality within a psychoanalytic situation is similar to the process of giving. 
Gift giving, like psychoanalysis, operates on the illusory concept that its status is not 
recognised - not 'seen'. The gift can be acknowledged, like the process of analysis, but 
it is important that both the giftness and transference is not acknowledged. It is a 
game that is played out in keeping with codes from the cultural order. The paradox 
present within the gift exists in transference. To acknowledge the transference is to 
thwart it. Freud argues that an analyst cannot direct the analysand's attention to the 
undertaking of transference. The entire issue of transference (and countertransference) 
cannot be brought into direct focus as its function is to bring “what is unconscious 
into what is conscious, we lift the repressions, we remove the preconditions for the 
formation of the symptoms, we transform the pathogenic conflict into a normal one 
for which it must be possible somehow to find a solution” (Freud 1986:486). It is in 
hindsight that Freud argues that he should have directed Dora (and thus the treatment) 
to transference - her transference. 
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If Dora can be read as a late 19
th century Viennese love story, with affections 
involving all characters, including (especially) Freud himself, the transferences in this 
case study can be said to appear as gifts and countergifts displaying love and the lack 
of love. In Lacan’s view, “as soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists 
somewhere ... there is transference” (Lacan 1978:232). The initial transference that 
occurs in Dora comes from Dora's own infancy. Dora's stereotype plate was formed 
through the love she had for her father. Each following object-choice and object-
relation was based on this infantile imago. Dora's love for Herr K. was transference 
from the love she had for her father. During analysis, the analysand transfers their 
desires onto the analyst, creating an intimate relationship of transference-love, infused 
with issues of power and authority. Through this final transference (from those 
presented to us in the case study) of Dora's affections to Freud as analyst, the 
unconscious repressions present in Dora's object-choice and object-relationship begin 
to emerge. It is through her transference that the complexity of her varying object-
choices becomes clear. The transference within the psychoanalytic situation 
corresponds to the dialectical relationship that occurs between the gift and the debt 
within an act of exchange as the process of giving also follows a predetermined 
pattern that adheres to a structure of object-choice and object-relations. The giver 
transfers their desires onto the gift intended for the receiver. In effect, the gift chosen 
reflects the desire/s of the giver - they give want they would like to receive. The size, 
the expense and all other mitigating factors, which contribute to the gift-choice, are 
directly relative to the gift-relation. The occasion, the relationship between giver and 
receiver, are just as specific and important to the gift-choice as the relationship 
between analysand and analyst. The variables in each situation are dependant on   247
power and authority and a precedent of respective transferences.
4 A certain resonance 
exists regarding Derrida’s claim that the consciousness of giving reflects “narcissistic 
gratitude” (Derrida 1994:23) particularly with the current focus on psychoanalysis – 
where reflecting on one’s self and identity invites a certain form of necessary 
narcissism that can be found within giving.  
 
7.2 Transference as gift 
 
On the analyst's acknowledgement of the analysand's transference during the analysis, 
the dynamics of the gift have been actualised. The transference is posited in the realm 
of the gift and the analyst's countertransference is posited in the realm of debt. This 
situation depends on a reversibility that enables a continuation of transference and 
giving. For example, the analysand's transference begins as a gift to the analyst whose 
countertransference is enacted in turn. As a response to this countertransference, and 
due to previous object-relationships, the analysand unconsciously interprets the 
countertransference as transference - that is, the situation is interpreted as a love-
relationship. There is no distinction between types of transference-love at this point. 
Indeed Robyn Ferrell discusses the differences between transference and love in her 
book, Passion in Theory, asking “[w]hat is the difference between transference and 
love? Superficially, it is 'anything which is excessive' - it is that part of any relation 
where libido protrudes” (Ferrell 1996:50). 
 
Declaring the transference as gift brings into question the analysand's position in 
relation to the analyst. The relations of power become the stage for the transference 
between both subjects in the analytic relationship. From the initial positioning of 
                                                             
4Certain points are taken up in chapter three where Foucault’s theory of power is discussed in terms of 
subjectivity and investment.     248
power relations, where the analysand appears as subordinate to the analyst, the 
process of transference is read through and operates within a site of power and 
authority and a site of power and knowledge. The analysand has automatically placed 
the analyst in the position of the sujet supposé savoir, imbuing the analyst with the 
presupposed gift of knowledge and power through the initial transference. There is no 
greater example of the sujet supposé savoir than Freud, especially in the case study of 
Dora. “As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere ... there is 
transference ... [Freud] was not only the subject who was supposed to know. He did 
know, and he gave us this knowledge in terms that may be said to be indestructible” 
(Lacan 1986:232). Lacan's sujet supposé savoir is the psychoanalyst. Through their 
training the psychoanalyst, it is argued, becomes the one who should know. Despite 
this knowledge however, the analyst is given all intimate details to help and add to the 
ubiquity of knowledge. "He must know, to him must be transmitted, through actual 
experience, what it is all about" (Lacan 1986:231). The analysand places the analyst 
in the position of knowledge, awaiting their ‘cure’. The analytic situation depends on 
this investment in the analyst’s capacity as sujet supposé savoir, even to the extent 
that the analyst begins to believe that they know. This was part of Freud's dilemma 
and failure in Dora’s case study. The desire of the psychoanalyst, intrinsic to their 
position as sujet supposé savoir is the trust from the analysand. Freud let his desire 
limit and complicates the psychoanalytic treatment and in a sense disrupted the 
economic dialogue between analyst and analysand because he did not return the 
‘right’ words, or as Lacan argues, did not interpret the developments of truth 
correctly. 
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Transference helps to define the subjectivity that forms within the analytic situation. 
In locating the sujet supposé savoir, the analysand locates himself or herself, as they 
are able to create their identity based on their investment in analytic exchange. In the 
gift-giving process, through contextualising the giver in terms of receiving and 
reciprocity, the gift itself becomes the object that locates sites of subjectivity. As the 
analysand uses the transference in psychoanalysis to help situate them, the giver uses 
the gift in gift exchange to establish their identity and the ensuing role of the receiver. 
The subjectivity of giver also sets up the role of receiver and obligations of 
reciprocity, becoming the giver that is supposed to know. Each gifting becomes a site 
that depends on this investment and recognition of subjectivity. Invested in each 
subject position is the relationship of subject formation. In response to the position of 
the analyst as sujet supposé savoir, the analysand’s subjectivity depends on the 
dialogue within treatment, their subjectivity forms through the exchange in dialogue 
both in relations of power and knowledge.   
 
The gift marks the point of investment of subjectivity in the relation between giver 
and receiver, as it allows the positions of giving and taking to recycle. In terms of 
Freudian psychoanalysis, it is repressed behaviour that is repeated or recycled within 
the transference. The object that signifies gift exchange is relatively insignificant 
compared to what it actually represents. The gift (or rather it is the representation of 
giftness) symbolises the capacity within gift exchange for renewal found in the 
excesses of history and repetition. In investing in the gift – or the exchange – the giver 
and receiver are investing in the cycle of exchanging subjectivities. Such a 
relationship of exchange parallels the sujet supposé savoir and analysand. Here both 
adopt subjectivities of giver and receiver – the sujet supposé savoir (analyst) as giver   250
of knowledge and interpretation, whereas the analysand is positioned as the receiver 
of such knowledge and interpretation. When reversed or exchanged, the positions of 
subjectivity can be read as analysand as giver of ‘words’ that the analyst receives in 
order to interpret and become the sujet supposé savoir. What this exchanging, 
reversing and shifting of subjectivities within the analytic situation (and within gift 
exchange) is arguing is that no subjectivity is intact and the act of giving is a subject-
stabilising attempt to produce a sense of intactness. In The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, Freud gives an example of unconscious motivations and in the 
destruction of an object. Walking past a vase given as a gift Freud’s elbow knocks the 
object, smashing it to the ground. For Freud this destruction originates from his 
unacknowledged dislike of the gift-giver. This can be read as an unconscious tactic 
for the preservation of the subject through the denial of such despised gifts. The vase 
effectively threatens Freud’s subjectivity and his seemingly accidental breaking of it 
is motivated by the desire to preserve the self. This comparison can be extended 
further when one recalls that, in the essay on humour, Freud argues that the role of 
humour is to allow the superego to comfort the ego and protect it from external harm. 
This is part of the intactness of the subject and gift giving. 
 
Their choice of gift needs to be recognised so that their subjectivity remains intact.  
The gift signifies the formation of subjectivity through its 'unveiling', as in revealing 
itself, the gift establishes certain relationships within gift exchange, between subject 
and Other, the Other and the gift, the gift and subject; but concurrently loses its 
giftness, “[t]he question is first, for each subject, where he takes his bearings from 
when applying to the subject who is supposed to know. Whenever this function may 
be, for the analyst, the transference ... is established” (Lacan 1986:233). For Lacan,   251
the analyst is the object of transference. Lacan argues that the analysand's lack of 
confidence in the initial phase of analysis "is the threat that the psychoanalyst may be 
deceived by him", (Lacan 1986:233) this is the threat of aphanisis. By the analysand 
being able to deceive the analyst - the analyst is no longer the sujet supposé savoir 
thus breaking down the transference, and the analysand is no longer able to invest 
his/her subjectivity in the analytic situation. The analysand is confronted with the fear 
of the loss of treatment as signifier that has come to represent their subjectivity. As 
will be discussed later, Cixous’s conception of appropriation is formed on this 
premise of loss. Cixous believes this framing of economy has been “erected from a 
fear that, in fact, is typically masculine: the fear of expropriation, separation, of losing 
the attribute” (Cixous 1986:80). Lacan's argument is that the subject (analysand/giver 
in this example) invests certain signifiers with immense psychical value, so that their 
loss (or threatening loss) represents a loss of identity - here specifically in analysis 
and gift exchange.  
 
Once the analysand has begun their psychoanalytic treatment, the circular economy of 
words has begun, signaling the process of exchange. Arguing countertransference (as 
a series of developments of truth and dialectical reversals) precedes positive 
transference is a strictly Lacanian approach. The countertransference for Lacan is the 
intervention on transference. However in order to argue transference as gift, it must be 
read as being part of the treatment within psychoanalysis. Ferrell claims that 
“transference then is more than a by-product of analysis; it becomes the vehicle of the 
treatment” (Ferrell 1996:51). Therefore, transference is present in the analysand’s 
developments of truth as without the trust in the analyst as sujet supposé savoir there 
is no dialogic basis for a return to their words. Transference works alongside   252
countertransference as the vehicle of the treatment. Lacan argues that in analysis, “the 
subject is, strictly speaking, constituted through a discourse, to which the mere 
presence of the psychoanalyst brings, before any intervention, the dimension, the 
dimension of dialogue” (Lacan 1985:93). As Freud states, "transference is an 
inevitable necessity. Practical experience...shows conclusively that there is no means 
of avoiding it" (Freud 1983:158). Transference as gift performs the same purpose as 
‘vehicle’ in that it affords the analyst and the analysand a site for exchange. In 
becoming the sujet supposé savoir, the analyst is empowered by the analysand and 
similarly in receiving the gift, the receiver empowers the giver. This exchange 
operates on the economy of the movement of the gift and in this way the gift (object 
that is given) is a vehicle for gift exchange. It is as though the gift allows the entire 
process of gift exchange to occur on the premise that its existence is overlooked. In 
the same way, the transference enables treatment to succeed but cannot be 
foregrounded within analysis.   
 
By placing transference as gift, the analyst's countertransference is questioned in 
terms of debt. In Freud's Dora, we find an example of how, by focusing on one aspect 
of a connection (in this case transference) another is ignored and/or not seen. 
Transferential processes and the process of the gift (which also necessarily includes 
the process of transferring the gift – that is the agency of giftness) operate under a veil 
as through only not announcing their presence can they continue to function. Once 
each becomes apparent, the dynamics shift and each process ends. The analysis ceases 
to continue and the gift no longer exists.  Freud argues that "transference, which 
seems ordained to be the greatest obstacle to psychoanalysis, becomes its most 
powerful ally, if its presence can be detected each time and explained to the patient"   253
(Freud 1983:159). However, part of transference is resistance and in lifting the 
repressed, unconscious desires of the analysand into their conscious, transference is 
always being destroyed. As Lacan has noted, Freud's countertransference was ignored 
and Freud wrote the case study of Dora in hindsight, allowing him to construct the 
narrative with the transferential process in the foreground. However, not even in the 
background does Freud acknowledge or cite his countertransference as part of the 
analysis, despite its direct influence on his interpretation of the transference within 
Dora and his relation with the analysand overall. This unbalanced interpretation (due 
to Freud's own transference-love) causes Freud to consider his part in the reason for 
Dora's cancellation of treatment. He distinguishes between a negative and positive 
transference in psychoanalysis and attributes his failure of Dora’s analysis to not 
being able to ascertain a positive transference, “I did not succeed in mastering the 
transference in good time” (Freud 1983:160). His conception of a positive 
transference was to explain to the analysand his/her own transferences rather than also 
acknowledge his own countertransference, “I ought to have listened to the warning 
myself. ‘Now’, I ought to have said to her, ‘it is from Herr K. that you have made a 
transference on to me’” (Freud 1983:160). This statement is indirectly asserting 
Freud's countertransference as he has placed himself in the position of Herr K - whom 
he has thought to have been the object of Dora's affections. In stating he should have 
explained Dora's transference on to him. Freud is reaffirming his transference-love for 
Dora. Aside from Freud's analytical conclusions, his reasons for Dora's premature 
cessation of treatment have a particularly acidic undertone to them. In explaining the 
reasons for his failure as an analyst, Freud offers the reader a partial scorned lover’s 
excuse. 
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If cruel impulses and revengeful motives, which have already been used in the 
patient's ordinary life for maintaining her symptoms, become transferred on to 
the physician during treatment, before he has had time to detach the from 
himself ... then it is not to be wondered at if the patient's condition is 
unaffected by his therapeutic efforts. 
 (Freud, 1983:162) 
 
The structure of transference and countertransference and the dialectic of the gift and 
the debt reveal a psychical exchange between analyst and analysand and also between 
the giver and receiver. Part of the argument here is that transference isn’t simply a 
metaphor or model of the gift, but it can only function and make sense in a context of 
giftness. In this way, Freud’s problem with Dora’s ‘dismissal’ of him like a servant is 
because she has refused a gift, and in doing so directly challenges Freud’s 
subjectivity. That such a challenge is embedded in ambiguity once more illustrates the 
impossibility of the gift and its polysemic nature. Such impossibility and polysemes 
produce a resistance to meaning that comes to define giftness. This contrived 
psychical exchange highlights respective ambiguities within each relationship. In such 
relationships one engages in the analysis of how the gift/debt circular economy 
operates within the impossible.  
 
Before these comparisons between transference and countertransference and gift and 
debt can continue, the gift needs to be contextualised in terms of exchange, power-
relations and gender positioning. Hélène Cixous’s consideration of the gift allows the 
thesis to consider the gift within a gendered economic frame. Comparing her 
perspective to Derrida's, we find the question of the gift adopts a stronger socio-
cultural resonance reflecting more than simple exchange or ambiguous presence. 
Cixous’s argument disrupts the problematic of the gift in a number of ways, not the 
least being how it should be theorised. Considering the circular ambiguity of the gift   255
and the definition of giving subjectivities, allows us to move on to discuss Derrida’s 
idiom of the impossible possibility of the gift.  
 
 
7.3 The circular ambiguity 
 
Derrida argues that there is no such thing as a gift. For him it exists within, and 
typifies, the realm of the impossible, “the gift is the impossible. Not impossible but 
the impossible. The very figure of the impossible. It announces itself, gives itself to be 
thought as the impossible” (Derrida 1994c:7). The premise of Derrida's argument 
rests on the recognition of the function and the forgetting of the gift within gift 
exchange. He argues the gift does not exist in the process of exchange, but rather 
exists concurrently with debt. If a gift is to exist there must be no return. 
For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, 
countergift, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to give me 
back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift, whether this 
restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by a complex calculation 
of a long-term deferral or differance. 
(Derrida 1994c:12) 
 
The structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss is important to the whole 
formation of the 'exchange-value' of the gift, particularly within Derrida’s framing. 
Briefly, Lévi-Strauss differs between "two types of reciprocity, to which [he] gave the 
names restricted exchange and generalized exchange, restricted exchange being 
possible only in an even number of groups, generalised exchange being compatible 
with any number of groups" (Lévi-Strauss 1963:150). Concerning the gift, exchange 
functions as more of a generalised restrictive exchange, generalised because the gift 
applies to all situations, and restrictive because of its repetitive circular economy. 
Lévi-Strauss acknowledges this on pages 150-151 in Structural Anthropology (1963).   256
He decides that his distinction between restricted and generalised exchange was 
"naive, because it is still to close to the native's classifications...it is more reasonable 
and more efficient to treat restricted exchange as a specialised case of generalised 
exchange" (Lévi-Strauss 1963:150-151). Thus Lévi-Strauss acknowledges that 
exchange cannot be represented in a dualism (hence neither can the gift), rather it is a 
"guise [through which exchange] vainly tr[ies] to masquerade [in]" (Lévi-Strauss 
1963:151). Champetier also notes that Derrida’s refusal to simultaneously deal with 
irreducible duality of gift and debt viewing “the gift as the indivisible part of a cycle 
of the circulation of commodities grounded on destitution and restitution – places 
Derrida in direct, conscious, and acknowledged opposition to the anthropological and 
ethnological tradition” (Champetier 2001:16). Champetier claims that Derrida repeats 
Lévi-Strauss’s critique in assuming the generalised exchange by viewing the hau as 
the “‘causal non-causal factor’ of the gift” (Champetier 2001:16). The interest of 
Champetier’s claim here exists in the interpretive gesture of gift economy. A key 
element that arises is that interpretation and interaction with something as 
intersubjective as the gift is predicated on constant potential misinterpretation.  The 
inescapable Derridean legacy that any discussion of the gift owes a debt to is that his 
work reflects some of Mauss’s own conclusions, such as the “[g]oodness and 
happiness in the peace that has been imposed … in the mutual respect and 
reciprocating generosity that is taught by education” (Mauss 1990:83).  
 
Derrida claims, “[a]t stake is a certain circle whose figure precipitates both time and 
the gift toward the possibility of their impossibility” (Derrida 1994c:6). Derrida 
relates the gift to economy through this circle motif, creating parallels of exchange 
and circulation. By creating this correlation of circle and gift, Derrida implies that   257
within the concept of the gift lies its own economy. The gift does not belong to an 
economy; rather it creates its own through the laws of return and exchange, “This 
motif of circulation can lead on to think that the law of economy is the - circular - 
return to the point of departure, to the origin, also to the home” (Derrida 1994c:6-7). 
This returns us to one of the most prevailing themes of the thesis, the paradox of the 
gift. The ambiguity that surrounds the gift emerges not from its definition but from 
the presence or lack of recognition. Ironically, this recognition is critical to the 
machinations of the gift. The gift and the debt belong to the same process of exchange 
but form two different sides, and whilst the act of giving can be acknowledged and 
celebrated, the presence of the gift cannot. However the debt that belies the gift must 
be acknowledged in order for the economy of gift to continue. It is the previously 
argued excesses of history and repetition that forms this debt present in the gift and 
the circle of gift exchange relies on the countergift (debt), as without return the gift 
cannot be 'acknowledged' and the economy of exchange ceases. This ambiguity is 
heightened when the gift's circular exchange is broken, through an act of donation for 
example. However, in order to be aware of donation, one has to be aware of how to 
primarily recognise the gift. Most donations today are tax deductible or arguably 
morally deductible. The donation can be masked as a gift to oneself, cancelling out a 
previous tax debt or balancing out a prior moral misdemeanor. In terms of charity, 
donations function as circular gifts of good will and higher morality. To give in 
donation is culturally regarded as a good rather than selfish act - by giving you are 
also giving to yourself. In his famous work on blood relations, The Gift Relationship. 
From Human Blood to Social Policy (1974), Richard Titmuss argues that the gift of 
blood operates within a similar range of selfless/selfish acts, yet this is not the specific 
focus or direction of the thesis here.    258
 
Gendering Economy 
 
Derrida argues that in order for the gift to exist independently of its individual 
economy, “it must not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be 
exhausted, as a gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of the circle in the 
form of return to the point of departure” (Derrida 1994c:7). The Derridean use of 
economy embraces the value of home (oikos) and law (nomos), allowing him to draw 
on the economic relativity of distribution and partition. Here Derrida is 
acknowledging a debt to the Hegelian nomos and autos, working to outline an 
economy and law of the self and other, and at the same time establishing the 
implication of acquisition and property. This signifies a symbolic exchange where 
questions of return, origin and self are attached to issues of appropriation, economy 
and exchange. And perhaps this is why Cixous sees the economy of the gift within a 
gendered context. For Cixous, it is not the subjectivities that are involved with the gift 
(specific of giver and receiver) that are gendered, but rather the economy of the gift. It 
is within the interpretation of the gift economy that is read as masculine or feminine. 
In his paper Logics of the Gift in Cixous and Nietzsche: Can we still be generous?,   
Schrift states, “[a]ccording to Cixous, current economic realities operate within what 
she calls ‘L’Empire du Propre,’ the ‘Empire of the Selfsame/Proper.’” (Schrift 
2001:116).  Schrift critiques the possible economy of generosity via a comparative 
analysis of Cixous and Nietzsche, his discussion regarding the validity of Cixous’s 
gender distinction is of particular interest here.  
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In Castration or Decapitation? (1981), Cixous claims that the economy of the proper, 
if based on foregrounding reciprocity as an economy of the propre, possession of 
private property and the need to accumulate, are reflective of a fear of loss. It is this 
fear of expropriation that Cixous sees as masculine. In Sorties: Out and Out: 
Attacks/Ways Out/Forays (1989), Cixous outlines her qualification of the masculine 
with reference to the gift, “[the masculine economy] always turn the gift into the gift-
that-takes … [and] brings in a return. Loss, at the end of a curved line, is turned inot 
its opposite and comes back to him as profit” (Cixous, 1989:87). Her reference to the 
‘curved line’ is an engagement with Derrida’s configuration of the gift and 
specifically refers to the issue of time that rules the economic dynamic. For Cixous, if 
the economy is to operate as masculine, time will always incite return, both in terms 
of expectation and obligation. This takes up the issues of feminine and masculine 
subjectivities that, as Schrift points out, Cixous sees as risky: 
  Cixous is aware of the risks of linking economy to anatomy in a way that 
  suggests essentialism … she continues to use the qualifiers ‘masculine’ and 
  ‘feminine’ is reference to economies because she regards these qualifiers as 
  culturally operative signs that must be acknowledged if the forces that animate 
  them are to be challenged and changed. 
(Schrift 2001:117) 
 
In order for a gift to exist, Derrida claims its presence cannot be recognised. A 
masculine economy of the gift waits for its return and its recognition. Once this 
occurs, the gift enters into the discourse of circular economy of debt, countergift and 
annulment, “according to the same circular ring that leads to 'giving back' ["rendre"], 
there is payment and discharge of a debt” (Derrida 1994c:12).  Yet there is an instant 
wherein the gift can exist outside the confines of its economical exchange. This enters 
into Derrida's argument of time concerning the gift and its 'instant'. Derrida's 
argument is that the possibility of the gift rests on “the instant all circulation will have   260
been interrupted and on the condition of the instant” (Derrida 1994c:9); this instant 
exists as the focal point of the circular economy, what Cixous would argue supports a 
masculine economy, embodying both the gift's possibility and impossibility. This 
instant of time sustains the separation of giver to gift (or self and other) through the 
constant denial of a pure gift. This distinction between the relationship of self and 
other is also derived from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit where, Cixous forms her 
gendered distinction on the same foundations of the acquisition of property.  
 
As time passes the ambiguity that surrounds the gift appears in the method of 
recognition regarding the gift, debt, and the process of exchange. This 'instant' of 
possibility that Derrida argues lies at the core of the economy of the gift. The 
economy/circle of the gift is polysemic, encompassing the gift's possibility with much 
impossibility. A possible gift is that which is unrecognisable, an impossible gift is that 
which is recognisable; intimating that a gift's possibility exists through its 
impossibility and vice versa. The gift's presence is its ambiguity. The possible gift is 
clear from debt and exchange yet, as the ring of ambiguity and impossibility 
surrounds it, it can never be realised, “[t]here would be a gift only at the instant when 
the paradoxical instant (in the sense in which Kierkegaard says of the paradoxical 
instant of decision that it is madness) tears time apart. In this sense one would never 
have the time of a gift” (Derrida 1994c:9). It is vital that the gift remains outside the 
constraints of time, as time is what destroys giftness, always suggesting return and 
reciprocity. This is further discussed later in the section.  
 
Cixous claims, “[w]ho could ever think of the gift as a gift-that-takes? Who else but 
man, precisely the one who would like to take everything?” (Cixous 1976:888).   261
Cixous's category of gift as feminine economy is not offered in opposition to 
Derrida’s masculine economy but as an alternative ironically provided precisely by 
the exclusion of phallocentrism. The lack of woman, their non-position is what 
Cixous sees as an essential element of creating a feminine economy, “[i]f there is a 
‘propriety of woman’, it is paradoxically her capacity to depropriate unselfishly: 
body, without end, without appendage, without principal ‘parts’” (Cixous 1976:889). 
Cixous contends that it is the masculine that views the gift in terms of debt and it is 
the feminine that views the gift in terms of lack of debt. Schrift notes that this form 
and non-position of woman-as-lack is want Cixous “wants to link to the possibility of 
writing” (Schrift 2001:118). Part of the giving economy, whether feminine or 
masculine, engages with a desire to produce. It is of no surprise that Cixous likens a 
feminine gift economy to écriture feminine as she sees the exclusion of woman as the 
very condition for writing and forming a separate feminine economy. In The Author in 
Truth (1991), Cixous further qualifies her idea of feminine economy in terms of 
writing and interestingly draws on a paradox similar to Derrida’s gift. The feminine is 
“the economy of positive lack” (Cixous 1991:164) and is simultaneously negative and 
positive, yet not at the consequence of negation. What emerges is a likeable 
irreducible duality that is present within the Derridean gift aporia.
5  
 
Cixous deliberately uses the French voler to implement its concurrent meanings of 'to 
fly' and 'to steal' with respect to the status of woman. Within the structure of this 
theoretical dialectic it is possible to read the gift in the Cixousian term of voler, 
                                                             
5 This separation of purpose regarding gift economies has been made before, most notably with the 
Derrida’s analysis of the gift. With Given Time we have an analysis of the gift that invites other 
discursive engagement, different to traditional anthropological writings. Even within anthropology 
there exists two disciplines regarding treatment of gift exchange– as commodity and as personal gifts. 
(Weiner 1976, Strathern, 1988, Lévi-Strauss 1963, Titmuss (1974) and Gregory 1982). Indeed the 
literature that exists now on the gift reflects a completely different set of research disciplines from 
theology analysis (Caputo 1997, Horner 2001) to critical theory (Baudrillard 1993, Lyotard 1993).   262
particularly with regards to the gift as feminine economy. Cixous argues that woman 
has been stolen within phallologocentric discourse and that she has been ignored and 
forced to exist and act within a masculine economy. “What woman hasn't 
flown/stolen? Who hasn't felt, dreamt, performed that gesture that jams sociality? 
...Who, by some act of transgression, hasn't overthrown successiveness, connection, 
the wall of circumfusion?” (Cixous 1976:887-888; italics added). If woman's actions 
within a masculine economy are prescriptive of transgressions, then so too is the gift 
she engages with. However, Cixous argues that woman must free herself from 
patriarchal discourse - here the double meaning of voler comes into play. Woman 
must fly. By flying away from masculine economy and freeing herself of all its 
constraints ‘that jam sociality’, woman is able to establish her own gift, nor longer 
defined by masculine parameters of binaries or laws. 
 
Cixous argues that a feminine economy reverses the Derridean definition of the gift. 
Within écriture feminine, the means through which a feminine economy can be 
realised, woman will no longer “appear as the one who is taken for; the bait in person, 
all veils unfurled, the one who doesn't give but who gives only in order to (take)” 
(Cixous 1976:888n). Rather woman's gift will transcend the structure of exchange and 
return. Woman will steal back from masculine economy in order to “dash through and 
to ‘fly’” (Cixous 1976:887) and implement her own debt-free gift. Voler demonstrates 
the gift because it should be impossible to steal a gift – that which is stolen is not a 
gift. Cixous’s point must be that the two economies (masculine and feminine) steal 
the signifiers of the gift from one another and in doing so negate the very qualities of 
giftness. It is not difficult to see how this would be applied in different contexts – the 
stealing of culturally defined gifts, for example. Cixous's gift as femininely inscribed   263
gives rise to a larger argument of power and authority when paralleled with Derrida's 
gift, defined within a masculine economy. 
 
The economic debate between Derrida and Cixous has certain significance for the gift 
and debt when related to transference and countertransference. In Dora, both Freud 
and Dora embody the categories of gift and debt within the analytic situation, as well 
as illustrate certain gender stereotypes. The power structure in this particular 
psychoanalytic situation appears to benefit Freud through his position as analyst and 
render Dora in a less empowered position through her as analysand. From the 
perspective of sexual difference, it appears as though Freud manipulates his masculine 
position and dominates Dora’s culturally ‘inferior’ feminine position.  However 
through the transference and countertransference, these occupations of place and 
space, relationships of power, and manipulations of gender become ambiguous. 
Dora's transference seems to be indicative of a potential disempowerment - yet 
Freud's own countertransference carries its own loss of power. As argued, Dora's 
transference functions as a gift as she ‘gives’ Freud the power to cure her hysteria and 
direct her treatment, through placing him in the position of the subject who is 
supposed to know. Dora's transference is a gift of knowledge to Freud, both as analyst 
and also as a gift to the masculine. From the first to the second dream, Dora is the 
disempowered analysand and female in distress. Towards the end of the second 
dream, the power relations begin to reverse between Freud and Dora. Freud's 
countertransference is the countergift (the debt), signaling the reversal of gift and debt 
and his masculinity (and personal need to be loved or desired by Dora) clouds his 
interpretation.  
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In this particular example, Freud's countertransference is indicative of debt as it 
presents itself in response to Dora's transference. Through his inability to detect his 
own countertransference, Freud loses his primary power as analyst. In a moment that 
Cixous would enjoy, Dora is empowered and in response to Freud’s inability to affect 
a positive transference, takes control of her treatment through her independent 
decision to end it. By not registering his countertransference, Freud also does not 
open his mind to other possible transferences and limits his interpretation to the 
possible transference between himself and Herr K, “transference took me unawares ... 
because of the unknown quantity in me which reminded Dora of Herr K., she took her 
revenge on me as she wanted to take her revenge on him, and deserted me as she 
believed herself to have been deceived and deserted by him”(Freud 1983:161). The 
emotion of Freud's words ('revenge', 'deserted') indicates that the blindness to his 
countertransference interrupted the analysis. Freud's writing up of the case study was 
done in hindsight and still his countertransference goes undetected. This invites the 
possibility for countertransference to be placed in the position of both gift and debt. It 
functions as debt when intervening (as Lacan would argue) or responding to the 
transference, yet as Freud was unaware of his transference, does this indicate that his 
debt is a possible gift rather than impossible? The recognition of the gift returns to the 
Derridean notion of ambiguity. The possibility of the gift represented in its non-
recognition and its impossibility represented in ambiguous recognition. 
 
Correlating transference and countertransference to the respective gift economy, the 
implication arises that countertransference is a ‘given’ concerning the presence of 
transference. Without transference there is no countertransference, but more 
importantly, transference cannot exist independently from countertransference. The   265
relationship of transference and countertransference holds intrinsic notions of giving 
and taking, power and authority - all of which are infused with ambiguity. Ambiguity 
is dependent on the constant reversibility of transference and countertransference and 
the gift and the debt - highlighting the impossible nature of the gift. 
 
7.4 The Impossible Possible, The Possible Impossible 
 
Recognition of the gift is the key to its impossibility. For without recognition the gift 
is able to remain possible, “the simple identification of the gift seems to destroy it” 
(Derrida 1994c:14). As the gift is susceptible to multiple semiotic coding, so too is it 
open to multiple readings of how it is rendered. As multiple readings of the gift occur, 
for example the gift existing in both transference and countertransference 
concurrently as gift and as debt, its ambiguity is prominent and hence its 
impossibility. To explicate the impossibility of the gift even further, we need not look 
past the varying hermeneutic arguments from Cixous, Derrida and Lacan. Cixous 
interprets the gift as a gift-that-does-not-take, whereas Derrida sees the gift as a gift-
which-takes. For Lacan, his interpretation of the gift can be realised through applying 
his discussion of the sujet supposé savoir - placing the gift as the gift of knowledge. 
 
The gift is impossible for Derrida because of its ritual of debt. Through this ritual, 
Derrida explores concepts of forgetting, truth and desire in relation to the gift as 
dependant on time. It becomes apparent within these parameters of the Derridean gift 
economy that the gift is possible because of its impossibility. Derrida writes, “there is 
gift, if there is any, only in what interrupts the system as well as the symbol, in a 
partition without return and without division [répartition], without being-with-self of   266
the gift-counter-gift” (Derrida 1994c:13). If the gift is to give anything for Derrida 
then it is that which supports it as masculine economy – time, “the given of the gift 
arrives, if it arrives, only in narrative” (Derrida 1994c:41). Whereas Cixous's gift 
interrupts the system as it waits for no return and is not dependant on time. The gift in 
a feminine economy does not forget that it is a gift and does not give with the desire 
of reciprocity. Rather this feminine gift gives freely within a discourse that has 
already stolen and taken from woman. Cixous's gift is able to interrupt the system, as 
it exists outside of masculine economical parameters, indebting itself not to debt but 
rather to its absence. What can be seen as striking contrasts between Derrida and 
Cixous are more striking as similarities. Both theorists recognise the gift in terms of 
debt (or lack) but it is how their debt is linked to recognition that defines their gift's 
impossibility/possibility. Hence the two dialectics can be presented as inter-
dependent, that of the gift/debt and the possible/impossible (no in respective order). 
Cixous recognises the gift as that which expects no return and Derrida views the gift 
as relying on return. 
 
Each theorist, regardless of return, invokes the concept of exchange. Cixous's 
exchange appears in terms of lack. Her gift exists because it has no debt. Derrida's 
exchange is dependent on debt; his economy is because of the gift/debt relation. What 
is ironic is that whilst these are the premises of each claim, both are argued from a 
reverse standpoint. Cixous - to negate the debt within gift - reasons from a strict 
possibility of the gift, to emphasis its impossibility with masculine economy. Derrida 
- to reinforce debt and negate the gift – claims an impossible gift, to emphasise its 
dependence on return.  Derrida's notion of forgetting implies an alteration regarding 
the possible impossibility of the gift. If one does not remember that they are giving,   267
then a gift exists? Derrida argues that “the forgetting ... if it is constitutive of the gift, 
is no longer a category of the psyche. It cannot be unrelated to the forgetting of Being, 
in the sense in which Blanchot also says, more or less, that forgetting is another name 
of Being” (Derrida 1994c:23). To forget implies knowledge and knowledge is 
recognition. On this level the gift, according to Derrida, would be annulled. Therefore 
to state the gift as impossible, its possibility must be considered, for what is 
impossible if it is not possible? Derrida circumscribes the gift's possibility to the 
realm of the instant and then defines the instant as impossible, “[t]he truth of the gift 
... suffices to annul the gift ... The truth of the gift is equivalent to the non-gift or to 
the non-truth of the gift ... That is why it is caught in the impossible of a very singular 
double bind, the bond without bond of a bind and a non-bind” (Derrida 1994c:27). 
 
This illustrates that even in the situation of donation, where one assumes that the 
donor is not expecting a return, there is no instant wherein a memory without the gift 
exists. For the instant wherein the gift is possible, it is also made impossible through 
the acknowledgement of its giving. The donor realises that they are giving regardless 
of the fact that no material countergift is expected. This is the split-instant where the 
gift becomes possible through its impossibility, and impossible through its possibility. 
 
Cixous would respond that no impossibility is attached to the gift - her feminine gift. 
Cixous also equates her gift with woman's love, “[s]he gives that there may be life, 
though transformation ... [w]herever she loves, all the old concepts of management 
are left behind” (Cixous 1976:893). Thus, to call the gift impossible, to state it exists 
without the desire of return, is to call love impossible and state that it exists without   268
the desire of return.
6 Derrida argues in a direct diametric “a gift without wanting, 
without wanting-to-say, an insignificant gift, a gift without the intention to give? Why 
would we still call that a gift? That, which is to say what?” (Derrida 1994c:27). 
Herein lies the recognition of the inevitable impossibility of the gift. Both Derrida and 
Cixous discuss the concept of the gift within their own separate economies 
determining their possibility and impossibility based on how each is recognised. 
 
To measure the impossibility of the gift, its possibility needs to be considered. In this 
sense the relation between gift and desire provides enough scope for the conception of 
the possible impossible and impossible possible to surface. 
 
For finally, if the gift is another name of the impossible, we still think it, we 
name it, we desire it. We intend it. And this even if or because or to the extent 
that we never encounter it, we never know it, we never verify it, we never 
experience it in its present existence or in its phenomenon. 
(Derrida 1994c:29) 
What enables this reversing dialectic to exist is the ambiguity that serves to validate 
and concurrently refute the gift. This ambiguity is what defines Derrida’s gift. While 
Derrida contends that the gift is impossible, he considers its possibility despite its 
existence being confined to the instant - the instant where possibility and impossibility 
meet. Cixous's theory of the feminine gift, the gift-which-does-not-take, gives 
credence to the notion of the impossible possible. Within a feminine economy, gift - 
with all its ties to lack and debt - exists “[e]lsewhere, [where] she gives” (Cixous 
1976:893). What becomes clear is that it is the recognition or non-recognition of the 
gift that defines its possibility and impossibility. The gift is possible through 
impossibility and impossible through its possibility. Schrift asks the question: 
                                                             
6 This idea engages with the Barthesian concept of I-love-you wherein "I-love-you has no 'elsewhere' ... 
I-love-you is not a sentence; it does not transmit meaning, but fastens onto a limit situation" (Barthes 
1990:148).   269
  [i]f we depart from the more traditional accounts of gift exchange that 
  presuppose a misrecognition or forgetting of the debt that its reception entails, 
  would this allow us to avoid describing gift-giving practices as a 
  misrecognition of what is in reality reciprocal exchange? 
(Schrift 2001:120) 
 
He is questioning the imposition and limitation of these Hegelian ideals that are 
applied to the economic aesthetic of the gift, seeking a freedom from “the 
oppositional logic of ‘self vs. all others’” (Schrift 2001:120). Schrift is clearly 
reflecting his Nietzschian and Cixousian bias here, yet his questions are significant if 
we are to truly listen to Cixous’s alternative logic of the gift.   270
Notes towards a Conclusion: On Giftness 
 
The relationship between the gift and giftness is a precarious one. On presentation, the 
gift demands recognition even amidst discursive instability. The connection between 
giftness and the gift operates as a meaningful intentionality in a highly unstable 
signifying process and in doing so produces a series of consequences. Fundamental to 
this is that the gift circulates as a cultural force. In other words the gift is determined 
not by its signifiers, but the reciprocity of cultural relations that are formed through its 
existence. The gift circulates, and in doing so enables the circulation of other cultural 
forces. This is due in part to the sliding nature of the gift in terms of its meaning: Who 
can ever really know what a gift means? Who can ever be sure of the exchange 
system of a gift? And it is due in part because of the demands made by the gift 
process. The gift may reside in presents (to speak literally) but its presence must 
always remain uncertain. Meaning is arrested through the gift system, which in turn 
brings into question how the gift can be represented at all. 
 
To understand the gift, then, involves more than noting its modes of representation. 
The life cycles of the gift (including the cultural constructions of giftness) operate in 
terms of discursive practices, where enunciating the gift is invested in social spaces, 
transgressive moments, and the formation of subject positions. And it is precisely 
because of this glissement that the space of the gift becomes located outside of, 
underneath, and beside the dominant cultural orders. Even the most complacent, most 
hegemonic gift harbours disruption because it feeds into those spaces located as 
otherness – the liminal, utopic, carnivalesque, and disturbing. In doing so the gift’s 
reciprocity comes to challenge social space and the praxis of subjectivity. 
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The reason for this disturbance is because within the slide of meaning and 
interpretation, within the moments of gift giving and receiving, exists a domain of 
pleasure and play that is paradoxical. The paradox of repetition and the fort-da of play 
produce a critique of the frame that encircles the gift process. Subjectivities become 
invested in the gift, and because the gift resists interpretation, a certain type of fear is 
produced. The desire attached to the gift becomes transferral, and the investment 
becomes one of power and knowledge. In such contexts all relationships become part 
of giftness, all interaction become modalities of exchange. The political economy 
(examples include the state’s gift of security against outside threat and the 
preservation of the Law), the body (as clean and proper, as abject, as the sign of 
punishment and visibility), and the visual text are part of the enunciation of the gift, as 
well as how the gift enunciates these cultural discourses. 
 
And yet despite all of these complex relations, errors of reading, disturbances of 
space, the gift remains one of the most profound and sustained social processes. 
Cultures, and the subjectivities within them, need the gift for a great many reasons. 
Not the least of these is because the gift defines relationships. Cultures (including 
their visual formations) define themselves through their giftness; subjectivities are 
formed according to the ways in which they are positioned as givers or receivers. 
Even in the most destabilised of examples, the gift remains attached to the ways in 
which a culture produces meaning for itself. The capacity to give remains embedded 
in the identification of both culture and subject. Without such a capacity all that is left 
is demand. 
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